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ABSTRACT




Recent studies have found a large earnings premium to attending a more selective college, but
the mechanisms underlying this premium have received little attention and remain unclear. In order
to shed light on this question, in Chapter I I develop a multi-dimensional signaling model relying
on college grades and selectivity that rationalizes students’ choices of effort and firms’ wage-setting
behavior. The model is then used to produce predictions of how the interaction of the signals should
be related to wages. Using five data sets that span the early 1960s through the late 2000s, I show
that the data support the predictions of the signaling model, with support growing stronger over
time.
Chapter II explores how high school graduate men and women vary in their behavioral responses
to beginning labor market entry during a recession. In contrast with previous related literature
that found a substantial negative wage impact but minimal employment impact in samples of highly
educated men, the empirical evidence presented here suggests a different outcome for the less well
educated, and between the sexes. Women, but not men, who graduate high school in an adverse
labor market are less likely to be in the workforce for the next four years, but longer-term effects
are minimal. Further, while men increase their enrollment as a short-run response to weak labor
demand, women do not; instead, they appear temporarily to substitute into home production.
Women’s wages are less affected than men’s, and both groups’ wages are less affected than the
college graduates previously studied.
Decades of research on the U.S. gender gap in wages describes its correlates, but little is known
about why women changed their career paths in the 1960s and 1970s. Chapter III, joint with Martha
J. Bailey and Amalia R. Miller, investigates the role of “the Pill” in altering womens human capital
investments and its ultimate implications for life-cycle wages. Using state-by-birth-cohort variation
viii
in legal access, we show that younger access to the Pill conferred an 8 percent hourly wage premium
by age fifty. Our estimates imply that the Pill can account for 10 percent of the convergence the
gender gap in the 1980s and 30 percent in the 1990s.
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CHAPTER I
Worker Signals Among New College Graduates: The Role of
Selectivity and GPA
1.1 Introduction
Recently, there has been a sizable interest in the return to attending a more selective or prestigious
college. Several studies have tried to identify empirically the private returns to going to a selective
school, with most finding that attending a more prestigious school does indeed have a causal, positive
impact on lifetime earnings. However, there has been little attention as to why. Given that annual
U.S. higher education expenditures are over $460 billion, but per-student expenditures increase
dramatically with college selectivity, understanding why students who attend selective colleges earn
more over their lifetimes has dramatic implications for how those dollars are optimally allocated.1
The goal of this paper is to propose a specific mechanism for the college selectivity premium—a
model of signaling—that can rationalize observed behavior.
Several factors make signaling in particular a compelling explanation for the premium. First,
the relatively few studies that have attempted to measure student learning in college have found
little difference across types of colleges once pre-college characteristics are controlled for (Pascarella
and Terenzini 2005; Arum and Roksa 2011). While it is not clear how the “learning” measured
in these studies relates to productivity on the job, this evidence suggests colleges may boost the
wages of their graduates in ways other than through value added. Second, the growing literature on
how employers learn about worker productivity has emphasized that this process is not immediate
but occurs over time, with employers often attempting to learn about an applicant’s latent ability
through measures that are immediately observable, such as education or race. In this context, as
the share of the labor force that are college graduates has risen, it seems reasonable that firms would
1Digest of Education Statistics, 2010 edition, table 29; Hoxby (2009).
1
sort workers not just through quantity of education but through perceived measures of quality of
education, as well. Finally, and related, human resources and cognitive psychology surveys have
documented that recruiters looking to hire new college graduates not only actively screen applicants
by college attended and grade point average, but that these measures positively correlate with on-
the-job performance (McKinney and Miles 2009). Together, these findings point to the importance
of examining how college selectivity and college grades are jointly determined and how employers
use these measures in wage setting.
This paper makes two substantive contributions toward understanding the college selectivity
premium. First, it develops a novel, multi-dimensional signaling model of ability between college
graduate workers and prospective employers. In equilibrium, the utility-maximizing behavior of
these agents leads to a specific—and empirically testable—relationship between the two dimensions
of the signal, college selectivity and grade point average (GPA), and starting wages. While the full
model is elaborate, the crux is intuitive. Students sort into different colleges by ability, and this
means that college selectivity is a valuable signal of ability to employers. If graduating from a more
selective school sends a more precise signal of ability than graduating from a less selective school, the
marginal informational benefit of an additional signal, such as GPA, is reduced. When it comes to
wage setting, we would expect the relative weight firms place on the GPA signal to be lower at more
selective colleges. Consequently, the change in log wages with respect to a change in GPA should
be smaller the higher is selectivity. Furthermore, the ability sorting across college types also implies
that the selectivity premium should fall as GPA rises. The intuition here is high-GPA students
benefit less from attending a selective school because they have demonstrated their ability through
their GPA; but for a lower-GPA student at a selective college, firms will discount the noisier signal
and place more weight on the college type.
Second, the paper empirically tests the implications of the model. Employing five nationally
representative data sets that span five decades, I consistently find strong support for the predictions
of my signaling model. The return on GPA is lower at selective colleges and falls as the threshold
of selectivity rises. The selectivity premium is highest for those with lower GPAs and declines as
GPA rises. Moreover, both of these phenomena have become more pronounced over time as ability
sorting across colleges has increased.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review some of the recent literature on the
returns to college selectivity and employers learning about workers. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 develop,
characterize solutions, and derive predictions for a multi-dimensional signaling model in the context
of college graduate workers whose productivity firms cannot perfectly observe. Section 1.5 describes
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the data sets and empirical methodology that are used to explore and test the implications of the
model, while Section 1.6 presents the results of these tests. The last section concludes.
1.2 A Literature Review
The earliest studies attempting to measure the return to college selectivity or quality in the
U.S. context date to the early 1970s and are primarily based on a non-representative sample of
skilled (male) World War II military veterans (Wales 1973, Psacharopoulos 1974). Conditioning on
observables (including measures of cognitive ability), these early papers find a sizable wage premium
in mid-career among respondents who attended colleges in the top fifth of the quality distribution.
While Wales discusses several possible explanations for the premium, the data do not allow him to
identify which of the explanations drive the results. More recent work has taken advantage of more
representative data and advances in identification methods. Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg (1999) and
Hoxby (2001) attempt to correct for selection on unobservables using nationally representative data,
and find a selectivity premium that appears to have grown over time. Black and Smith (2006) use
NLSY79 data and several approaches for identification, with their preferred GMM method yielding a
selectivity premium that is smaller than the earlier studies, but still statistically significant. Perhaps
the most credible identification comes from Hoekstra (2009), who employs regression discontinuity
designs based on a test cutoff for admission to a (specific) selective college. He finds a larger premium
than in previous work. Dale and Krueger (2002) are unusual in employing a data set only of students
at selective colleges and controlling for the schools to which an individual was accepted; perhaps as
a result, theirs is the only paper to find no wage premium from attending a more selective college.
Each of these papers tacitly assumes a world of perfect information in which productivity is
directly known by employers, and the objective is to isolate the return to college quality from
the return to latent individual ability. However, there is a growing body of work that suggests
productivity is not immediately known but must be learned over time. This employer learning
literature was begun by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and applied in the (quantity of) education
context by Lange and Topel (2006), Lange (2007), and Arcidiacono, Bayer, and Hizmo (2010).
These latter papers conclude that employers learn about the underlying productivity of workers
relatively rapidly, especially in the case of college graduates. However, their findings suggest it is
possible that, by examining earnings several years if not decades after graduation, the returns-to-
college-quality studies conflate the initial premium with revelation of ability or productivity over
time.
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The existing theoretical work on the returns to college quality makes similar assumptions of
perfect information. In particular, several papers argue that the concomitant increases in ability
sorting and school resources experienced by higher ability students can be explained by positive
complementarities in student ability and resources in human capital acquisition (Rothschild and
White 1995; Epple, Romano, and Sieg 2006; Courant, Resch, and Sallee 2008). The basic line of
thinking in these models is that the learning of high ability students is enhanced when they are
around other high-ability students and resources (better faculty, libraries, etc.), and firms observe
this greater human capital acquisition and pay the students for it. There has been little empirical
evaluation of this class of hypotheses, however, as credible identification is elusive.
More recently, there is a single paper to my knowledge that investigates a signaling mechanism
empirically. Lang and Siniver (2011) investigate the returns to attending the more selective of two
universities in Israel that have courses taught by common faculty and that share resources. Using
a regression discontinuity design, they find a significant premium to attending the more selective
institution and, given the common faculty and other resources, argue that the result is consistent
with a quality signal framework. However, they cannot fully control for the possibility of peer effects,
and it is unclear whether their results generalize when there is a larger set of schools or apply in
the U.S. context, which has a far greater number of institutions of higher education. Thus, there is
ample room for further work in exploring signaling in the college selectivity context.
1.3 A Multi-dimensional Signaling Model of Latent Ability
Consider the labor market between firms and new college graduates they wish to employ. In the
United States, this labor market is large, with over 1.5 million graduates annually, more than 75
percent of whom are working full-time one year after graduation.2 The market is also well-developed
and competitive, as evidenced by the popularity of career fairs at colleges and geographical mobility
of recent graduates (Malamud and Wozniak, 2008). Below, I lay out a model that illustrates how
signaling can affect the interactions of these college graduates and firms.
In order to focus on the behavior of students, I assume that firms are homogeneous. Prospective
workers (i.e., students), on the other hand, vary in their ability, η ∼ N(0, 1), and this trait affects
the worker’s productivity to firms.3 While students can observe their own ability, the firms cannot.
Instead, in the spirit of Spence (1973), the firms observe imperfect signals of ability that are chosen
2Digest of Education Statistics, tables 268 and 391.
3“Ability” as used here need not be thought of purely as cognitive ability, but a combination of cognitive and noncog-
nitive abilities mapped to a single dimension. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) show in their Table S3 that
measures of cognitive and noncognitive ability are positively correlated.
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by the students. These signals, for example, might appear on a potential worker’s résumé, be
transmitted during a job interview, or appear in the form of references or letters of recommendation.
While there may be many such signals, two of note are the undergraduate grade point average (GPA),
and the prestige, reputation, or selectivity (SEL) of the degree-granting college. Because most new
college graduates have limited prior working experience, both of these measures tend to feature
prominently in their résumés, which often serve as the first set of information observed by firms
when hiring new workers.4
Employers care about these signals because they can be used to form expectations about a
worker’s productivity. Using this information set, the firm offers a wage to the worker based on
its beliefs. From the perspective of a student, increasing the value of these signals is costly—and
more costly for those of lower ability—but doing so makes the individual look more productive to
prospective employers, and thus can increase the anticipated wage offer. The behaviors of these
agents are described more formally below.
1.3.1 Firm’s Problem
Let the production function of a new worker i at time t be given by
(1.1) ln yit = ait + ρtηit + εit,
where ln y is the natural logarithm of output. The individual-specific intercept ait represents char-
acteristics about worker i other than ability that affect productivity (e.g., through type of job),
that may vary over time due to changes in technology or discrimination, and that are observable
to both the firm and the econometrician. These characteristics include features such as the major
or field of study at college, race, and sex. The scaling factor ρt is a positive parameter that mea-
sures how closely ability, ηit, is related to productivity and which may also vary over time as the
importance of skill (or ability) in production changes. Finally, εit is a normally-distributed random
disturbance term that is meant to capture other individual characteristics independent of ability
that influence productivity (e.g., luck, random match quality) that are observable to the firm but
not the econometrician.
The objective of the firm is to set a wage policy in order to maximize expected profits from a
4McKinney and Miles (2009) review several studies that validate the use of these signals by recruiters at colleges. Indeed,
college career office web sites highlight the importance of these two pieces of information by suggesting they feature
most prominently on the résumé (http://www.careercenter.umich.edu/students/resume/sectionexplanations.
html). This is consistent with most hiring comprising a multi-stage process, with the first stage consisting of an
initial screening of the résumé.
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new college graduate worker. Competition among firms, however, ensures that profits are zero in
expectation, and so
(1.2) wit(GPAit, SELit) = ait + ρtE[ηit | GPAit, SELit] + εit,
where wit represents log wages. The firm’s wage schedule depends on how it forms an expectation of
a worker’s ability given both the GPA and selectivity signals, and this will be a function of optimal
student behavior.
1.3.2 Student’s Problem
The student faces a two-stage problem. In the first stage, which occurs during high school, she
is concerned with the type, or selectivity, of college she will attend. (As the labor market of interest
is new college graduate workers, the effective student population includes only those who graduate
from college and then enter the workforce.) For simplicity, suppose there are two types of colleges,
indexed by j and denoted selective (j = 1) and less selective (j = 0), respectively. While admission
to the less selective type is guaranteed, entrance to selective schools is competitive and requires
effort, e1 ∈ [0,∞), from the student.
Let P (e1) equal the probability of getting into college type j = 1 given effort level e1. The
function P (·) is described by:
(1.3) P (e1) =

ε if e1 < ẽ1
f(e1); f
′(e1) > 0, f
′′(e1) < 0, lime1→∞ f(e1) = 1 if e1 ≥ ẽ1.
For effort levels below some threshold ẽ1, the probability of admittance into the selective tier of
colleges is fixed at ε, which is assumed to be close to zero.5 Only for effort levels above ẽ1 does the
likelihood of admittance begin to increase, and in a concave fashion. The probability function thus
allows for non-smooth returns to effort, as might be the case under certain admit/reject rules at
selective colleges (Toor, 2001).
Effort, which here can be thought of as the time and energy put into studying during high school,
is costly. However, students find exerting a given amount of effort less costly the greater is their
5The ε term is a simplification meant to capture students who may gain entry to selective schools through non-
academically competitive means, such as legacies and scholarship athletes.
6








where α1, α2, and α3 are each positive constants.
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In the second stage, the student has observed the admission outcome and knows what type of
college she will attend.7 At the chosen college type, she must again decide how hard to work,
e2 ∈ [0,∞), but this time the outcome of interest is her grade point average (GPA), a summary
measure of academic performance. GPA is an affine function of effort, but there is a random noise
additive component as well. This error term is independent of effort (and ability) and may reflect
personality matches between the student and the professor, arbitrary grading, or simple luck. Thus,
(1.5) GPA(e2) = γ1 + γ2e2 + ν; ν ∼ N(0, σ2ν),
where γ1 and γ2 are positive constants. In writing the GPA-effort relationship this way I have made
two assumptions. First, GPA is related linearly to effort. This is problematic in the sense that GPA
is typically measured on a bounded 4-point scale and equation (1.5) allows for an unbounded GPA.
However, as long as optimal effort levels are in a suitably restricted range, the unboundedness issue
should not be a major concern.8 Second, the GPA function is independent of college type. It turns
out the qualitative implications of the model are not affected by this restriction (see Appendix 1.B),
and so I proceed for now under (1.5).





where δ1 and δ2 are each positive constants.
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Combining both stages, the student’s objective can be written
(1.7) Maxe1,e2 Ui = w (SEL(e1), GPA(e2))− C1(e1; η)− C2(e2; η),
where w is the log wage earned conditional on GPA and SEL, an indicator variable for whether
6The value of α1 is such that η + α1 > 0 for all but a trivially small range of η.
7In equilibrium, there is a wage premium from attending the selective type, and students’ beliefs behave accordingly.
8Related is that the boundedness of GPA implies ν is not strictly independent of effort. Empirically, this seems to be
trivial, however, with approximately 1 percent of individuals recording the maximum 4.0 GPA. As such, I treat this
issue as ignorable.
9The value of δ1 is such that η + δ1 > 0 for all but a trivially small range of η.
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j = 1, and the η subscripts in the cost functions reflect their dependence on a student’s ability.10
1.3.3 Solution Characteristics
The student’s problem can be solved with backward induction, beginning with the second stage.









The student equates the marginal cost of exerting effort with the marginal benefit of higher wages
resulting from a higher grade point average. The student’s belief of how the wage offer changes
with GPA, and how this relationship may differ by college selectivity, is key to determining optimal
effort. If the belief is that wage changes linearly with GPA, then ∂w(·)∂GPA
∣∣∣
SEL=j
is a constant (which
may differ for j = {0, 1}), and optimal effort rises linearly with a student’s ability.11 This leads to
the common-sense prediction that, within a school type, average GPA should be higher among the
higher ability students.





























under the assumption that ∂w(·)∂GPA
∣∣∣
SEL=j
is a constant kj . (I discuss the empirical validity of this
assumption, as well as the linearity of GPA in ability, in Appendix 1.C.)
Returning to the first stage, although the GPA function is unrelated to college type, there may
be complementarity between the two stages if k0 6= k1. Suppose, for example, that k0 > k1. Then
an individual with ability ηi will expend more effort in the second stage at a less selective college
than at a selective one, and earn a higher expected GPA. The situation would be reversed if k1 > k0.
Acknowledging this possible complementarity, the first-order condition for the first stage is:






10Equation 1.7 assumes students are risk neutral. In Appendix 1.C, I briefly sketch how behavior changes when agents
are risk-averse.
11Optimal effort e∗2 is rising in η as long as
∂w(·)
∂GPA








0 if α2η+α1 +
α3ẽ1
η+α1
> f ′(ẽ1) (w(E[GPAj=1,η], SELj=1)− w(E[GPAj=0,η], SELj=0))
e∗1
∣∣∣ α2η+α1 + α3e∗1η+α1 = f ′(e∗1) (w(E[GPAj=1,η], SELj=1)− w(E[GPAj=0,η], SELj=0)) , else.
Because the transition to a different selectivity college is possibly associated with a change in ex-
pected GPA, the return to moving from a less selective to more selective institution is not simply
the partial derivative (technically, discrete change) of log wages with respect to selectivity but must
include the expected change in GPA as well. In the first-order condition, this return is expressed
as the discrete change in the wage as both arguments change, and it is multiplied by the change in
probability of admission that comes with increased effort. For a (unique) interior solution to exist,
this probability-weighted return must be at least equal to the marginal cost of effort at the threshold
ẽ1, where the likelihood of admission begins to rise.
The solution can perhaps best be explained graphically, as in Figure 1.1. For the sake of expo-
sition, the figure plots marginal cost and benefit curves for three ability types: high (ηH), medium
(ηM ), and low (ηL). Equation (1.4) implies that that marginal cost of effort has both the slope and
intercept decreasing in ability. The marginal benefit curves (dashed) capture the expected return
to moving from a less to more selective institution, weighted by the change in admission probability
from increased effort. For effort levels less than ẽ1, there is no change in admission probability from
increasing effort, and so the marginal benefit curve has a value of zero. For higher effort levels, the
concavity of f(·), the probability of admission to the selective tier, ensures that the marginal benefit
curves are downward sloping. It remains, though, to characterize the net return from moving from
a less selective to more selective college.
Notably, for a fixed ability level, the expected return from switching selectivity levels is a constant,
since the expected GPA arguments in the wage equation are themselves constants by second stage
optimization. However, across ability levels, this expected return will vary. Since the difference in
expected GPA between selectivity tiers is larger the higher is ability,12 higher ability types experience
a larger change in the net return from the GPA component when switching selectivity tiers. If
k1 < k0, this means higher ability types enjoy a smaller expected wage gain when moving to the
more selective tier. This effectively lowers the slope of the marginal benefit curve, as shown in the
figure. (If, instead, k1 = k0, the marginal benefit curves would be identical across ability, and if
k1 > k0, the slope of the marginal benefit curve would become steeper as ability rises.)
Three things bear mentioning. First, students below some ability threshold (denoted η̃ and







Figure 1.1: Student’s First State Solution











implicitly defined by (1.10)) do not find it worthwhile to expend any effort in the first stage. (This
characterization is shown for ηL in the figure.) Only a trivial fraction of these students (ε of them)
will be admitted and attend the selective tier of colleges. Second, for students above this threshold,
optimal effort is rising in ability under relatively weak conditions.13 Third, the threshold η̃ is rising
in ẽ. (Appendix 1.A provides proofs.) The first two features together imply that the likelihood of
gaining admission (and attending) selective schools is rising in ability. The third feature implies,
sensibly, that when more effort is required to increase the probability of gaining admittance to
selective schools, only increasingly higher ability students will find it worthwhile to do so.
1.4 Firm Expectations of Student Ability and Predictions
1.4.1 Moment Expectations
For a given η̃ the features described above lead to the following propositions:
Proposition 1: Mean ability is higher at more selective schools.
13Marginal cost must decline in ability faster than does the wage premium from the endogenous reduction in expected
GPA.
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Proposition 2: A higher ability threshold, η̃, leads to a larger difference in mean ability
between more and less selective schools.14
Proposition 3: A higher ability threshold, η̃, leads to a lower variance in ability at more
selective schools.
Proposition 4: Variance in ability is lower at more selective schools when η̃ > 0.
Proofs: Appendix 1.A.2
Intuitively, because students who attempt selective entry are of higher average ability than those
who do not, selective colleges will have higher ability students on average. Furthermore, raising
the ability threshold for applying must amplify the average ability gap, as the applicant pool for
selective colleges will shrink proportionately more than the less selective pool will grow.
It also follows that the variance of ability, conditional on the student having graduated from the
selective tier, is falling in η̃. This occurs nearly mechanically; a higher minimum threshold reduces
the fraction of the student population who find it worthwhile to exert effort in the first stage, and
so the conditional variance falls as a result. More generally, it is not necessarily the case that the
variance of ability at the selective tier is smaller than at the less-selective tier for all values of η̃.
When η̃ > 0 this will necessarily be true, as less than half the ability distribution “applies” to the
selective schools and not all of them will get in. When η̃ < 0, whether the conditional variance is
smaller at the selective tier will depend on the shape of f(·), which will affect the skewness of ability
distributions across school types. However, in the data used in this study far fewer than half of the
eventual college graduates reported applying to the selective tier, so it seems reasonable that η̃ > 0
and the variance of ability is smaller at the selective tier.
How do firms incorporate both selectivity and GPA into their expectations? Recall that an
optimizing student’s GPA is linear in η plus a normally distributed, independent error term. If η is
normally distributed, conditional on selectivity, then GPA, as the sum of two independent normal
random variables, is normally distributed as well, and GPA and η are jointly distributed as bivariate
normal. As documented by Aigner and Cain (1977), among others, this would imply that the
conditional expectation of ability given selectivity and GPA is of the form:







The conditional expectation of ability given both selectivity and GPA is linear in GPA, with both
the slope and intercept varying by selectivity tier.15
14This assumes the factors that brought about the change in η̃ were exogenous; see Hoxby (2009) and section 1.4.3
below for evidence to this effect.
15Of course, bivariate normality is unlikely to hold exactly, as the necessary sorting by ability would occur only under
a specific f(·). Yet this assumption may not be a poor one. If the distribution of η is reasonably close to normal at
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It follows from equation (1.2) that log wages at a given time (t subscript suppressed) are given
by:




















where ψj is a function of the structural parameters that depends on j, and σ
2
ηj is the variance in




















It was assumed earlier that, according to students’ beliefs,
∂wij
∂GPAij
= kj . In the context of (1.13), a



















≡ h(kj) = kj .
Since h(·) is continuous in kj , is plausibly bounded on a closed interval, and maps to its own domain
by assumption, kj exists by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
1.4.2 Cross-sectional Predictions




η0 , by (1.14) k1 6= k0. Yet, the same equation makes it
possible, for certain parameter values, for either k1 > k0 or k1 < k0. It turns out, however, that any
possible equilibrium with k1 > k0 cannot be supported as a (perfect Bayesian) Nash equilibrium.
Suppose k1 > k0, such that the return on GPA is higher at selective colleges. Then firms must believe
that, on average, the increase in ability from a one-point rise in GPA is higher at selective colleges
than at less selective colleges. But it has already been shown that the variance in ability is smaller
at selective colleges. (Indeed, this is verified empirically in Table 1.1.) With a smaller variance in
ability, but a fixed GPA range, it is not rational to believe that a unit change in GPA corresponds
to a larger increase in ability at selective colleges. Therefore, k1 > k0 is not a valid equilibrium.
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Thus the only surviving equilibrium has k1 < k0. This leads to the following prediction.
both selectivity tiers, then GPA at each tier should be approximately normal as well. In Appendix Figures 1 through




















, with ζj ≡ γ42k2j δ
−2
2 .
17For k1 to be greater than k0, the necessary condition is that the ratio of the ability-GPA covariance to the variance
of GPA is larger at more selective schools (see (1.11). This is strongly rejected in every data set.
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PREDICTION 1: The return on GPA should be higher at less selective schools than at more
selective schools.
Moreover, if the threshold η̃ is increased, the resulting variance in ability at selective schools, σ2η1 ,
will be smaller. As σ2ν and other parameters remain unchanged, however, the strength of the GPA
signal at selective schools will decline further, and thus so will k1 relative to k0.
18 Thus, there exists
the next prediction.
PREDICTION 2: As the selectivity threshold becomes more restrictive (η̃ increases), the differ-
ence in the GPA returns between less selective and more selective schools should increase.
By taking equation (1.12) and differencing between selective and less selective colleges and then
taking the derivative with respect to GPA, one can show that the selectivity premium is a linear
function of GPA with slope k1−k0. Since it has been argued that k1 < k0, there is another prediction:
PREDICTION 3: The selectivity premium is falling in GPA whenever k1 < k0.
1.4.3 Trend Predictions
In addition to generating these predictions in a cross-section, the model can also be used to
investigate the integration of the college market over the past 40 years that has been thoroughly
documented by Hoxby (2009). In effect, reductions in communication, transportation, and infor-
mation costs have nationalized (or even globalized) the college market in a way that has allowed
selective colleges to become more discriminating in which students they accept. In the context of
the model, the measure of the student population has increased faster than the supply of slots at
selective colleges. For the market to clear, the “price” of admission also needs to have risen, or, put
differently, the minimum first-stage effort threshold, ẽ, has increased.19 But, as was shown earlier,
a rise in ẽ leads to a higher η̃, and this in turn yields a higher conditional expectation and lower
conditional variance of ability at selective schools.




















18See Appendix 1.C.3, “Bounding the variance of ν” for an exercise that relates the magnitudes of σ2GPA1 and σ
2
ν .
19Bound, Hershbein, and Long (2009) discuss these changes in more detail and provide extensive evidence that measures
of high school effort have increased greatly among those who attend and apply to selective colleges. They also show
that in the absence of this increased effort, the probability of admission to selective colleges would have fallen over
time.
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Since σ2η1 should be falling, this implies that the return on GPA at more selective colleges should
decline as ability sorting increases.
Additionally, Murnane et al. (1995) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), among others, have
documented a rising return to skill or ability since the 1980s. In the context of the model, this
corresponds to a rise in ρt, the association between ability and productivity. While equation (1.14)
clearly shows that the return on GPA is rising in ρ, it should be noted that the effect is more
pronounced the larger is kj . It follows that the return on GPA should have increased faster at less
selective schools than at more selective schools. Combining the changes in σ2η1 and ρ produces
prediction 4:
PREDICTION 4: The difference in the return on GPA at less selective and more selective schools
should grow larger over time.
1.5 Data and Empirical Strategy
1.5.1 Data
To test the implications derived above, I use three panel surveys of students conducted by the
National Center for Education Statistics: the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class
of 1972 (NLS72), the High School and Beyond (HSB), and the National Education Longitudinal
Study (NELS). These data are supplemented by two additional data sets: Project Talent (PT) and
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997 (NLSY97). Each of these nationally representative
data sets tracks students beginning in secondary school, following them through postsecondary
education and the transition into the workforce. They contain detailed information on postsecondary
schools attended, degrees earned, course grades, and job characteristics. They also contain the results
of an aptitude test battery administered to the students during adolescence, typically the senior
year of high school; this score can be used as a measure of ability.20 Importantly, the restricted-
access versions of these data sets, used in this paper, allow the identification of all post-secondary
institutions attended and, for the NCES data, have complete post-secondary transcript data for
students who reported attending a post-secondary institution. Each survey is similar in scope
and types of questions asked but covers cohorts roughly 10 years apart—college graduates in the
mid 1960s (PT), late 1970s (NLS72), late 1980s (HSB), late 1990s (NELS), and mid-to-late 2000s
(NLSY97). They thus facilitate analyses for pooled cohorts that span 40 years and longitudinal
20As these were low-stakes tests, the ability measure picks up both non-cognitive as well as cognitive abilities.
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analyses across cohorts.21 The data appendix discusses the sampling frame of these surveys in more
detail.
As the focus of analysis is new college graduate workers, in each data set the sample is restricted
to individuals who had earned their bachelor’s degree at U.S. institutions within 6 years of high
school graduation and began a job after earning their bachelor’s degree.22 Furthermore, at the
time of beginning their post-college graduation job, they must have earned no additional (graduate)
degree, not have been enrolled in school, been working for pay with real (year 2005) hourly earnings
between 5 and 100 dollars, and have been neither self-employed nor in the military. Last, college GPA
and the bachelor-degree-granting institution must be identifiable for the respondent.23 Appendix
Table 1.1 contains more detailed information on how the restrictions affect the sample size for each
data set.
Empirical analysis of the theoretical model described in Sections 1.3 and 1.4 rests on a practical
measure of college selectivity. The primary measure of college selectivity used in this paper is drawn
from the competitiveness index from Barron’s Profile of American Colleges. Each year, Barron’s
classifies nearly all four-year colleges and universities in the country into six categories according
to their admissions selectivity. The criteria used to classify colleges includes median ACT or SAT
scores for the most recent freshman class, minimum grade point averages and high school class rank
required for admission, and the acceptance rate for applicants to the most recent freshman class.
Using an electronic data set of the Barron’s rankings for the years 1972, 1982, 1992, and 2004 that
was created by Bastedo and Jaquette (2009), I create three different binary indicators for college
selectivity for each of the five data sets. The first of these indicator variables is coded as 1 if the
college is ranked in Barron’s top three categories and 0 otherwise (Tier I); the second is coded as
1 if the college is ranked in Barron’s top two categories and 0 otherwise (Tier II); and the third is
coded as 1 if the college is ranked in Barron’s top category and 0 otherwise (Tier III).
Note that these three tiers are nested; Figure 1.2 provides examples of colleges in each selectivity
tier. The 1972 rankings are used for Project Talent and NLS72 (or 1974 when 1972 rankings are
unavailable), the 1982 rankings for HSB, the 1992 rankings for NELS, and the 2004 rankings for
NLSY97.24
21I have also performed cross-sectional analysis separately for each cohort. Point estimates are qualitatively similar to
those reported in this paper, although they are less precise.
22For students who transfer colleges, the bachelor degree-granting institution is used. Gill and Leigh (2003) find no
wage differences among bachelor degree recipients who began at two- or four-year colleges.
23College GPA is generally taken directly from transcripts and from self-reports when not transcripts were not available.
See the data appendix for details.
24The rankings tend to be fairly consistent over time. The data appendix describes an alternative college selectivity
measure that does not vary over time, and results using this measure are discussed later as a robustness check.
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Figure 6 
Some summary statistics of the estimation samples from each data set can be found in Table 1.1.
A detailed description of these variables is found in the data appendix. In each data set, average log
wages of the post-graduation job typically rise with the selectivity of the institution attended, with
this gradient getting steeper over time. Average grades also consistently rise with selectivity, but
by much less than does either proxy for ability (SAT/ACT percentile or senior test score), which
is consistent with k1 < k0. Additionally, not only is the variance in either ability measure falling
as selectivity rises, but, consistent with the predictions of the model and the empirical argument of
Hoxby (2009), this becomes more pronounced over time.
1.5.2 Methodology
In order to test Predictions 1 through 3, I estimate the following reduced-form of equation (1.12)
separately for each selectivity tier threshold using the pooled data:








where wid is the logarithm of the hourly wage of worker i from data set d, GPA is the college grade
point average, S is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the individual graduated from a selective
college and 0 if she did not, Dd is a dummy for each data set, and Xid is a vector of dummies for
sex, race, and college major. The interaction between Dd and Xid allow the effect of sex, race, and
college major to vary across each data set and capture the ait term in equation (1.1).
25 Because
graduates of the same college presumably had access to similar resources in searching for their post-
graduate job (e.g., the same career office on campus), the idiosyncratic error εid may be correlated
among these students; variance estimation thus allows for this arbitrary within-college correlation.
Except for the addition of the GPA variables, equation (1.16) appears similar to many of the
estimating equations used in the returns-to-college-quality literature. The parameter θ2 represents
the (approximate) percent increase in wages resulting from a one-point increase in GPA at a less-
selective college, and θ3 represents the same at a selective college. According to Prediction 1, θ2 > θ3.
Moreover, as the threshold for selectivity grows higher, Prediction 2 posits that the difference between
θ2 and θ3 should be larger. In practice, this means that we would expect θ̂2 − θ̂3 to be larger when
estimated for Tier II than for Tier I (and similarly for Tier III than for Tier II).
25For consistency across data sets, race is coded as “white”, “black”, or “other”, and college major consists of 11
categories: humanities, social sciences, psychology, life sciences, physical sciences and mathematics, engineering,
education, business, arts, health, and other.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables
Panel A: Pooled
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
GPA 2.966 0.509 3.051 0.505 3.134 0.485 3.232 0.437
Barron's  Tier I: 0.305 0.460 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's Tier II: 0.105 0.307 0.344 0.475 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's  Tier III: 0.031 0.174 0.103 0.304 0.299 0.458 1.000 0.000
Female 0.574 0.495 0.550 0.498 0.522 0.501 0.515 0.501
Black 0.055 0.228 0.034 0.183 0.040 0.195 0.061 0.240
Other race 0.054 0.226 0.067 0.250 0.074 0.262 0.087 0.282
Real wage ($2005) 14.48 7.204 15.58 8.360 16.40 9.810 17.20 11.010
Full-time 0.856 0.351 0.842 0.364 0.810 0.392 0.785 0.412
SAT/ACT percentile 55.6 25.3 68.0 21.5 76.4 19.0 84.2 15.6




Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
GPA 2.624 0.480 2.640 0.514 2.628 0.467 2.565 0.273
Barron's  Tier I: 0.247 0.431 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's Tier II: 0.047 0.213 0.192 0.394 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's  Tier III: 0.004 0.065 0.017 0.131 0.090 0.288 1.000 0.000
Female 0.591 0.492 0.606 0.489 0.517 0.502 0.300 0.481
Black 0.014 0.116 0.004 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Other race 0.011 0.103 0.008 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Real wage ($2005) 13.88 4.454 14.78 4.412 14.60 3.828 13.69 4.290
Full-time 0.924 0.265 0.930 0.255 0.911 0.286 0.715 0.260
SAT/ACT percentile — — — — — — — —
Senior test score 0.629 0.758 1.142 0.584 1.195 0.666 1.698 0.260
Observations
Panel C: NLS72
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
GPA 2.955 0.478 2.981 0.502 3.012 0.525 3.043 0.503
Barron's  Tier I: 0.209 0.407 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's Tier II: 0.053 0.224 0.254 0.435 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's  Tier III: 0.009 0.094 0.043 0.203 0.170 0.377 1.000 0.000
Female 0.515 0.500 0.476 0.500 0.476 0.501 0.459 0.510
Black 0.064 0.244 0.050 0.219 0.058 0.235 0.124 0.337
Other race 0.046 0.210 0.065 0.247 0.045 0.208 0.000 0.000
Real wage ($2005) 14.42 6.857 14.71 6.776 14.94 5.779 15.15 7.219
Full-time 0.879 0.327 0.878 0.328 0.928 0.260 0.843 0.373
SAT/ACT percentile 53.9 26.2 67.6 22.4 75.9 21.9 83.2 20.0
Senior test score 0.740 0.751 1.067 0.667 1.366 0.621 1.498 0.559
Observations 2803 554 138 22
2025 490 122 11
All Tier I Tier II Tier III
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables
All Tier I Tier II Tier III
All Tier I Tier II Tier III
8637 2404 815 231
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Summary Statistics of Selected Variables, cont’d
Panel D: HSB
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
GPA 2.955 0.471 2.973 0.441 3.040 0.440 3.148 0.414
Barron's  Tier I: 0.254 0.436 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's Tier II: 0.105 0.306 0.411 0.493 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's  Tier III: 0.029 0.169 0.115 0.320 0.280 0.451 1.000 0.000
Female 0.575 0.495 0.559 0.497 0.580 0.496 0.414 0.500
Black 0.066 0.248 0.041 0.199 0.056 0.231 0.125 0.336
Other race 0.054 0.225 0.056 0.230 0.045 0.209 0.031 0.175
Real wage ($2005) 12.33 7.579 13.49 9.800 14.85 12.211 14.08 4.749
Full-time 0.826 0.379 0.802 0.399 0.741 0.441 0.814 0.395
SAT/ACT percentile — — — — — — — —
Senior test score 0.732 0.802 1.145 0.652 1.330 0.538 1.709 0.504
Observations
Panel E: NELS
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
GPA 2.994 0.472 3.036 0.462 3.076 0.468 3.093 0.480
Barron's  Tier I: 0.336 0.472 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's Tier II: 0.134 0.341 0.398 0.490 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's  Tier III: 0.044 0.206 0.132 0.339 0.332 0.472 1.000 0.000
Female 0.576 0.494 0.515 0.500 0.463 0.499 0.490 0.502
Black 0.062 0.241 0.033 0.180 0.039 0.193 0.065 0.247
Other race 0.093 0.290 0.131 0.338 0.155 0.362 0.118 0.325
Real wage ($2005) 17.99 8.178 20.29 9.741 22.23 12.298 24.91 16.674
Full-time 0.934 0.248 0.945 0.228 0.934 0.248 0.951 0.216
SAT/ACT percentile 54.8 24.4 68.2 20.6 77.2 18.4 86.5 12.6
Senior test score 0.758 0.727 1.047 0.652 1.279 0.536 1.543 0.373
Observations
Panel F: NLSY97
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
GPA 3.313 0.392 3.351 0.361 3.397 0.344 3.422 0.308
Barron's  Tier I: 0.483 0.500 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's Tier II: 0.189 0.392 0.391 0.489 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's  Tier III: 0.071 0.258 0.148 0.355 0.378 0.487 1.000 0.000
Female 0.613 0.487 0.575 0.495 0.547 0.499 0.594 0.495
Black 0.072 0.258 0.041 0.197 0.036 0.186 0.028 0.164
Other race 0.068 0.252 0.059 0.236 0.060 0.237 0.106 0.308
Real wage ($2005) 13.74 7.128 14.15 7.399 13.90 5.736 14.04 5.006
Full-time 0.710 0.454 0.728 0.445 0.699 0.460 0.662 0.477
SAT/ACT percentile 58.6 24.9 68.2 21.6 75.9 18.3 82.2 16.9
Senior test score 0.810 0.758 1.044 0.709 1.253 0.660 1.308 0.732
Observations
Tier III
829 379 147 56
1078 264 98 33
Notes: Statistics shown  are weighted using sampling weights provided in the data. GPA is measured on a four point scale (0 to 4). Senior test 
scores follow a standard normal distribution (among high school seniors) within each dataset. The number of observations for SAT/ACT 
percentile and Senior test score are less than that shown, as not all sample individuals had these measures (SAT/ACT percentile unavailable in 
PT and HSB). See Data Appendix for variable construction.
All Tier I Tier II Tier III
1902 717 310 109
All Tier I Tier II
Table 1: Summ ry Statistics of Selected Variables, cont'd
All Tier I Tier II Tier III
Notes: Statistics shown are weighted using sampling weights provided in the data. GPA is measured on a four point
scal (0 to 4). Senior test scores follow a standard normal distribution ( mong high school seniors) withi each data
set. The numb r of obs rvati ns for SAT/ACT percentile and Senior test score are less than that shown, as not all
sample individuals had these measures (SAT/ACT percentile unavailable in PT and HSB). See data appendix for
variable construction.
The return to selectivity in equation (1.16) can vary by GPA, something that earlier work in the
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return to college quality did not allow. Specifically, the return to selectivity is given by θ1 − (θ2 −
θ3)GPA. Prediction 3 implies that, since θ2 − θ3 > 0, the return to selectivity falls as GPA rises,
but that it should remain weakly positive at the maximum GPA.
Furthermore, Prediction 4 argued that increasing ability-sorting across colleges and returns to
skill should intensify the first three predictions. To test this hypothesis, I divide the data into an
“early” period consisting of the data sets from the 1960s and 1970s and a “late” period consisting
of the data from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. (This division accords with the findings of growing
returns to skill that began in the 1980s and also balances sample sizes.) I then estimate:
wid =θ0 + θ11Sid + θ12SidLateid + θ21GPAid(1− Sid) + θ22GPAid(1− Sid)Lateid(1.17)







where Lateid equals 1 if the individual is from the HSB, NELS, or NLSY97 data sets, and 0 otherwise.
In this equation, θ21 gives the return on GPA at less selective schools in the early period, θ21 + θ22
gives the return on GPA at less selective schools in the late period, θ31 gives the return on GPA at
more selective schools in the early period, and θ31 + θ32 gives the return on GPA at more selective
schools in the late period. The return to selectivity is given by θ11 − (θ21 − θ31)GPA in the early
period, and by θ11 + θ12 − ((θ21 + θ22)− (θ31 + θ32))GPA in the late period. Prediction 4 asserts
that θ22 > θ32, which implies that the return on GPA has grown faster at less selective schools and
that the return on selectivity, while higher on average, has declined more rapidly with GPA.
1.6 Estimation Results
1.6.1 Pooled Model
Table 1.2 presents the results from estimating equation (1.16) on the pooled data. Columns 1
through 3 use selectivity tier I, II, and III, respectively, on the entire eligible sample, while columns
4 through 6 repeat the analysis on the full-time worker sample. At less selective colleges, the return
on GPA is highly significant at about 9 percent for the whole sample, regardless of the selectivity
threshold. However, these returns are uniformly smaller at selective colleges, and for tier II and tier
III colleges, the returns are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Of course, the standard errors
tend to be much larger for the selective college GPA estimates, especially at the higher tiers, because
the effective sample sizes are so much smaller. Consequently, the null hypothesis that the returns on
GPA are the same across selectivities cannot be rejected at conventional levels in columns 1 through
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3. Nonetheless, the point estimates are fairly close to 0 for selective colleges in columns 2 and 3.
Table 1.2: Log Hourly Wages on GPA by Selectivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selectivity Tier Tier I Tier II Tier III Tier I Tier II Tier III
Sel. Dummy @ GPA=3.0 0.075*** 0.097*** 0.145*** 0.060*** 0.069*** 0.128***
[0.015] [0.025] [0.039] [0.014] [0.022] [0.037]
GPA, less-selective 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.113*** 0.107*** 0.103***
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.012]
GPA, selective 0.069*** 0.023 0.011 0.071*** 0.035 0.016
[0.023] [0.047] [0.069] [0.021] [0.035] [0.077]
p-val for diff 0.326 0.144 0.261 0.079 0.045 0.263
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8637 8637 8637 7580 7580 7580
Adjusted R-squared 0.238 0.236 0.235 0.262 0.260 0.259
Notes: Estimates shown are for OLS regressions using sampling weights and data pooled across all datasets. Standard errors 
(in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for arbitrary correlation of the error term within college. Asterisks 
indicate statistical significance (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
Table 2: Log hourly wages on GPA by selectivity
(Dependent variable is real log hourly wage)
Controls for sex, race, and 
college major?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Esti ates sho n are for OLS regressions using sampling weights and data pooled across all data sets. The
dependent variable in each column is the real log hourly wage. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and allow for arbitrary correlation of the error term within college. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (*
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01)
For the full-time sample, the patterns are remarkably similar. Less selective college graduates
earn a GPA return of 10 to 11 percent, but graduates from selective colleges do not enjoy the same
benefit from a higher GPA. A graduate of a tier I (or higher) school earns only 0.073 log points per
point increase in GPA, and this return is statistically less than that at non-tier I schools at the 10
percent level. The GPA returns fall monotonically as the selectivity threshold increases to tier II
and tier III. The return at tier II is one third the size of less selective schools’, and the difference is
statistically significant at 5 percent. The tier III gap is even more dramatic, although it is not as
precisely estimated.
The pattern of these coefficients and the magnitude of their differences are striking. Furthermore,
these results are reasonably robust to the specific definition of selectivity. Panel A of Appendix Table
1.2, for example, repeats Table 1.2 using the an alternative measure of selectivity suggested by Black
and Smith (2006) that is based on college inputs. The table shows similar, if noisier, patterns. The
data therefore appear to confirm predictions 1 and 2.26
26I have also estimated variants of (1.16) that interact selectivity with the controls for sex, race, and major. These
interaction coefficients typically are small and statistically insignificant for sex and race, although the returns to
social sciences, physical sciences, and engineering (relative to humanities) are larger at selective schools. Allowing
these interactions, however, has minimal effect on the GPA estimates presented above.
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Figure 7: Selectivity premium, by GPA 





Notes: Line markers indicate point-wise statistical significance against a null of 0 at the 5 percent level.  
The selectivity return is statistically significantly different (at 5 percent) for any two GPA values for the 1960s-2000s  
sample and the 1980s-2000s sample, but not the 1960s-1970s sample. 
GPA 
Notes: Line markers indicate point-wise statistical significance against a null of 0 at the 5 percent level.
The selectivity return is tatistic lly significantly different (at 5 percent) for any two GPA values for the
1960s-2000s sample and the 1980s-2000s sample, but not the 1960s-1970s sample.
Although Table 1.2 shows that the selectivity premium estimate is positive and statistically
significant at the mean GPA of 3.0, the return on selectivity implied by equation (1.16) is best
shown graphically. Figure 1.3 plots the selectivity return (in log points) against GPA for full-time
workers using the tier II definition (column 5 of Table 1.2), although using the sample of all workers
or other selectivity thresholds does not appreciably change the picture. Since θ̂2 > θ̂3, the selectivity
return slopes downward. Looking at the pooled 1960s through 2000s sample, students with a GPA
of 2.0, around the 5th percentile of the pooled sample, earn 0.14 log points more at their first job
if they graduated from a selective college, and the marker at this point indicates that this premium
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The premium is reduced to about 7 percent at the
sample mean GPA of 2.97, and although it remains positive for the rest of the GPA distribution, it
ceases to be statistically different from zero at GPAs above 3.2. Perhaps more important, one can
reject that the selectivity premium is the same for any two different GPA points; thus, the 0.14 log
point premium at a GPA of 2.0 is not only different from the 0.07 log point premium at a GPA of
3.0, it is also different from the premium of 0.13 at a GPA of 2.2.27 This confirms prediction 3 and
27The linearity of GPA results in all Wald statistics of selectivity differences across GPA having the same value.
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provides further support for the signaling model.
1.6.2 The Model Over Time
Both the rising return to ability and increased ability sorting at colleges should serve to widen
the gap in GPA returns between selective and less selective colleges (equation 1.15). This is tested
formally in Table 1.3, which is similar to Table 1.2 but provides estimates separately for the 1960s-
1970s and 1980s-2000s periods.
Panel A shows that in the early period, graduates of less selective colleges earned a statistically
significant return on GPA of between 5 and 7 percent. Their counterparts at selective colleges earned
a much lower premium: at tier I colleges, the return is marginally significant at 3 to 4 percent; at
the more selective tier II and tier III colleges, the point estimates are essentially zero. However,
these gaps are small enough in magnitude (and the selective college GPA coefficients are too noisily
measured) that a null of no difference between the groups cannot be rejected.
Switching to panel B and the late period, the coefficient estimates for graduates of less selective
schools are about 0.13 for the whole sample and 0.14 to 0.15 for full-time workers. At tier I colleges,
the GPA return, while statistically significant, is about half this size. For the full sample, the gap
in GPA returns widens from 0.018 in the early period to 0.059 in the late period, roughly tripling,
though the latter difference just fails statistical significance. For full-time workers, however, the gap
rises from 0.030 to 0.071 and is significant at the 10 percent level.
At tier II and III schools, the growth in the gap is more pronounced, largely because the returns
on GPA at these selective schools did not change at all. Among all workers, the tier II gap grows
from 0.046 to a statistically significant 0.136, and the tier III gap increases from 0.078 to 0.137. For
full-time workers, these gaps jump from 0.062 to 0.119 and 0.062 to 0.130. Only the last of these,
owing to the small sample size of tier III grads, fails to be statistically significant.28 Moreover,
these results are robust to using the alternative quality index definition of selectivity, as shown in
Appendix Table 1.2, panels B and C.
28The GPA estimates for less selective colleges are lower when the selectivity threshold is higher because the less selective
group includes the tier I colleges that are not tier II (columns 2 and 5) or the tier II colleges that are not tier III
(columns 3 and 6). If the tier III selective college estimate in panel B is compared with the less selective estimate
from column 4, the two are statistically different at 10 percent.
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Table 1.3: Log Hourly Wages on GPA by Selectivity and Time Period
Panel A: Pooled, early (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selectivity Tier Tier I Tier II Tier III Tier I Tier II Tier III
Sel. Dummy @ GPA=3.0 0.046** 0.021 -0.026 0.046*** 0.021 0.044
[0.020] [0.025] [0.048] [0.016] [0.025] [0.047]
GPA, less-selective 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.061***
[0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014]
GPA, selective 0.033 0.004 -0.030 0.038* 0.002 -0.001
[0.023] [0.036] [0.127] [0.020] [0.042] [0.147]
p-val for diff 0.489 0.236 0.542 0.195 0.155 0.676
Panel B: Pooled, late (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selectivity Tier Tier I Tier II Tier III Tier I Tier II Tier III
Sel. Dummy @ GPA=3.0 0.094*** 0.129*** 0.173*** 0.071*** 0.088*** 0.142***
[0.021] [0.034] [0.048] [0.020] [0.029] [0.044]
GPA, less-selective 0.135*** 0.132*** 0.122*** 0.154*** 0.146*** 0.136***
[0.022] [0.019] [0.020] [0.023] [0.020] [0.019]
GPA, selective 0.076** -0.004 -0.015 0.083** 0.027 0.006
[0.036] [0.067] [0.075] [0.033] [0.044] [0.086]
p-val for diff 0.152 0.048 0.075 0.073 0.012 0.135
p-val for diff-in-diff 0.419 0.235 0.666 0.372 0.323 0.673
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8637 8637 8637 7580 7580 7580
Adjusted R-squared 0.240 0.239 0.237 0.264 0.262 0.261
Table 3: Log hourly wages on GPA by selectivity
(Dependent variable is real log hourly wage)
Yes
Notes: Estimates shown are for OLS regressions using sampling weights. Panel A shows results from the 1960s and 1970s and 
Panel B from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for 
arbitrary correlation of the error term within college. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01).
Controls for sex, race, and 
college major?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Estimates shown are for OLS regressions using sampling weights. The dependent variable in each column is
the real log hourly wage. Panel A shows results from the 1960s and 1970s and Panel B from the 1980s, 1990s, and
2000s. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for arbitrary correlation of the error
term within college. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
When one attempts to measure whether the growth in the GPA return gaps is statistically
significant, this difference-in-difference, while of a non-trivial magnitude, comes up short. Despite
this growth averaging (across selectivity tiers) about 0.06 log points, greater than the GPA returns
at less selectives in the early period, the estimates at selective schools are too noisily measured for
a double difference to have sufficient precision for these data. While a null of no growth in the gap
cannot technically be rejected, the size of the point estimates is suggestive.
Returning to Figure 1.3 and the selectivity premium by GPA, we find that not only has the
selectivity premium risen throughout the GPA range between the 1960s-1970s and 1980s-2000s
periods, but, as a consequence of θ̂22 being larger than θ̂32, the premium’s decline with GPA has
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become more pronounced. The selectivity premium at a GPA of 2.0 increased from 0.083 log points
in the early period to 0.207 log points in the late period, for a gain of 0.124. At a GPA of 3.0, closer
to the mean, the selectivity premium rose from a statistically insignificant 2 percent to 9 percent.
While this growth is considerable, it is much smaller than the gain at a 2.0 GPA, and growth in the
selectivity premium at higher levels of GPA is smaller still and generally not statistically significant.
Furthermore, while one can easily reject that the selectivity premium does not vary with GPA in
the later period, this hypothesis cannot be rejected in the early period, where both the level and
slope are smaller.
These results support prediction 4, that the GPA return gap between more and less selective
schools has widened over time and, consequently, that the selectivity premium has become more
dependent on GPA. Moreover, the specific mechanisms underlying the prediction are supported.
The GPA return at less selective schools has unambiguously risen as ρ has increased. The GPA
return at more selective colleges has barely changed over time: not only is the effect of ρ on these
GPA returns weaker than at less selective colleges, but the shrinking ability variance would have
served to reduce the GPA return (equation (1.14)). On net, then, it is perhaps not surprising that
the GPA return has changed so little at selective colleges.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper formalizes and tests a model of ability signaling to explain the return to college
quality that has been documented in the literature. Notably, it is the first work to both theoretically
rationalize and empirically test a specific mechanism for this return. Based on data that span four
decades of students, the empirical results are consistent with the signaling model. Not only is
the return on GPA smaller at selective schools than at less prestigious institutions, the return on
selectivity itself declines as GPA, and average ability, rise.
Of course, that the patterns observed in the data are consistent with signaling cannot conclusively
rule out alternative explanations, including variants of the human capital model. More specifically,
while I have assumed a production function where the signals of GPA and selectivity provide in-
formation about the unknown ability parameter η, the production function could could include a
value-added component, f(ηi, SELi, GPAi(e)), where f(·) represents the productive value added by
graduating from college, and may depend on the individual’s initial ability, the selectivity or prestige
of the college attended, and the effort exerted (as passed through the GPA function). While existing
data do not allow the examination of this productive value added, it is interesting that in their
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survey of learning during college, Arum and Roksa (2011) do not find significant differences in the
correlations of GPA with learning (as measured by the Collegiate Learning Assessment) by school
selectivity. Their finding, along with the varying “returns” to GPA by college selectivity found in
this paper, imply restrictions on any generalized value-added model that seeks to explain the college
selectivity premium.
None of this is meant to imply that institutions of higher education should be thought of primarily
as signaling devices for students. Indeed, nothing in the model or the empirical results is inconsistent
with college-going providing human capital to students. Rather, the intent of this chapter is to
show that signaling provides a compelling alternative mechanism underlying the college selectivity
premium.
Moreover, the signaling model is appealing in that it can aid in understanding other stylized
facts in the literature. For example, Bound, Hershbein, and Long (2009) document the increase in
competitive behavior among high school students trying to get admitted into selective colleges, while
Babcock and Marks (2010) show that study and class time among college students have declined
sharply over the past 40 years. The rising return to selectivity partially brought about by increased
ability sorting may help explain this apparent shift in effort from college (second stage) to high
school (first stage). Because the greater degree of sorting leads to less variance in ability at selective
schools and makes GPA a noisier signal there, students have less incentive to work as hard as they
did previously. As the top students increasingly attend the selective colleges, the average aptitude at
less selective colleges falls, and thus so does the average effort. We would therefore expect study time
to decline across the selectivity spectrum, as Babcock and Marks (2010) find. Finally, the model
also suggests why employers appear to learn about the productivity of college graduate workers
much faster than that of high school graduate workers (Arciadocono et al. 2008): the signals that
college graduates can send to employers are more revelatory of ability than those from high school
graduates, so there is less to to be learned.29 Human capital models that seek to explain the selective
college premium should also reconcile these stylized facts in order to be persuasive.
It is also worth emphasizing that the evidence in favor of signaling is not at odds with the findings
of (ability-adjusted) returns to college selectivity in mid-career. Although employer-learning papers
typically assume that the the role of the signal generally diminishes over time as the underlying
characteristic that firms care about is revealed through experience (Altonji and Pierret 2001, Lange
2007, Arciadocono et al. 2008), this need not be true in the presence of job frictions where the
initial signal can affect the productivity profile. In fact, Heisz and Oreopoulos (2006) find empirical
29I present evidence of this phenomenon in Appendix 1.D.
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support for this exact type of labor friction using data on Canadian college graduates and the types
of training they receive as a function of their initial job placements. In turn, Bose and Lang (2011)
provide a microtheoretical foundation for this friction as firms’ try to match specific tasks to the
workers they think are best able to handle them; as the initial task assignments are based on what
the firms observe ex ante about the workers, the signals play a role in further training and the
chance of promotion. In the presence of career ladders, first jobs matter because they open doors;
as a consequence, a medium ability student who graduated from a selective college can have better
career opportunities than a high ability student who graduated from a less selective college.
More generally, the two-dimensional signaling framework presented here is relevant to settings
other than the new college graduate labor market. For example, it could also be applied to an
experienced labor market where a worker sends signals of her productivity both through the last
company she worked for (the “selectivity” indicator) and her list of accomplishments while she
worked there (the “GPA” measure). The general idea in this context is that a prospective employer
can better infer the worker’s innate productivity from where she has worked than it can from a series
of bullet points playing up her contributions. This context is also attractive because it ties directly
into the one described in this paper through a career ladder mechanism, magnifying the incentives
faced as far back as high school (if not farther) for the forward-looking student.
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1.8 Appendices
1.8.1 Appendix 1.A: Proofs
1.A.1: Section 3
Claim: Below η̃, students exert no effort in first stage.







= f ′(ẽ1) (w(E[GPAj=1,η̃], SELj=1)− w(E[GPAj=0,η̃], SELj=0)) .
Claim: Above η̃, e∗1 is rising in η if marginal cost falls in ability faster than does expected marginal
benefit.














Rearranging and evaluating ∂w(·)∂η :[
−α2 − α3e∗1
(η + α1)2





















+ f ′′(e∗1) · w(·)
.
The denominator is strictly negative. The numerator will be negative (and the quotient positive)








. Note that the second term is strictly positive and
−f ′(e∗1) is negative. If k1 ≥ k0, the quotient will always be positive. If k1 < k0, the condition binds,
with the left-hand side of the inequality representing the slope of expected marginal benefit and the
right-hand side the slope of marginal cost. 
Claim: η̃ is rising in ẽ.
Proof: This follows from the previous claim by replacing e∗1 with ẽ and η with η̃. However, as w(·)
is a function of η and not η̃, ∂w(·)∂η̃ = 0. The quotient is thus unambiguously positive. 
1.A.2: Section 4
Proposition 1: E[η | j = 1]− E[η | j = 0] > 0
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Proof: A firm’s expectation of the ability of a student who graduated from a selective college is:





































where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions, respec-
tively. Similarly, the firm’s expectation of ability if the student had graduated from a less selective
college is:



































































Note that both denominators are positive by construction and that
∫∞
η̃
ηf(e∗1(η))φ(η)dη > 0, since
f(·) is increasing in its argument. Thus every term in both numerators is positive, except for −εφ(η̃);
however, it was assumed that ε is close to zero. It therefore follows that E[η1]− E[η0] > 0. 
Proposition 2: ∂(E[η | j=1]−E[η | j=0])∂η̃ > 0
















































The first term is unambiguously positive. Suppose η̃ < 0. Then the second term is unambiguously
negative, and the whole expression is positive. If η̃ = 0, then the second term equals zero, and the















. V (ηj=1) is actually k · V (ηf(η)|η > η̃), where k is a positive constant
that adjusts for the renormalization of the distribution of ηf(η) on the interval from η̃ to infinity.
Since k is a constant and f(η) is a positive-valued increasing function, the derivative of V (η|η > η̃)
with respect to η̃ will have the same sign as the derivative of k · V (ηf(η)|η > η̃) with respect to η̃.
It thus suffices to show that the derivative of the first variance is negative.
∂V (η|η > η̃)
∂η̃
= −2IMR3(η̃) + 3η̃IMR2(η̃) + (1− η̃2)IMR(η̃),
where IMR(η̃) is the inverse Mills ratio, φ(η̃)1−Φ(η̃) . Graphing this function reveals it to be negative
for all values of η̃. 
Proposition 4: V (ηj=1) < V (ηj=0) if η̃ > 0.
Proof: First note that, because f(·) is increasing and maps between 0 and 1, it follows that
V (ηj=1) = V [f(e
∗











some individuals with η > η̃ do not get admitted to the selective college and instead attend the


















































Graphing this function reveals it to be positive for all values of η̃ > 0. 
1.8.2 Appendix 1.B: Relaxing functional form on the GPA-effort function
In Section 1.3, the relationship between effort and GPA, given by equation (1.5), assumed the
same linear function for all college tiers. If the relationship does vary across selectivity type, it is not
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clear how, à priori. For example, it could be argued that classes are more difficult at more selective
schools, which could imply a lower γ1 at these schools if more effort is required to obtain the same
expected grade. On the other hand, it has also been argued that grade inflation is more prevalent
at selective schools (Kuh and Hu 1999), which could suggest a higher γ1 and lower γ2.
Here I allow the linear relationship to vary by college tier and sketch how the solution charac-
teristics change from the canonical setup. Suppose that the GPA function is now
GPAj(e2) = γ1j + γ2je2 + ν,
where the j subscript indicates that the coefficients are specific to college type. Because there exists
a well-defined maximum GPA in the data (4.0), the functions should converge as effort increases,
leaving two cases of interest.
Case 1: γ11 > γ10 ; γ21 < γ20, or there is a higher intercept but smaller slope at the more selective
tier. This case could correspond with greater grade inflation/compression at selective schools, as
the return on effort to GPA is diminished. As indicated by equation (1.8), the lower slope implies
a contraction of effort across the ability distribution at selective schools. On the other hand, ∂w∂GPA
may rise, since for a fixed change in expected GPA, there is now a larger variation in ability.30 Thus
the difference in effort distribution from the original setup is uncertain, but higher ability students
still exert more effort at each school type. Functionally, this should lead to a smaller difference in
the returns to GPA at the different tiers relative to the homogeneous case.
Case 2: γ11 < γ10 ; γ21 > γ20, or there is a lower intercept but steeper slope at the more selective
tier. This case could correspond with harder classes (or smarter peers) at selective schools, with
more effort required to achieve the same expected grade as at less selective schools. As indicated
by equation (1.8), the steeper slope implies an increase of effort across the ability distribution at
selective schools. On the other hand, ∂w∂GPA may fall, since for a fixed change in expected GPA,
there is now a smaller variation in ability. Thus the difference in effort distribution from the original
setup is again uncertain, but higher ability students still exert more effort at each school type.
Functionally, this should lead to a larger difference in the returns to GPA at the different tiers
relative to the homogeneous case.
1.8.3 Appendix 1.C: Empirical Support for Model Assumptions
1.C.1: Linearity of GPA in effort and ability
The model in Section 1.3 makes a strong functional form assumption that expected GPA is
linear in effort (equation (1.5)). With the additional assumption of normally distributed ability,
optimization implies that (1) average GPA is a linear function of ability and (2) average wages
are a linear function of GPA. (Both of these slopes can, and generally will, vary across selectivity
tiers.) This appendix section provides empirical support for these assumptions using both graphs
and statistical tests.
To demonstrate the validity of (1), Appendix Figures 1.5 and 1.6 present nonparametric estimates
30In the absence of the error term ν, grade inflation/compression can makes grades more important to employers, since
average ability levels vary more across grades. This effect will be mitigated, however, the larger is the variance of ν.
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of GPA on the normalized senior test score for less selective colleges and for selectivity tier II.31 Each
figure has six panels: one that pools all cohorts, and one for each cohort separately. The relationship
in the first panel of Appendix Figure 1.5, which pools all the data from less selective colleges, shows a
distinct linear pattern between ability and GPA. The only appearance of strong curvature occurs at
the endpoints of the ability distribution, where there are few observations and large standard errors,
as shown by the shaded 95 percent confidence bands. The other panels of the figure show this
pattern holds across each data set individually except for Project Talent in the 1960s, which shows
a slight convex shape. Notably, this is the sole data set for which only categorical self-reported
GPA is available, and aggregation effects may overly influence the nonparametric estimates. For
selectivity tier II in Appendix Figure 1.6, the relationships are noisy, but it is easy to see that a
straight line lies within each panel’s confidence band. Furthermore, higher-order global polynomial
specifications (beyond linear) are rejected empirically. Taken together, there seems little evidence
from these graphs to call into question the assumption of linearity of GPA in ability.
While it follows from this assumption that average wages should be linear in GPA, I test this,
too. I modify equations (1.16) and (1.17) to allow for selectivity-specific quadratics or cubics in
GPA. Wald tests are then performed on the higher-order polynomial terms against a null of zero; a
rejection would suggest that wages are not, in fact, linear in GPA. Appendix Table 1.3 shows the
F-statistics and p-values from these Wald tests. Panel A presents pooled data, while panels B and
C perform tests separately for the “early” and “late” periods.
Panel A shows that while nonlinearity does not seem to present among the sample of all workers
(columns 1 through 3), there is some evidence in favor of a quadratic specification among full-time
workers who graduated from less selective colleges. Specifically, the Wald tests in columns 4 and 5
can reject the null at 10 percent, though not at 5 percent. The quadratic pattern suggested by the
data is convex, such that the return on GPA is rising in GPA. Tracing out the estimates, the return
on GPA at less selective colleges exceeds the return at more selective colleges once GPA reaches 2.6,
about half a standard deviation below the mean. Thus, even allowing this nonlinearity would not
alter the conclusion that GPA returns are larger at less selective colleges.
Panels B and C show that the nonlinear GPA returns are driven entirely by the early period and
actually prefer a cubic specification. (Interestingly, it is in Project Talent in the early period where
evidence of a nonlinear GPA-ability relationship was found.) Tracing out the estimates in this case
reveals that GPA returns are higher at less selective colleges except at the highest portion of the
GPA distribution (GPA ≥ 3.5), which is relatively sparse in the early period. Therefore, this does
not seem a major threat to the model assumptions, either. In sum, the linearity assumptions are
empirically plausible.
1.C.2: Empirical densities of GPA and ability
Figures ?? and ?? show kernel density estimates of GPA across selectivity tiers for each of the
five data sets used in the paper.32 At less selective institutions, in each time period, the estimated
densities appear approximately normal upon visual inspection, with a single peak, minimal skewness,
and only slight truncation at the upper bound of 4. While the densities at the selective tiers are not
31The specific procedure is a local linear regression using an Epanechnikov kernel with the bandwidth that minimizes
integrated squared error. Nonparametric estimate for the other selectivity tiers are not shown for brevity but are
available on request.
32Bandwidth is chosen according to the Sheather-Jones plug-in method with the Epanechnikov kernel.
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quite as well behaved, this is somewhat expected due to their much smaller sample sizes. Still, even
these densities tend to be unimodal and reasonably symmetric, the more so the larger the number
of observations used to construct them.
Figures ?? and ?? show similar kernel density estimates of the senior test score measure of student
ability. (I have rescaled this ability measure to have a mean of 0 and variance of 1 among the full
estimation sample to better reflect the model.) As expected, dispersion in ability falls sharply as
selectivity rises, and this is even more prevalent in the more recent periods, except for the NLSY97,
which uses a different testing scheme (see data appendix). These densities, moreover, also exhibit
an approximately normal distribution, even more so than the GPA densities in most cases. They
are all single-peaked, show little excess kurtosis, and exhibit relatively little skewness. (The NELS
densities do have slightly more pronounced left skewness, but this is at least partially an artifact
of the testing instrument, which exhibited a greater degree of upper-level censoring than in earlier
periods.33)
Nonetheless, I simulated data to resemble these empirical distributions in order to examine
whether the implications of bivariate normality shown in equation (1.11) are robust to departures
from exact normality. The resulting biases in the slope and intercept terms were minimal, on the
order of 2 percent, and the true parameters could not be statistically rejected. While it would be
unreasonable to expect the densities of GPA and ability to be precisely normal in the data, treating
them as approximately normal does not seem unreasonable.
1.C.3: Bounding the variance of ν
A minimum bound of the variance of ν can be estimated by using equation (1.9) with bounds on






is effectively bounded between 0 and 3. With η ∼ N(0, 1), fewer than 1 out of 10000
observations will take on an (absolute) value greater than 4, so with δ1 = 4, the expression ηi + δ1
is approximately bounded between 0 and 8. This implies that
γ22kj
δ2
has an effective upper bound of


















= 0.1406. Thus, even assuming that the variance in ability
conditional on selectivity is as large as the unconditional variance of 1, the deterministic component
of GPA can account for at most 0.1406∗10.235 , or about three-fifths, of the overall variance, leaving at
least two-fifths due to the noise term, ν. In practice, however, the fraction of variance in GPA due
to the stochastic component is probably higher. For example, the observed empirical support of
GPA seems to have a lower bound closer to 1.5 than 1, and there appears to be relatively minor




bound less than 0.375 and perhaps closer to 0.25. The fraction of variance due to ν would then be
on the order of 70 percent. Additionally, if σ2ηj < 1, the relevance of ν rises further. The importance
of the random component in explaining the variance of GPA is therefore likely substantial.
33This censoring does not result from the sample restriction used in this paper but is rather symptomatic of all respon-
dents with this metric in the NELS.
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1.C.4: A comment on risk-averse agents
The model assumes students are risk neutral, but if they are uniformly risk averse, qualitatively
nothing changes except effort distributions (by ability) will be compressed. Intuitively, this occurs
because higher wages—and thus effort—exhibit diminishing marginal returns to utility. If risk
aversion is positively correlated with ability, outcomes become ambiguous: college sorting by ability
is mitigated by risk aversion in the first stage, and the GPA-ability correlation is mitigated in the
second stage at less selective colleges. (Greater mixing by ability at selective colleges due to varying
risk aversion makes the GPA return there ambiguous). This would generally bias against finding a
selectivity premium or differences in GPA return by selectivity. On the other hand, if risk aversion is
negatively correlated with ability, then outcomes are qualitatively as in the risk neutral case: sorting
by ability is strengthened in the first stage, and effort distribution widens in the second stage but is
ability-rank preserving.
1.C.5: A comment on worker sorting across firms
The model assumes that all firms are homogeneous and distinguish workers by paying them
different amounts based on their signals of productivity. More realistically, firms are heterogeneous
and are willing to hire only workers whose expected productivity is within some band, with variations
in pay of new workers quite small within a given firm (controlling for job type). Put differently,
a higher value of a signal does not raise a worker’s pay at some fixed firm; rather, it qualifies the
worker to get hired at a different company that hires higher ability workers at a higher wage. While
this distinction is worth mentioning, as the treatment is imprecise in this regard, it is not important
for empirical analysis. As long as workers can costlessly sort across firms, then the implications
continue to hold, and firm heterogeneity of this sort is unimportant.
1.C.6: A comment on GPA differences between men and women
Finally, it is well-documented that there are substantial differences in GPA between men and
women (Pascarella and Terenzini 2005), and this is empirically true in each of the data sets used in
this study, with women averaging a 0.1 to 0.2 point advantage over men. Moreover, this advantage
is roughly constant throughout the distribution except in the extreme tails. In the context of the
model, this would be consistent with women and men having different intercepts but the same slope
in equation 1.5, which would not affect their optimization. Employers presumably build this into
their expectations of productivity, and this can be controlled empirically by using dummies for sex
in the regressions. Of course, this assumes the same ability distribution for men and women, and
this seems reasonable using senior year ability scores (although not SAT/ACTs, which are known
to exhibit differences by sex).
1.8.4 Appendix 1.D: Signaling and Employer Learning
The signaling model in this paper can also help explain why employers appear to learn about
the productivity of college graduate workers much faster than that of high school graduate workers.
Arcidiacono et al. (2008), for example, show that while ability (AFQT) is only weakly correlated with
log wages among recent high school graduates, with this correlation growing with worker experience,
the ability-wage correlation among college graduates shows up immediately, with negligible growth
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over the career. In the context of ability signaling, this is precisely the result one would expect to
find if the signals that college graduates can send are more revelatory of ability than those from high
school graduates. Curiously, the authors’ attempt to demonstrate this supposition is relegated to a
brief section in an appendix, where they regress AFQT on college entrance scores and college major
and find a high R2 (0.57 to 0.73). However, these regressions do not actually show that college
graduates can better signal their ability to employers: as mentioned earlier, it is not at all clear that
college entrance scores are visible to potential employers, and there is no attempt to compare signals
with those of high school graduates.
I undertake such an exercise here. Specifically, using a regression similar to (1.16), I calculate how
well the signals of college selectivity and GPA (along with college major, race and sex) can predict
the standardized measure of aptitude in the pooled data. For comparison, I construct a sample of
(exact) high school graduates who take wage jobs within a year of high school graduation and aren’t
self-employed or in the military. While college selectivity does not have a direct analogue at the high
school level, high school GPA replaces college GPA as the relevant signal in this sample. Because
other characteristics of the high school record may serve as signals, I include some specifications that
also include quartile indicators for each of sports, leadership, and prior work experience, and the
number of semesters (and their square) taken in each academic, business, and vocational subject.34
As the interest is in the variance of the prediction error, the relevant statistic is 1n
∑
σ̂2, the mean
squared error (or average variance of the residuals), and not R2, which normalizes by the variance
in ability. Appendix Table 1.D.1 shows the calculated mean squared error of the prediction, as well
as the total variance of ability, for both the high school graduate and college graduate samples.35
The MSE is substantially lower (about 30 percent less) among the college sample (column 1) than
among the high school sample (column 2), and this difference is similar in size in both the early
and late periods (panels B and C). Even with the additional potential high school signals (column
3), the MSE is larger for the high school graduates than for the college graduates. Furthermore,
these additional signals seem to have less marginal predictive power in the late period relative to
the early period, particularly among full-time workers (columns 5 and 6). These relative prediction
errors help illustrate why employer learning is more rapid among college graduate workers than high
school graduate workers: the initial signals available can more precisely pinpoint the worker’s ability,
so there is less to be revealed through experience.
34See the data appendix for details on the construction of these measures.
35In the college regressions, the partial correlation of GPA on ability is always lower, and often statistically significantly
so, at selective colleges than at less selective colleges, consistent with equation (1.11).
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Appendix Table 1.D.1: Prediction Errors on Ability for College and High School
Panel A: Pooled, All (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Group Coll HS HS Coll HS HS
MSE 0.433 0.625 0.525 0.434 0.630 0.528
mean(ability) 0.721 -0.397 -0.397 0.724 -0.429 -0.429
var(ability) 0.579 0.821 0.821 0.574 0.789 0.789
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Pooled, early (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Group Coll HS HS Coll HS HS
MSE 0.431 0.624 0.505 0.435 0.608 0.496
mean(ability) 0.703 -0.465 -0.465 0.706 -0.461 -0.461
var(ability) 0.561 0.754 0.754 0.557 0.726 0.726
Panel C: Pooled, late (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Group Coll HS HS Coll HS HS
MSE 0.431 0.617 0.524 0.433 0.638 0.534
mean(ability) 0.743 -0.332 -0.332 0.747 -0.390 -0.390
var(ability) 0.600 0.877 0.877 0.594 0.865 0.865
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Estimates shown are mean squared errors (MSE) and mean absolute errors (MAE)  from OLS regressions of ability on 
signals using sampling weights. All samples are restricted to those who are working with wages. All regressions include 
controls for sex and race. Selectivity signals for college group also include college major, college GPA, selectivity dummy, and 
interactions of the selectivity dummy with college GPA. The selectivity thresholds are based on Tier II thresholds; using Tier I or 
Tier III thresholds produces similar results. High school signals include high school GPA and other controls as shown. Panel A 
shows results for all cohorts together; Panel B from the 1960s and 1970s; and Panel C from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. 
Yes
Controls for course-taking, 
sports, leadership, and 
work
 — No Yes  — No
Table 4: Prediction Errors on Ability for College and High School
(Dependent variable is normalized ability measure)
Controls for course-taking, 
sports, leadership, and 
work
— No Yes — No Yes
Notes: Estimates shown are mean squared errors (MSE) from OLS regressions of normalized ability on signals using
sampling weights. All samples are restricted to those who are working with wages. All regressions include controls
for sex and race. Selectivity signals for college group also include college major, college GPA, selectivity dummy, and
interactions of the selectivity dummy with college GPA. The selectivity thresholds are based on Tier II thresholds;
using Tier I or Tier III thresholds produces si ilar results. High school signals include high school GPA and other
controls as shown. Panel A shows results for all cohorts together; Panel B from the 1960s and 1970s; and Panel C
from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.
1.8.5 Data Appendix
The National Center of Education Statistics (NCES) has conducted four nationally-representative,
large-scale, longitudinal surveys of secondary students since 1972. Each of these surveys originally
sampled between 12,000 and 25,000 students in a given grade cohort, with follow-up survey waves
over the next several years. Designed to shed light on the secondary school to post-secondary school
and school-to-work transitions, the surveys ask questions about demographic background, school
experiences, education and work expectations, and labor market outcomes. Additionally, each sur-
vey cohort was administered a cognitive test battery. In most cases, the data variables are directly
comparable across the four different surveys. Central to the analysis presented here, the restricted-
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access versions of these data sets allow the identification of all post-secondary institutions attended
and have complete post-secondary transcript data for most students who reported attending a post-
secondary institution. Because the most recent of these four surveys is too new to have data on
respondents’ post college-graduation transitions, I use the first three surveys, described below.
I supplement the NCES data with two additional, nationally-representative data sets that allow
analysis of the new college graduate labor market in the 1960s—Project Talent—and the 2000s—the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997. These surveys cover much of the same sets of questions
as do the NCES surveys, including specific colleges attended and cognitive test batteries. While self-
reported cumulative GPA is available in these latter data sets, transcript data, unfortunately, are not.
NLS72
The National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 queried approximately 17,000
high school seniors in the spring of 1972, with follow-up waves in 1973, 1974, 1976, 1979, and 1986.36
I focus on respondents from the 1976 and 1979 waves, by which time most respondents have com-
pleted their undergraduate post-secondary education.
HSB
The High School and Beyond survey consists of two cohorts: sophomores in 1980 and seniors in 1980
(approximately 14,000 students of each). Each cohort had follow-ups in 1982, 1984, and 1986; the
sophomore cohort alone had an additional follow-up in 1992. Because the 1992 follow-up is several
years after the sophomore cohort was on track to graduate from college (1986), I use the senior
cohort and focus on the 1986 wave.
NELS
The National Educational Longitudinal Survey began following nearly 25,000 8th graders in 1988,
with follow-ups in 1990, 1992, 1994, and 2000. As these students were on track to graduate high
school in 1992 and college in 1996 (under normal progression), I focus on respondents in the 2000
wave.
Project Talent
Project Talent surveyed approximately 100,000 each of 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th graders in 1960,
with follow-ups one, five, and 11 years after anticipated high school graduation.37 I use the recently
available ICPSR 1-in-4 sample of the senior cohort, as the other cohorts do not have the required
job timing information necessary for analysis, and focus on the 5-year follow-up.
NLSY97
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997 surveyed 8,984 12 to 17 year-olds beginning in
1997, with annual follow-ups. By 2009, the last data year available, respondents are aged 25 through
29. I use the geocoded version, available with application from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and
information from all available waves.
36As in all of the NCES surveys here, new individuals were often added in some of the later waves.
37Based on normal progression. Respondents were followed regardless of actual high school graduation.
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Sample Restrictions and Variable Construction
Because the five data sets differ in the timing of their follow-up interviews, care was taken to make
them as consistent as possible. In each survey, the estimation sample was restricted to individuals
who had earned their bachelors degree at U.S. institutions within 6 years of high school graduation,
and at the time of observation had earned no additional (graduate) degree, were not currently
enrolled in school, were working for pay with real (year 2005) hourly earnings between 5 and 100
dollars, and were neither self-employed nor in the military. After imposing these conditions, the final
sample size consists of 2,803 individuals for NLS72; 1,078 individuals for HSB; 1,902 individuals for
NELS; 2,025 in Project Talent; and 829 in NLSY97. Appendix Table 1.1 contains more detailed
information on how the restrictions affect the sample size for each data set.
College Information
College major, GPA, date of graduation, and college itself are taken from the institution from
which the respondent graduated. When available, these measures come directly from the post-
secondary transcript (90.5% of cases in the NLS72, 55.0% of cases in the HSB, and 94.9% in the
NELS); otherwise, they are taken from self-reported information in the survey.38 For students who
attended more than one post-secondary institution before earning a bachelor’s degree, GPA is based
on courses taken at the degree-granting school.
While detailed college major is provided in the data, I collapse these into 11 categories that are
consistent across data sets: humanities, social sciences, psychology, life sciences, physical sciences
and mathematics, engineering, education, business, arts, health, and other.
When transcript data are available, GPA is calculated as the credit-weighted average of all
course grades (on the standard 4 point scale) earned at the institution of graduation up to the date
of degree receipt. Courses that do not receive grades (e.g., pass/fail, audits, drops, and withdrawals)
are ignored in the GPA calculation. When transcript data are unavailable, self-reported GPA is used.
(For observations with both measures available, the correlation between the two is 0.84 for NLS72,
0.87 for HSB, and 0.75 for NELS.). In the NLS72 and HSB, GPA is self-reported categorically (A,
A-/B+, B, B-/C+, etc.) for all post-secondary courses to date (not just at the degree-granting
institution). Project Talent also uses a categorical scale, although it is finer than NLS72 and HSB
(A, A-, B+, B, etc.). These categories are converted to a 4 point numeric scale. NELS and NLSY97
ask respondents to report cumulative GPA as a numeric variable; NELS converts these self-reports
to a 4 point scale internally, while NLSY97 provides the institution-specific grading scale; in this
latter case, I performed the 4-point conversion manually.
College selectivity indicators are matched to the degree-granting college of each sample respon-
dent using either the FICE code (NLS72, HSB, and Project Talent) or UNITID code (NELS and
NLSY97) of the institution.
Alternative Selectivity Measures
While the Barron’s rankings constitute the preferred selectivity metric due to their construction
from attributes based entirely on students, as another measure of college selectivity I adopt the
38The much lower transcript data rate in the HSB is due to post-secondary transcripts being collected earlier in that
survey (in 1984, four years after high school) relative to the others. Consequently, students who earned their degrees
more than four years after high school graduation do not have complete transcript data.
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strategy of a quality index advocated by Black and Smith (2006). The quality index is created by
applying factor analysis on five characteristics of each college: the faculty-student ratio, the rejection
rate of applicants, the freshman retention rate, mean SAT/ACT score of entering freshmen, and
mean faculty salaries. The factor analysis produces weights, or factor loadings, for each of these
characteristics under the assumption they are each composites of some latent underlying “factors.”
Calling the first and most important of these factors “quality”, the factor loadings allow construction
of a quality index, a linear combination of the characteristics that accounts for their correlation.
Using data on colleges from 1991 provided by Smith, I create the quality index for each college
that has sufficient data and then compute percentiles.39 Again, three different binary indicators for
selectivity are calculated. The first of these is coded 1 if the quality index percentile is at or above
80, and 0 otherwise (QI I); the second is coded 1 if the percentile is at or above 90, and 0 otherwise
(QI II), and the third is coded 1 if the percentile is at or above 95, and 0 otherwise (QI III).40 Of
the ten highest ranked colleges by the quality index, all ten are considered to be in Barron’s highest
category in 1992, nine are in the highest category in 1982, and eight are in the highest category in
1972. (The top ten not in Barron’s highest category 1982 or 1972 are ranked in the second-highest
category.) More generally, the quality index approach is less discriminating between selectivity levels
than is the Barron’s system, but the effect is minor. Complete summary statistics using the quality
index are available on request.
Ability Measures
For each data set, I construct two measures of cognitive ability: SAT/ACT percentile and (high
school) senior year test score. The SAT/ACT percentile is calculated from the SAT or ACT score
of the respondent as follows. For students with SAT scores, their verbal and math scores were
adjusted to the re-centered scale using the College Board’s concordance table41, summed, and then
converted to a percentile score using the 2005-2006 year distribution, also from the College Board.42
For students with ACT scores (and without SAT scores), composite scores were converted to SAT
equivalent scores using concordance table jointly developed by the College Board and the ACT43 and
then converted into percentiles as above. (Similar results are produced if ACT scores are converted
directly into percentiles using the ACT score distribution.) SAT and ACT scores have relatively
high item non-response, in part because not all valid sample respondents took either exam, and
they are unavailable for the HSB sample, as they were not collected for the senior cohort. However,
because the scores are mapped to a fixed distribution, this measure is comparable across time.
For each of the NCES data sets and Project Talent, the senior year test score is based on an
aptitude test battery administered to students during their senior year of high school (and thus is
available only for students who were surveyed during that wave.) The test batteries are similar but
39Data for each characteristic from before 1991 are not readily available for many colleges, which prevents it from being
the preferred quality measure. However, as student characteristics evolve slowly (Black and Smith 2006), using 1991
data should still be a reasonable proxy for earlier cohorts.
40As in the Barron’s rankings, colleges without sufficient data to calculate a quality index are usually less selective
ones. A virtue of using a binary measure for selectivity rather than a continuous one is that more colleges (and thus
respondents) can be analyzed, and estimates can be compared across different selectivity measures without worrying






not identical across survey waves and are intended to measure reading comprehension, vocabulary,
and mathematical knowledge. Scores are normalized to have a (population) mean of 0 and standard
deviation of 1 among high school seniors within each cohort.
For NLSY97, I use the internally constructed ASVAB percentile score. About 80 percent of
respondents completed the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, a 12-component test, in
1997. Based on four of these components—word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, mathemati-
cal knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning—NLSY staff computed percentile scores within three-month
age groups. While not representative of high school seniors, these scores represent age-adjusted
norms within cohorts.
While the senior year test and ASVAB scores are not strictly comparable across time, unlike
college entrance exams, they are low-stake tests, the results for which had no direct impact on
student outcomes. As such, the results reasonably capture both cognitive and non-cognitive aptitude
(motivation, perseverance, etc.), which is more directly in line with the theoretical ability measure.
Job Information
Job information was taken from the first job that began after the respondent graduated with a
bachelors degree except in NELS, where it was taken from the current job held at the year 2000
interview (the only post-graduation job information available.)
In NLS72, earnings data are provided at the weekly level, and hourly earnings are constructed
by dividing weekly earnings at the first post-graduation job by the number of hours worked in an
average week at that job. In HSB, there are data for the number of hours usually worked per week,
the frequency at which one gets paid, and the rate of pay at this frequency. A majority of sample
individuals report being paid annually (about 55 percent), but hourly, weekly, biweekly, and monthly
are also options. In order to construct a comparable rate of pay variable, I transform the earnings
variables into an hourly figure. The transformation is the identity function for hourly workers and
is the rate of pay divided by the product of usual hours worked per week and the number of weeks
in the frequency unit (with 4.3 weeks per month and 52 weeks per year). In NELS and Project
Talent, the hourly rate of pay is constructed in a similar fashion as in HSB. For NLSY97, there is
an internally constructed hourly wage variable already available. Hourly earnings in each data set
are deflated to year 2005 dollars using the Personal Consumption Expenditures Deflator, and then
logged.
High School Characteristics
High school GPA is taken from categorical student responses for each data set except for NELS,
where it is constructed (within the data set) using high school transcript data. High school GPA
is converted to a 4-point scale in a manner analogous to undergraduate GPA. Each data set has
students report the number of semesters (or Carnegie units) of each academic subject taken (English,
math, science, social science, and foreign language) during high school, and these are standardized
to be in semester units. I also constructed (separately by data set) indices for participation in high
school sports, leadership activities, and work experience based on student responses to a similar set
of questions available in each data set except for NLSY97. From these indices, I generate dummies
for being in each quartile, or separate dummies if the quartile measures cannot be made.
40
Job information for high school graduates was constructed from the same set of questions used














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 1.2: Log hourly wages on GPA by selectivity (Quality Index 1991)
Panel A: Pooled, All (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selectivity Tier QI QII QIII QI QII QIII
GPA, less-selective 0.085*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.100***
[0.014] [0.013] [0.012] [0.014] [0.013] [0.012]
GPA, selective 0.095*** 0.068 0.052 0.087*** 0.053 0.106**
[0.024] [0.043] [0.084] [0.021] [0.033] [0.048]
p-val for diff 0.708 0.632 0.673 0.400 0.120 0.904
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8637 8637 8637 7580 7580 7580
Adjusted R-squared 0.241 0.235 0.237 0.264 0.260 0.260
Panel B: Pooled, early (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selectivity Tier QI QII QIII QI QII QIII
GPA, less-selective 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.074*** 0.064*** 0.061***
[0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.014]
GPA, selective 0.019 0.004 0.023 0.017 0.019 0.044
[0.023] [0.027] [0.038] [0.018] [0.031] [0.040]
p-val for diff 0.137 0.108 0.519 0.008 0.164 0.671
Panel C: Pooled, late (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selectivity Tier QI QII QIII QI QII QIII
GPA, less-selective 0.127*** 0.132*** 0.121*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.131***
[0.021] [0.020] [0.019] [0.022] [0.020] [0.019]
GPA, selective 0.094** -0.002 -0.031 0.103*** 0.015 0.081
[0.039] [0.066] [0.151] [0.034] [0.045] [0.070]
p-val for diff 0.447 0.049 0.317 0.289 0.008 0.478
p-val for diff-in-diff 0.944 0.238 0.409 0.748 0.127 0.650
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8637 8637 8637 7580 7580 7580
Adjusted R-squared 0.245 0.240 0.241 0.268 0.264 0.263
Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Estimates shown are for OLS regressions using sampling weights. Panel A shows results for all cohorts together; Panel 
B from the 1960s and 1970s; and Panel C from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and allow for arbitrary correlation of the error term within college. Asterisks indicate statistical significance 
(* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
Appendix Table 2: Log hourly wages on GPA by selectivity (Quality Index  1991)
(Dependent v riable is real log hourly wage)
Controls for sex, race, and 
college major?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YesControls for sex, race, and 
college major?
Yes Yes
Notes: Estimates shown are for OLS regressions on the real log hourly wage using sampling weights. College selectivity
is based on the Quality Index from Black and Smith (2006). Panel A shows results for all cohorts together; Panel B
from the 1960s and 1970s; and Panel C from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust
to heteroskedasticity and allow for arbitrary correlation of the error term within college. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Appendix Table 1.3: Wald Tests of Nonlinearity of Wages in GPA
Panel A: Pooled, All (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Group Tier I Tier II Tier III Tier I Tier II Tier III
Less-selective, quadratic 0.86 1.14 1.06 3.07 3.03 2.11
[0.354] [0.284] [0.303] [0.080] [0.082] [0.147]
Selective, quadratic 0.36 0.15 0.26 0.09 0.00 0.71
[0.549] [0.696] [0.610] [0.763] [0.992] [0.398]
Less-selective, cubic 0.46 0.96 0.66 1.51 1.90 1.13
[0.634] [0.385] [0.520] [0.221] [0.149] [0.324]
Selective, cubic 0.61 0.33 0.73 0.91 0.13 0.92
[0.545] [0.721] [0.483] [0.401] [0.879] [0.398]
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Pooled, early (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Group Tier I Tier II Tier III Tier I Tier II Tier III
Less-selective, quadratic 0.43 0.12 0.33 0.79 0.55 0.93
[0.511] [0.725] [0.567] [0.376] [0.457] [0.335]
Selective, quadratic 0.17 0.86 0.39 0.03 1.12 0.03
[0.680] [0.354] [0.534] [0.875] [0.290] [0.873]
Less-selective, cubic 3.18 1.35 1.58 4.42 3.31 3.39
[0.042] [0.260] [0.206] [0.012] [0.037] [0.034]
Selective, cubic 0.23 0.44 0.29 0.17 0.62 0.87
[0.791] [0.644] [0.751] [0.846] [0.538] [0.421]
Panel C: Pooled, late (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Group Tier I Tier II Tier III Tier I Tier II Tier III
Less-selective, quadratic 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.30 0.02
[0.826] [0.980] [0.947] [0.529] [0.582] [0.878]
Selective, quadratic 0.50 0.21 1.12 0.00 0.03 1.14
[0.479] [0.650] [0.290] [0.955] [0.860] [0.285]
Less-selective, cubic 0.21 0.09 0.01 1.03 0.16 0.10
[0.808] [0.915] [0.985] [0.357] [0.853] [0.906]
Selective, cubic 0.92 0.39 0.80 0.92 0.06 0.83
[0.400] [0.680] [0.450] [0.397] [0.944] [0.438]
Notes: Estimates shown are F statistics (and p-values in brackets) from Wald tests for whether the coefficients on higher-order 
polynomial terms in GPA are equal to a null of zero. See Table 3 for other notes.
Appendix Table 3: Wald Tests of Nonlinearity of Wages in GPA
(Dependent variable is normalized ability measure)
Notes: Estimates shown are F statistics (and p-values in brackets) from Wald tests for whether the coefficients on
higher-order polynomial terms in GPA are equal to a null of zero. See Table 1.3 for other notes.
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CHAPTER II
Graduating High School in a Recession: Work, Education,
and Home Production
2.1 Introduction
The 2008-2009 recession is widely acknowledged as one of the most severe labor market con-
tractions since the Great Depression. While the contemporary harm to workers unable to find jobs
is well-studied in both the popular and academic press, the enduring effects on new entrants are
less well understood. A small but growing economics literature has explored the impact that labor
market conditions at the time of entry have on the long-term career profiles of men, with most
studies finding a negative impact on wages and/or job prestige that is persistent, lasting at least 6
to 8 years, and often longer. The subject has made for an interesting empirical question because
different economic theories of labor supply offer different predictions.1 Given the richness of theories
about female labor supply, however, it is somewhat puzzling that little work has examined the effects
of graduating during a recession on women. This paper aims to extend the literature by examining
how initial negative labor market shocks affect a not-well-studied demographic group—high school
graduate women—and whether these impacts are different from those for men. Unlike much of the
earlier literature, particular emphasis is placed on channels besides wages, such as the extent and
timing of employment and enrollment in higher education.
There are several reasons why high school graduate women are both an economically interesting
and important group to study. First, because they arguably have a greater set of alternative uses
for their time, they are likely to respond to initial adverse labor market conditions differently than
men. For example, housework and child care are well-known to be more plausible choices for women
than men.2 Indeed, given the relatively higher labor supply elasticity found for women relative to
1For example, competitive spot labor markets suggest short-lived effects of entry conditions, while job-matching and
search models allow for longer-lasting impacts. Kahn (2010) offers a longer discussion of the predictions of these
models.
2According to the March Current Population Survey, for the period 1975 through 1999, an average of 24 percent of
women aged 18 to 40 reported not being in the labor force at any point during the year. Of these 24 percent, 70
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men (Blau and Kahn, 2007), women first entering the labor force in a period of depressed real wages
should be less likely than men to be working, implying that margins other than wages are worth
investigating. If home production represents a viable alternative to market work for these women,3
whether due to less stigma or greater productivity, do women at the margin select into it when the
effective market wage offer falls, as it does in a recession? On the other hand, beginning in the early
1980s, women began to outnumber men in college-going. As Goldin (2006) has noted, the generation
of women who graduated high school in the late 1970s and early 1980s had greater career ambitions
than did their parents; rather than trying to find a job during a recession right after high school or
starting a family, perhaps obtaining more education represented another appealing option. Whether
more young women are on the work-home production margin or work-education margin–and how
these compare with men—is an open empirical question.
Second, certain stylized facts suggest that the long-lasting effects, or scarring, found among more
educated men might not occur among less educated women. Studies to date have generally shown
that negative effects tend to be larger, and more durable, for workers with steeper earnings profiles.
For example, the economics Ph.D. and MBA graduates studied by Oyer (2006, 2007) suffer larger
and longer-lasting earnings and placement penalties than do the college graduates studied by Kahn
(2010) and Oreopoulos et al. (2012), and the college graduates in these two studies in turn fare worse
than the prime-age male workers in Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), Genda, Kondo, and Ohta (2010),
and Brunner and Kuhn (2009). While different methodologies stress caution in making inferences,
the additional finding from Brunner and Kuhn (2009) that effects are more severe for white-collar
than blue-collar workers is strongly suggestive that the shape of the earnings profile is related to the
impacts of labor market entry during a recession. If the earnings profiles of high school graduate
women are relatively flat, these women may recover much better than the previously studied men.
High school graduate men, whose earnings profiles fall between these groups, might similarly be
expected to fare worse than the women but better than the highly educated men.
Third, studying these women allows a more complete understanding of the short and long-run
welfare implications of business cycles for workers, and how they vary by fundamental economic
parameters, such as the elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages or the return to labor market
experience. Intertemporal behavioral shifts may play a sizable role in determining the impact of an
initial adverse labor demand shock on certain worker groups, and analyses that focus predominantly
on wages may miss this part of the story. Moreover, given the severity of the 2008-2009 recession,
percent reported their primary reason for not working as “taking care of home/family.”
3Lechner and Wiehler (2007) present evidence consistent with this hypothesis for less-skilled women in Austria.
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understanding the behavioral responses of high school graduates and the consequences for their
long-term well-being is of tremendous concern to policymakers and the public.
In order to understand how and why choices might vary across education groups and sex, in the
next section I present an informal discrete-choice discussion that focuses the analysis and nests the
possibilities for wage impacts seen in previous studies. Section 2.3 discusses the data set, the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, and the estimation strategy used for identification. The fourth
section presents the main results of how an initial labor demand shock affects the probability of being
employed, showing that high school graduate women—but not men—substitute away from market
work in the first few years following graduation. This section also provides checks for robustness and
explores some channels through which the observed effects might be operating. Section 2.5 offers a
brief conclusion and thoughts for future research.
2.2 Labor Demand Shocks and Time Use Decisions
Suppose at time t individuals can choose among working in the market, pursuing education, or
engaging in home production. Each of these choices grants some flow of utility to the individual that
period based on her characteristics, and the choices also have the potential to affect utility flows
in future periods. For example, working grants the individual a wage, and the experience gained
while working can raise the wage in subsequent periods. Likewise, enrolling in postsecondary school
is costly in terms of both money and effort, but additional education can also raise future wages.
Home production may possibly affect future productivity in home production, but it does not affect
future flows from either working or education.4
An individual’s optimal choice at time t is the one that grants the highest expected utility, and
this depends on an individual’s characteristics at that point. For instance, those who have worked
more in the past face higher wage offers, on average, than those who have worked less, making
working again a more compelling choice. Similarly, if education becomes more costly to pursue the
more educated one is (Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2006), further education is less appealing unless
the return rises commensurately. More generally, greater levels of schooling or work experience make
home production a less appealing option, because the opportunity cost (in foregone wages) is greater.
For new high school graduates, in particular, the decision process is somewhat cleaner, as they
all have the same education, minimal work experience,5 and are of nearly the same age. Choices
4For evidence that home production is highly substitutable with market work, at least in the short run, see Burda and
Hamermesh (2009).
5The literature has not reached consensus on whether work experience in high school affects later labor market out-
comes. Ruhm (1997) finds positive effects on work participation and earnings around age 30 for those who worked in
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will be determined chiefly by exogenous characteristics, such as cognitive ability—which affects the
psychic and financial costs of education and thus its net return—the return to working—both the
initial wage offer and the return to experience—and the value attached to home production.
When a negative labor demand shock occurs, as during a recession, and wage offers are reduced,
how are choices affected?6 It depends on the size of the shock relative to the value of the alternative
options, and while the latter depend on levels of schooling and experience, there is also reason to
believe they vary by sex even when schooling and experience are held constant. Women, for instance,
likely find childrearing and housework (i.e., home production) far more feasible than men, who often
suffer greater stigma from these choices (Goldin, 2006). Additionally, because women on average
have more career interruptions than men, often family related, joblessness is less likely to convey
a negative signal of worker quality to employers for women than it is for men. Indeed, Light and
Ureta (1995) show that women’s wage penalties associated with re-entering market work after a
nonworking spell are small relative to those for men. Furthermore, women’s greater amount of time
spent outside market work may serve to lower the lifetime returns to education. Each of these factors
suggests that more women than men are on the margin between work and home production, and
thus a negative labor demand shock would be expected to induce women from the former to the
latter more than men.
As simple as this framework is, it can put into context why different effects should be expected
than the results found by Kahn (2010), Oreopoulos et al. (2012), and Oyer (2006, 2007). Because
these papers study those with bachelor’s or graduate degrees, the wage offer is much higher than it
would be for the less educated.7 Additionally, the value of additional schooling is likely to be less,
both because schooling becomes more costly and because the return decreases. Consequently, even
with a labor demand shock that reduces the wage offer, continuing to work is likely to remain the
best option for most of this population, and the initial impact on these workers will almost fully
show up in observed wages.
Furthermore, the framework can also shed light on how long the effects from an early demand
shock can be expected to last. It is well known that wage experience profiles tend to be steeper
for those more highly attached to the workforce, particularly the more educated. In the context
here, the return to experience is likely to be larger for these groups than it is for new high school
high school, but Hotz et al. (2002), using the same data, argue and present evidence that once unobserved endogeneity
is taken into account, the positive effects become statistically indistinguishable from zero.
6For evidence that the unemployment rate serves as a decent proxy for labor demand, and the procyclicality of wage
offers, see Hall (2005) and Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009).
7The single other paper that has investigated women specifically, to my knowledge, is Kondo (2008). Because her
focus is on wages, and her sample includes women with different initial education levels, she does not examine the
behavioral substitution predicted here.
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graduates, especially new high school graduate women.8 Using the NLSY79, I find that a simple
Mincer equation estimate for female high school graduates implies a return to actual experience of
about 3 percent among new workers. This is considerably less than the implied estimates of 10 to 13
percent for new male workers found by Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006). Over time, not only
will the negative impact on wages persist for the labor friction-related reasons of implicit contracting
(Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991) or reduced accumulation of industry or occupation specific capital
(Kahn, 2010), these effects compound as wage growth occurs from a smaller initial base. With a
flatter wage profile, not only is the initial penalty from foregoing work smaller, so is the compounding
effect. This implies weaker long-term wage effects among individuals who do work, and, because the
implicit wage offers are penalized less, contemporaneous labor demand shocks are likely to matter
more than the initial labor demand shock for the less educated, and for women more than men.
Consequently, negative employment effects for less educated women are likely temporary.
2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Discussion of Data
To investigate the presence and magnitude of behavioral shifts, I employ the National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort. The NLSY79 is a detailed panel data set that first interviewed
12,686 individuals aged 14 to 22 in 1979 and conducted follow-up interviews annually thereafter until
1994, when subsequent interviews became biennial. Not only does it contains extensive information
on education and work history, its respondents graduate high school during the mid 1970s through
early 80s, a period that experienced a recession, a recovery, and another recession.9
The panel data in the NLSY79 provide several advantages over repeated cross-sections from the
Current Population Survey (CPS ). By using the restricted geocoded version of the data set, I can
precisely identify the exact year, month, and geography of high school graduation.10 This allows me
to restrict the sample to the population of interest: “on-time” high school graduates who leave high
school the year they turn 17, 18 or 19. Additionally, as the CPS is a household sample, individuals
attending college and living in a dormitory may not be counted properly, which is particularly
8This would be true, for example, if there are complementarities between education and work experience.
9For more information on the NLSY79, see the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ web site: http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy79.
htm.
10Measurement error in the CPS on the timing and location of receipt of the high school diploma may be substantial.
First, the date of diploma receipt is not consistently available, and back-of-the-envelope calculations from the NLSY79
suggest considerable dispersion in the age at diploma receipt, making imputation based on age unwise. Second, high
school graduation is generally commingled with GED receipt. Heckman and LaFontaine (2007) review why GEDs are
not the same as actual diplomas and document that 10 to 15 percent of high school completers in the CPS are GED
recipients.
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problematic as college enrollment is an outcome of interest. Perhaps most importantly, however, is
that the data provide an ability measure, the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT).11 Although no
measure of ability is perfect, the AFQT is likely to be a good proxy for the ability variable discussed
in Section 2.2. Since respondents ranged in age from 15 to 23 at the time of administration, it
is necessary to adjust the scores to make them comparable across cohorts. I create age-specific
z-scores by regressing the raw scores on year of birth dummies and then dividing the residuals from
this regression by their sample cohort standard deviations.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables
Panel A: Time Invariant Variables
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
Age-standardized AFQT 0.275 0.847 0.202 0.803
National unemployment rate at HS grad 7.44 1.24 7.40 1.21
Panel B: Time Varying Variables
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
Years since HS graduation 13.21 7.32 13.36 7.38
Currently in labor force 0.855 0.352 0.775 0.418
Currently employed 0.796 0.403 0.716 0.451
Annual weeks employed 43.3 15.9 38.1 19.7
Annual hours worked 1935 960 1431 932
Currently enrolled 0.131 0.338 0.130 0.337
Log hourly wages ($1977) 1.632 0.585 1.404 0.527
See Data Appendix for variable definitions and construction.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables
Men Women
Men Women
Notes: See data appendix for variable definitions and construction.
The NLSY79 data are then linked to external labor market indicators. For the principal inde-
pendent variable of interest, the labor market demand shock at the time of high school graduation,
I match the national annual average unemployment rate of all workers using year of graduation. I
use the national unemployment rate rather than state unemployment rates for two reasons. First, it
is measured much more precisely than the state unemployment rates. Second, it is available for all
cohorts in the data whereas the state unemployment rate series begin only in 1976, and thus cannot
be matched to the 1975 high school graduation cohort.12 Summary statistics for all the variables
mentioned are shown separately by sex in Table 2.1.
11More accurately, the respondents took a 10-component test known as the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
(ASVAB). The AFQT is a weighted sum of four of the components: arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph
comprehension, and numerical operations.
12This comes at the expense of potentially greater identifying variation in the state unemployment rates. While I do
not use these latter rates in the current paper, analysis using them in earlier drafts showed similar, albeit slightly
smaller and noisier, results than those using national unemployment rates.
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2.3.2 Empirical Strategy
Organizing the data into a panel format, I estimate the following reduced-form equation moti-
vated by the framework in the preceding section:
yit = β0 +
∑
m=1






β5r[1(yearit = r)] + β6Xi + εit,
(2.1)
where i indexes the individual and t indexes the number of years elapsed since high school gradu-
ation. The dependent variable yit is a measure of work attachment, college enrollment, or wages.
AFQTi is the age-standardized z-score, ti is the number of years since graduation (i.e., potential
experience),
∑
r β5r[1(yearit = r)] is a set of calendar year-of-observation dummies to control for
contemporaneous labor demand factors,13 and Xi are time-invariant family background controls.
14
The terms [URi0 ∗ 1(ti = m)] represent a set of variables for each possible year elapsed since gradu-
ation, where each variable takes on the value of the national unemployment rate at the time of high
school graduation for t = m and 0 otherwise. The corresponding set of coefficients, {β1m}, gives the
impact of the high school graduation unemployment rate on yit at each year after graduation, with
identification coming from temporal variation in the unemployment rate.15 When yit is continuous,
as for wages or number of weeks worked, equation (2.1) is estimated by OLS. When yit is a binary
variable, as for work status or college enrollment, the probability that yit equals 1 is modeled as the
probit analogue to equation (2.1) and estimated by (quasi-)maximum likelihood.16 For each depen-
dent variable, the estimation is done separately by sex, although tests of equality across sexes are
based on a fully interacted model. Finally, because the survey waves are fielded at different points
in the year over time, models for dependent variables that refer to a point-in-time measure (work
status, labor force participation, wages) also include a set of calendar month dummies in order to
control for seasonal effects.
13Results do not appreciably change if a linear term of the contemporaneous unemployment rate interacted with time
since high school graduation is added as an additional control.
14These background controls include a set of dummies for mother’s education, father’s education, race, whether one’s
mother worked when one was 14, whether one was born in the South, and whether one grew up speaking a language
other than English. I have also estimated equation (2.1) excluding the family background controls. Consistent
with these controls being essentially uncorrelated with the unemployment rate at high school graduation, the point
estimates are nearly identical, although standard errors are slightly larger.
15This semi-parametric specification is generally to be preferred over a low-order polynomial interaction with potential
experience and the initial unemployment rate, despite it being more demanding of the data. If the treatment effect is
not smooth over time, or fades quickly relative to the estimation horizon, a polynomial specification may not capture
effects properly. Appendix Figures 1 and 2 contrast the semi-parametric specification with one using a quartic in
experience for different outcomes.
16Because εit is likely correlated across time for a given individual, the observations are not strictly independent, and
thus the estimator is only “quasi-ML.”
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2.3.3 Validity of Empirical Strategy
Identification of the causal effect of the high school graduation unemployment rate on later
outcomes rests on the assumption that the unemployment rate is uncorrelated with the timing of
high school graduation. If there is correlation between the two, then high school graduation is itself
endogenous and the estimates will be biased and inconsistent. To test this assumption, Table 2.2
shows the results of regressing whether an individual graduated high school on time (at age 17, 18,
or 19, and with a regular diploma) on the unemployment rate in the year in which the individual
turned 17 or 18. The first two columns look at women while the last two look at men. In none of the
cases is the point estimate statistically significant at even the 10 percent level, and the magnitudes
are generally quite small. Consequently, the assumption that the unemployment rate is uncorrelated
with the timing of high school graduation cannot be rejected.
Table 2.2: Tests of Correlation Between High School Graduation and Unemployment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Women Men Men
Mean dep variable 0.758 0.758 0.724 0.724
HS Grad UR, age 17 0.003 0.009
(0.010) (0.007)
HS Grad UR, age 18 0.009 0.003
(0.006) (0.004)
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.194 0.194 0.210 0.209
Observations 2938 2938 2810 2810
Table 2: Tests of Correlation Between High School Graduation and Unemployment Rate
(standard errors in parentheses)
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
The estimates report the results of marginal effects (averaged over sample individuals) from probit regressions
of on-time high school graduation on the unemployment rate during the year when the respondent turns age 17
or 18. The samples in this table are restricted to individuals who have valid AFQT scores; they include 
nongraduates and those who graduate after age 19. The unit of observation is an individual. All regressions
include as covariates the age-standardized AFQT score and family background controls. Standard errors are
clustered at the year-of-birth level; using standard Huber-White "robust" variance estimation produces nearly
identical standard errors.
Notes: The estimates report the results of marginal effects (averaged over sample individuals) from probit regressions
of on-time high school graduation on the unemployment rate during the year when the respondent turns age 17 or
18. The samples in this table are restricted to individuals who have valid AFQT scores; they include nongraduates
and thos who gr duate after age 19. The unit of observation is n individual. All regressions i clu e as cov iates
the age-stand rdized AFQT score and family backg ound controls. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the year-of-birth level; using standard Huber-White “robust” variance estimation produces nearly identical standard
errors.
Another issue is the potential for omitted variable bias, as use of the national unemployment rate
does not allow for heterogeneity or trends across cohorts in the outcome variables. I investigate this
possibility by making the assumption that ability, as measured by the AFQT, is highly correlated
with the unobserved cohort heterogeneity parameter. Appendix Table 2.1 presents sample means
and standard errors of the normalized AFQT measure by high school graduation cohort. Two
things bear mentioning. First, most of the scores are significantly positive, at around 0.2 standard
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deviations above zero. This is commensurate with the fact that the sample is conditioned on those
who graduated from high school (full diploma) and on time (age 17, 18 or 19); this group is expected
to be slightly above average. Second, most of the means are not significantly different from one
another; the two exceptions are 1976 and 1983. The difference between 1976 and most of the other
years is small, about 0.1 standard deviations. The 1983 mean, on the other hand, is a clear outlier
with a mean of 0.5 standard deviations below zero. As the youngest cohort in the NLSY79 turned 15
during the calendar year 1979, the 1983 high school graduation cohort consists exclusively of students
who turned 19 that year. This group may disproportionately comprise students who were held back
a year, individuals who are presumably of lower than average ability. Because this finding calls
into question the comparability of the 1983 cohort with the others, the subsequent regressions were
also run omitting this cohort, as well as the 1976 graduation cohort; results were not appreciably
affected. Thus, cohort differences do not appear to be an important concern for estimation.17
2.3.4 Regarding Inference
For purposes of inference, it would be desirable to allow for arbitrary correlation of the er-
rors within a high school graduation year cohort, of which there are nine (see Moulton, 1986, and
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). However, when the number of clusters is small, both
the standard normal distribution and the t-distribution with few degrees of freedom may prove
poor approximations of the distribution of the test statistic, making standard asymptotic inference
problematic. Two alternative approaches for variance estimation when there are few clusters have
been suggested (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008): a nonparametric cluster bootstrap and a
wild cluster bootstrap of the t-statistic. The first of these methods relies on re-sampling the data by
clusters, running the estimation, and then deriving the distribution of the point estimates across the
re-samples. The second is a more complicated technique that relies on simulating data under the null
hypothesis. Unfortunately, there are difficulties using either technique to calculate standard errors
in the current setting. The nonparametric cluster bootstrap will produce some re-samples with very
little variation in the key regressor—the unemployment rate at high school graduation—resulting in
point estimates that behave erratically. Indeed, Cameron et al. present simulations that show that
this method does not perform well when the number of clusters is fewer than 20.18 The wild cluster
bootstrap, on the other hand, is designed for continuous (not binary) outcomes and to yield rejection
17The data appendix discusses further approaches used to check the validity of the empirical strategy against variation
across cohorts.
18In particular, the distribution of the point estimates is highly kurtotic, with data points in the tails occurring when
variation in the high school unemployment rate is small.
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regions rather than standard errors, per se. Furthermore, recent work suggests the approach may
not be robust to model mis-specification (Kline and Santos, 2011).
Because of the shortcomings of these variance estimation approaches, I have chosen to present
standard errors that cluster the error structure on individuals. These standard errors are generally
larger than those from clustering on high school graduation year, so this approach will lead to more
conservative inference. (Wald tests of joint significance are based on the “robust” estimator of the
covariance matrix that accounts for individual-level clustering.) However, because it is not feasible
to reliably allow for intra-graduation cohort correlation, some caution should be used in inferring
statistical significance.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 The Work Decision
The results from estimation of the model for whether the respondent is currently working appear
in column 1 of Table 2.3 (women) and Table 2.4 (men). These estimates show how changes in
the unemployment rate at high school graduation affect the likelihood of working for each of the
15 years following graduation.19 For women, the effects are negative, large in magnitude, and
statistically significant for the first few years after graduation. In the first year, the average woman
is 2.5 percentage points (about 4 percent) less likely to be employed per percentage point rise in
the unemployment rate. Thus, a woman who graduated in a severe recession like that of 1982,
in which the unemployment rate rose 3 percentage points above its long-term average, would be
7.5 percentage points (or about 12 percent) less likely to be working one year after graduation.20
Following this sharp drop in the first year, the net effect begins to diminish, with the magnitude of
the estimate falling by almost half, to 1.4 percentage points, in the second year, and another
19Although the underlying regressions use all available experience years, to save space, Tables 2.3 and 2.4 report effects
only up to 15 years after graduation; significant effects past this horizon will be discussed as they arise.
20For comparison, this 7.5 percentage point reduction is of approximately the same magnitude as Angrist and Evans
(1998) find for the motherhood penalty using data on twin births, and it is about two-thirds of the difference in
employment rates between females who are exactly high school graduates and those with some college (Bureau of
Labor Statistics).
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Table 2.3: Working Status by Experience Year, Women
(1) (2) (3)




   1 year after 0.583 -0.0246*** 32.2 -0.895** 1029 -56.94***
[0.0087] [0.354] [15.53]
   2 years after 0.652 -0.0136** 34.0 -0.621** 1129 -42.87***
[0.0069] [0.304] [13.33]
   3 years after 0.674 -0.0097* 35.0 -0.470* 1189 -34.23***
[0.0057] [0.265] [11.63]
   4 years after 0.686 -0.0082 36.1 -0.342 1295 -20.42*
[0.0052] [0.244] [10.76]
   5 years after 0.753 0.0010 38.1 -0.095 1455 -0.56
[0.0047] [0.233] [10.39]
   6 years after 0.768 0.0025 39.5 0.085 1530 7.91
[0.0047] [0.230] [10.49]
   7 years after 0.781 0.0032 39.3 0.033 1526 4.56
[0.0049] [0.235] [10.87]
   8 years after 0.781 0.0024 39.4 0.023 1538 3.83
[0.0051] [0.243] [11.38]
   9 years after 0.767 -0.0009 39.0 -0.072 1537 1.46
[0.0056] [0.252] [11.94]
   10 years after 0.764 -0.0020 39.2 -0.063 1543 0.26
[0.0058] [0.262] [12.51]
   11 years after 0.765 -0.0027 29.1 -0.102 1536 -2.17
[0.0059] [0.271] [13.04]
   12 years after 0.749 -0.0059 39.1 -0.129 1530 -5.30
[0.0061] [0.277] [13.40]
   13 years after 0.747 -0.0077 39.0 -0.187 1513 -10.25
[0.0062] [0.283] [13.78]
   14 years after 0.756 -0.0082 39.3 -0.194 1524 -11.63
[0.0061] [0.286] [14.03]
   15 years after 0.765 -0.0086 39.5 -0.207 1518 -14.49
[0.0064] [0.288] [14.21]
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.031 0.037 0.045
Observations 34,660 50,657 50,157
Unique women 2,211 2,209 2,209
The estimates report the marginal effect of a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate in the year of high school
graduation on the likelihood of being employed x years after high school graduation. Column 1 shows average marginal effects
(averaged across sample observations) from a probit; columns 2 and 3 show OLS coefficients. All regressions also include
AFQT z-score, a quadratic in years since high school graduation, dummies for years of observation, and family background
controls (mother's education, father's education, race dummies, a dummy for whether the mother was working when respondent
was 14, a dummy for whether the respondent was born in the South, and a dummy for whether the respondent grew up
speaking a foreign language). Column 1 also includes month of interview dummies. Observations are person-years, and the
number of unique individuals refers to respondents who have at least one observation in the sample. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level. See text for discussion on inference.
Table 3a: Working Status by Experience Year, o en
(standard errors in brackets)
* significant at 10%     ** significant at 5%     *** significant at 1%
Wald test 1-4 years 








Notes: The estimates report the marginal effect of a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate in the
year of high school graduation on the likelihood of being employed x years after high school graduation. Column
1 shows average marginal effects(averaged across sample observations) from a probit; columns 2 and 3 show OLS
coefficients. All egressions also inclu e AFQT z-score, a qu dratic in years since high school graduation, dummies
for years of observation, and family background controls (mother’s education, father’s education, race dummies, a
dummy for whether the mother was working when respondent was 14, a dummy for whether the respondent was
born int he South, an dummy for whether the respo dent grew up speaking a foreign language). Column 1 also
includes month of interview dummies. Observations are person-years, and the number of unique individuals refers
to respondents who have at least one observation in the sample. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the
individual level. See text for discussion on inference.
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Table 2.4: Working Status by Experience Year, Men
(1) (2) (3)




   1 year after 0.594 0.0102 32.9 0.123 1199 -17.70
[0.0092] [0.340] [17.17]
   2 years after 0.640 0.0058 34.6 0.029 1318 -21.61
[0.0075] [0.303] [15.46]
   3 years after 0.667 -0.0005 36.0 -0.105 1402 -28.72**
[0.0065] [0.268] [13.96]
   4 years after 0.695 -0.0053 37.6 -0.159 1528 -28.83**
[0.0060] [0.244] [12.93]
   5 years after 0.767 -0.0024 40.4 -0.051 1730 -18.39
[0.0055] [0.230] [12.42]
   6 years after 0.816 -0.0016 42.3 -0.044 1846 -19.07
[0.0052] [0.219] [12.15]
   7 years after 0.846 -0.0023 44.1 -0.043 1962 -18.49
[0.0049] [0.2111] [12.09]
   8 years after 0.865 -0.0035 45.0 -0.132 2020 -24.16**
[0.0048] [0.209] [12.21]
   9 years after 0.881 -0.0037 45.8 -0.217 2080 -27.85**
[0.0046] [0.207] [12.31]
   10 years after 0.892 -0.0039 46.0 -0.334 2118 -31.64**
[0.0045] [0.207] [12.51]
   11 years after 0.893 -0.0049 46.3 -0.425** 2155 -34.10***
[0.0046] [0.206] [12.68]
   12 years after 0.905 -0.0042 46.6 -0.509** 2190 -36.41***
[0.0044] [0.207] [12.87]
   13 years after 0.904 -0.0051 46.7 -0.574*** 2182 -42.41***
[0.0047] [0.209] [13.09]
   14 years after 0.931 -0.0006 47.3 -0.562*** 2224 -40.33***
[0.0037] [0.208] [13.16]
   15 years after 0.913 -0.0030 47.3 -0.620*** 2233 -41.86***
[0.0047] [0.207] [13.16]
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.098 0.108 0.142
Observations 30,673 44,381 43,905
Unique women 2,006 2,004 2,004
The estimates report the marginal effect of a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate in the year of high school
graduation on the likelihood of being employed x years after high school graduation. Column 1 shows average marginal effects
(averaged across sample observations) from a probit; columns 2 and 3 show OLS coefficients. All regressions also include
AFQT z-score, a quadratic in years since high school graduation, dummies for years of observation, and family background
controls. Column 1 also includes month of interview dummies. Observations are person-years, and the number of unique
individuals refers to respondents who have at least one observation in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. See text for discussion on inference.
Table 3b: Working Status by Experience Year, Men








Wald test 1-4 years 
zero effect (p-value) 0.100 0.171 0.012
* significant at 10%     ** significant at 5%     *** significant at 1%
Wald test 1-4 years, 
men same as women 0.010 0.017 0.003
Notes: See notes to Table 2.3.
third, to 1 p rcen age oint, by the third year. One can easily r ject the null hypothesis of no ffec
of the initial unemployment rate on the likelihood of working in the first four years (p = 0.003).
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However, full recovery is reached five years out, and there appears to be no significant effect of the
high school graduation unemployment rate on women’s work status, either negative or positive, after
this point.
Men, on the other hand, suffer no short-run employment penalty to graduating in a recession
(Table 2.4). In fact, the point estimates are actually positive for the first two years, although none
of the estimates is individually statistically significant. Although the joint test of no effect over the
first four years is marginally significant (p=0.100), the change in sign of the point estimates rules out
a negative effect. Moreover, the initial employment effects between women and men are statistically
different at the 1 percent level. This difference can perhaps best be seen in Figure 2.1, which plots
out the estimates for both sexes over the 15-year time horizon.21
Furthermore, the negative work effects for women are not driven by women entering unemploy-
ment. Figure 2.2 presents estimates based on equation (2.1) using labor force participation as the
dependent variable. The pattern of estimates for women is nearly identical to the work estimates
shown in Figure 2.1. The pattern for men is remarkably similar as well, except for the first two years
out, where labor force participation effects are slightly more positive than work estimates (although
they are not statistically significantly different). These results are consistent with the average high
school graduate woman having a more valuable alternative option to working than the average high
school graduate man.22
The remaining columns of Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show that these work effects are robust to alternative
measures of work intensity. Column 2 reports the effects of the unemployment rate on the number
of weeks worked over the calendar year, and column 3 similarly shows effects for the number of
hours worked over the calendar year.23 For women, the pattern of the coefficients is quite similar
to the binary measure of work status: a strong negative estimate at one year after graduation that
fades away over the next two to three years. The magnitudes are also comparable. The initial 0.9
week (57 hour) reduction in work at one year amounts to a 2.8 (5.5) percent decrease, close to the
4 percent decline for work status. Tests on the joint significance of effects over the first four years
also give similar inference: rejections of no effect at p=0.039 for weeks worked and p<0.001 for
21Tests of joint significance from 5 years until the end of the data horizon (including past year 15) indicate no significant
effect for women (p=0.122), a marginally significant impact for men (p=0.051), and no statistical difference between
the two (p=0.212).
22The negative work results for women appear to be driven by those who don’t go to college: restricting the sample to
those who don’t enroll in the first four years after high school produces effects approximately 50 percent larger in the
first two years.
23As these measures are based on work history schedules, they are available for every year, including after the survey
switched to a biennial format. In contrast, the work status variable in column 1 is based on the employment status
recode variable, which is available only through 1998. Both these factors serve to increase the number of observations
in columns 2 and 3.
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Figure 2.1: Net Marginal Effects of HS Graduation Unemployment Rate on the Probability of Work-
ing, by Years Since Graduation
Data represent the net marginal effect (in percentage points) on the likelihood of working (Fig 1) or being a labor
force participant (Fig 2) per percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate at the time of high































Figure 1: Net marginal effects of HS graduation unemployment rate on the 
probability of worki g, by years since graduation 































Figure 2: Net marginal effects of HS graduation unemployment rate on the 
probability of being in the labor force, by years since graduation 
Women      Men 
Notes: Data represent the net marginal effect (in percentage points) on the likelihood of working per percentage point
increase in the national unemployment rate at the time of high school graduation. Dashed lines represent point-wise
95-percent confidence intervals.
Figure 2.2: Net Marginal Effects of HS Graduation Unemployment Rate on the Probability of Being
in the Labor Force, by Years Since Graduation
Data represent the net marginal effect (in percentage points) on the likelihood of working (Fig 1) or being a labor
force participant (Fig 2) per percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate at the time of high































Figure 1: Net marginal effects of HS graduation unemployment rate on the 
probability of working, by years since graduation 































Figure 2: Net marginal effects of HS graduation unemploy t rate on the 
pro ability of being in the labor force, by years since graduation 
Women      Men 
Notes: Dat represent he net inal effect (in percentage points) on the likelihood of being in the labor force per
percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate at the time of high school graduation. Dashed lines
represent point-wise 95-percent confidence intervals.
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hours worked. (Although joint tests over the remaining time horizon also lead to rejection of no
effect—p=0.013 for weeks worked, p=0.003 for hours worked—these are harder to interpret given
the estimates’ change in sign, and the magnitudes are only one-fourth the size as in the first few
years.)
The weeks worked by men soon after graduation, like work status, is not affected by the high
school unemployment rate (p=0.171 for the first four years), but there does appear to be a slight
negative effect on hours worked. More specifically, men cut their annual hours by about 1.5 to 2
percent per percentage point increase in the unemployment rate over their late teens and early 20s
(p=0.012). Since there is no reduction in weeks worked, though, this effect stems from a shorter
work week. This decline is still significantly smaller than that for women: the null of equal effects
between the sexes can be rejected at the 1 percent level for hours worked (and the 5 percent level
for weeks worked). Also different from the women is that the effect of the initial unemployment rate
has enduring effects on the men. This negative impact starts showing at about 10 years after high
school and persists for another 10 years (not fully shown in the table).24 Over this horizon, men
work about 0.5 fewer weeks and 35 to 40 fewer hours per year for each percentage point increase
in the unemployment rate. These estimates imply that 10 to 20 years after graduating high school
during a severe recession, men’s weeks (hours) worked would be about 4 (7) percent lower than if
they had graduated during a typical labor market. The persistence in male negative employment
effects at the intensive margin suggests that the labor frictions described by Kahn (2010), in which
the initial labor demand shock affects accumulation of occupation or industry-specific human capital,
may manifest in ways other than wages.
2.4.2 College Enrollment
Because the negative work (and labor supply) effects shown in Table 2.3 last around four years,
the typical length of study for a baccalaureate degree, the initial labor demand shock possibly induces
women from working into education.25 The first column of Table 2.5 demonstrates this is not the
case. Examining the first four rows of coefficients, there is no effect at all of the unemployment rate
on college enrollment rates of women. Men, on the other hand, are induced into attending college
shortly after graduation, and the magnitudes of these effects are considerable:
24The null hypothesis that there is no effect for men from year 5 through the end of the horizon is soundly rejected
(p<0.001 for weeks worked, p=0.005 for hours worked). Despite the differences in magnitude of the point estimates,
the joint effects for men over this interval are not statistically distinguishable from those for women.
25Betts and McFarland (1995) and Turner (2003) find positive effects of the unemployment rate on college enrollment;
Betts and McFarland show that the effect is concentrated among two-year colleges, and Turner that the effect is much
stronger among people who have been out of high school for several years (i.e., who are in their mid and late 20s).
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Table 2.5: College Enrollment and Log Wages by Experience Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men Women Men
HS Grad UR:
   1 year after 0.472 -0.0048 0.453 0.0173* -0.0131* -0.0240***
[0.0091] [0.0091] [0.0074] [0.0091]
   2 years after 0.413 -0.0025 0.421 0.0188** -0.0153** -0.0184**
[0.0075] [0.0076] [0.0065] [0.0081]
   3 years after 0.358 -0.0004 0.384 0.0196*** -0.0136** -0.0164**
[0.0062] [0.0065] [0.0056] [0.0072]
   4 years after 0.315 0.0018 0.366 0.0219*** -0.0115** -0.0157**
[0.0052] [0.0058] [0.0052] [0.0067]
   5 years after 0.176 -0.0078** 0.233 0.0075 -0.0070 -0.0098
[0.0038] [0.0048] [0.0051] [0.0065]
   6 years after 0.125 -0.0075** 0.161 0.0004 -0.0027 -0.0053
[0.0031] [0.0039] [0.0053] [0.0064]
   7 years after 0.110 -0.0049 0.132 -0.0004 -0.0022 -0.0026
[0.0030] [0.0037] [0.0056] [0.0066]
   8 years after 0.105 -0.0020 0.111 -0.0007 -0.0026 -0.0036
[0.0030] [0.0035] [0.0060] [0.0069]
   9 years after 0.111 0.0027 0.097 -0.0004 -0.0047 -0.0020
[0.0034] [0.0035] [0.0065] [0.0071]
   10 years after 0.086 0.0018 0.087 -0.0001 -0.0042 -0.0008
[0.0030] [0.0034] [0.0069] [0.0075]
   11 years after 0.080 0.0034 0.069 -0.0013 -0.0055 -0.0014
[0.0030] [0.0029] [0.0073] [0.0078]
   12 years after 0.080 0.0055* 0.065 -0.0010 -0.0047 -0.0020
[0.0031] [0.0029] [0.0077] [0.0082]
   13 years after 0.076 0.0072** 0.055 -0.0008 -0.0068 -0.0019
[0.0031] [0.0028] [0.0080] [0.0084]
   14 years after 0.078 0.0091*** 0.052 -0.0002 -0.0059 -0.0032
[0.0033] [0.0028] [0.0083] [0.0086]
   15 years after 0.076 0.0112*** 0.050 0.0003 -0.0096 -0.0047
[0.0034] [0.0028] [0.0085] [0.0089]
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.196 0.280 0.272 0.300
Observations 40,135 35,225 29,862 29,661
Unique individuals 2,211 2,007 2,194 1,988
0.075
* significant at 10%     ** significant at 5%     *** significant at 1%
Wald test 1-4 years, 
men same as women 0.133
Notes: The estimates in columns 1 and 2 report the marginal effect (averaged across relevant observations) from a probit of
a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate in the year of high school graduation on the likelihood of being
enrolled in college x years after high school graduation. Columns 3 and 4 have real log hourly wage as the dependent
variable and report estimates from an OLS regression. All regressions include the same controls as those in Table 3.
Observations are person-years, and the number of unique individuals refers to respondents who have at least one
observation in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. See text for discussion on inference.
Log wages
Table 4: Co lege Enr ll t  og ages by Experience Year
(standard errors in brackets)







Notes: The estimates in columns 1 and 2 report the marginal effect (averaged across relevant observations) from a
probit of a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate in the year of high school graduation on the
likelihood of being enrolled in college x years after high school graduatio . Columns 3 and 4 have real l g hourly wage
as the dependent variable and report estimates from a OLS regression. All regressions include the same controls as
those in Table 2.3. Observations are person-years, and the number of unique individuals refers to respondents who
have at least one observation in the sample. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the individual level. See
text for discussion on inference.
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a one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate increases the enrollment rate by about 2
percentage points, or between 4 and 6 percent.26 Although one just fails to reject that the effects
on enrollment are the same for men and women over the first four years as a whole (p = 0.133), the
differences for each of these years individually are statistically significant at the 5 percent level (10
percent for the first year).
The effects for men are somewhat higher than what Betts and McFarland (1995) or Turner
(2003) find for recent high school graduates, but these studies did not look at enrollment separately
by sex. If the non-response of women is averaged in with the positive response of men, the estimates
are in line with both studies. As women on the margin of attending college are likely to work
considerably less over their lifetime than similar men, and would thus be expected to have a lower
return to attending college, their lack of immediate enrollment response is consistent with the theory
described in Section 2.2. This effect would be enhanced if credit constraints are more binding during
times of weaker labor demand (Christian 2007).27
Interestingly, there is a modest but generally statistically significant net negative effect on enroll-
ment rates for women five and six years after graduation. Perhaps initial college-going for the average
woman in the sample is relatively inelastic to labor market conditions at high school graduation,
but continuing in college (or going to graduate school) is not.28
This might be the case, for example, if an individual who has amassed debt to pay for college may
be reluctant or unable to accumulate more by continuing one’s studies, and instead might prefer
to work or at least put off further schooling. Some support for this hypothesis can be found by
looking at the rows for the effects 12 or more years after graduation: net effects for women are now
significant and positive in column 1. (Although Table 2.5 truncates experience years beyond 15,
these later interaction effects are also positive through year 20, and are driven by women who have
not yet completed college.) In contrast, there are negligible enrollment effects for men.29 Going
back to school may be optimal for women if returns to schooling are larger than returns to work
experience (Light and Ureta, 1995), and the value of home production falls relatively quickly after
26These enrollment effects are concentrated among the men who continue to work, suggesting that education may be
acting as a substitute for on the job training if Kahn’s (2010) match-based training job friction story is correct. It
is also worth noting that these enrollment effects do translate into higher educational attainment: men obtain about
0.08 more years of schooling per percentage point increase in the high school unemployment rate.
27Indeed, stratifying the enrollment analysis by whether the respondent had a father who was a manager or professional,
a proxy for household wealth, showed weak positive enrollment effects for women with white-collar fathers and weak
negative effects for women with blue-collar fathers, although these results were not statistically significant.
28Further analysis showed that the negative effect five to six years out was driven equally by those without a BA and
those in graduate school.
29The positive effects for women at 12 to 15 years just fail to be significantly different from those of the men (p =





Finally, columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.5 present results for log real hourly wages among working
individuals. If women, on average, view home production as a more feasible alternative to working
than men, more women at the margin (near their reservation market wage) will choose not to work
in the market, as shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Although wage offers are lowered for everyone, the
substitution out of working by women at the margin, who have lower average wages, creates positive
selection among the women who remain working. As a result, the effect of the initial unemployment
rate on observed wages should be smaller for women than for men.
The wage estimates in Table 2.5 show that both men and women experience a temporary negative
wage impact after graduating in a weak labor market. A severe recession that raises the unemploy-
ment rate by 3 to 4 percentage points reduces women’s wages by about 5 percent over the next four
years, and men’s wages by about 7 percent. The effects for both sexes are statistically significant
at the 5-percent level for each of the first four years after graduation as well as jointly over this
horizon. Although it is only marginally significant (p = 0.075), one can also reject that men and
women suffer the same wage impact.
Furthermore, the wage estimates here, even for the men, are a little over half of what Oreopoulos
et al. (2012) find for similar cohorts of Canadian college graduate men and approximately one-third
of what Kahn (2010) finds in her sample of NLSY79 college graduate white men. Additionally, the
wage effects fade away more rapidly here than in those studies; by six years out, the wages of both
women and men who graduated in a recession are barely distinguishable from those of their more
fortunate peers.30 However, as there are lingering negative effects on the work intensity of men
(Table 2.4), there is some persistence of a slight loss in their annual earnings. In context, the results
here and in the other papers suggest that if there are wage frictions in the form of implicit contracting
or match-based training, their effect on earnings depends integrally on the underlying wage profiles
of affected groups. The flatter the wage profile, the less persistent and severe labor-demand-induced
wage frictions appear to be.
30Joint tests over the horizon from 5 years out show statistical significance (p=0.044 for women and p=0.015 for men;




While it would be desirable to test directly for the impact on home production using the same
methodology, limitations of the data make this infeasible. However, the timing of certain specific
channels of home production, notably first marriage and childbearing, can be investigated. One
should note that if the unemployment rate affects the marriage market by lowering the wages of
potential spouses, a positive own substitution effect toward family formation can be offset by a
negative income effect from lower earnings of mates. Although most of the literature on the economic
determinants of fertility has found evidence for procyclical fertility since the 1970s (see Butz and
Ward, 1979, and Andersson, 2000, for a review), these papers have focused on married women or
on all women of childbearing age, with little specific attention toward the young and unmarried.
An exception is Kondo (2011), who finds support for opposing own-substitution and mate-income
effects: young women who experience higher unemployment rates are likely to marry and have
children sooner, but these effects are countered by the unemployment rates that young men face.
In Figures 2.3 and 2.4, I present results from a modification of equation (2.1) that show the impact
of the initial unemployment rate on the probability of having been married or having borne a child.31
While the women evince no change in the likelihood of either event shortly after graduation, the
men do shy away from marriage in their early 20s, findings broadly consistent with Kondo (2011),
despite her different methodology.
There is some suggestive evidence, however, that women graduating high school in a recession do
in fact partially shift toward housework. Using a single cross-section of time-use data in the NLSY79
from 1981 with state unemployment rates, and parameterizing the impact of the unemployment rate
linearly with time elapsed, women (but not men) increased their time spent in housework by about
10 percent per percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, with this effect fading over the
next four years. Of course, as the identification strategy is different, this finding should be treated
cautiously. Some additional evidence comes from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS ). Using
these data, which run from 2003 through 2010, Aguiar, Hurst, and Karabarbounis (2011) demon-
strate that in the 2008-2009 recession, both women and men reduced their time spent on market
work by about 6 percent, with about one-third of the difference being spent on home production.
However, they looked at men and women of all ages and education levels. With the same data, I
examined how the national unemployment rate at age 18 affected the daily home-production time
31Because these outcomes are one-time events, equation (2.1) is estimated without the time-varying controls. A version
that also included a linear trend in year of birth to capture trends unrelated to the unemployment rate produced
similar results.
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of high school graduates aged 18 through 24.32
Women increased this time between 9 and 14 minutes (about 9 percent) per percentage point
increase in the unemployment rate between the ages of 18 and 22; men, on the other hand, saw
insignificant increases of only 1 to 5 minutes (about 5 percent). While none of these time use results
is definitive, and better data would certainly be helpful, the patterns are consistent with women
being more likely than men to substitute into home production following graduating high school in
a recession.
Figure 2.3: Net Marginal Effects of HS Graduation Unemployment Rate on Marriage Probability,
by Years Since Graduation
Notes: Data represent the net marginal effect on probability of first marriage (Fig 5) or first childbirth (Fig 
6) per percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate at the time of high school 
graduation. Dashed lines represent point-wise 95 percent confidence intervals.
Notes: Data represent the net marginal effect on probability of first marriage (Fig 3) or first childbirth (Fig 4) per
percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate at the time of high school graduation. Dashed lines






























Figure 3: Net marginal effects of HS graduation une ployment rate on marriage 
probability, by years since graduation 































Figure 4: Net marginal effects of HS graduation unemployment rate on childbirth 
probability, by years since graduation 
Women      Men 
Notes: Data represent the net marginal effect (in percentage points) on the likelihood of first marriage per percentage
point increase in the national unemployment rate at the time of high school graduation. Dashed lines represent
point-wise 95-percent confidence intervals.
32More specifically, I combined the time use variables for “household activities” and “caring for and helping household
members” and regressed this measure on a variant of (2.1) that excludes family background variables other than race
(as they aren’t available) but includes day-of-the-week controls. Detailed results are available upon request from the
author.
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Figure 2.4: Net Marginal Effects of HS Graduation Unemployment Rate on Childbirth Probability,
by Years Since Graduation
Notes: Data represent the net marginal effect on probability of first marriage (Fig 5) or first childbirth (Fig 
6) per percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate at the time of high school 
graduation. Dashed lines represent point-wise 95 percent confidence intervals.
Notes: Data represent the net marginal effect on probability of first marriage (Fig 3) or first childbirth (Fig 4) per
percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate at the time of high school graduation. Dashed lines
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Figu e 4: Net marginal effects of HS graduation unemployment rate on childbirth 
probability, by years since graduation 
Women      Men 
Notes: Data represent the net marginal effect (in percentage points) on the likelihood of first childbirth per percentage
point increase i th national unemployment r te at the time of high school graduation. Dashed l nes repr sent point-
wise 95-percent confidence intervals.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper set out to provide and test the implications of a framework for how men and women
(and the more educated and less educated) may vary in their behavioral responses to beginning labor
market entry during a recession. In contrast with previous related literature that found a substantial
negative wage impact but no effect on labor supply in samples of highly educated men, the empirical
evidence presented here suggests a different outcome for the less well educated. Women, but not
men, who graduate high school in an adverse labor market are less likely to be in the workforce for the
next four years, but longer-term effects are minimal. Further, while men increase their enrollment
as a short-run response to weak labor demand, women do not; instead, they appear temporarily to
substitute into home production, most likely in the form of housework. Additionally, the wages of
high school graduate women who do continue to work—in both the short-run and the long-run—are
less affected by the unemployment rate at the time of graduation than are the wages of similarly
educated men, and both groups are less affected than the college graduates previously studied.
This analysis extends our understanding of the short and long-run implications of business cycles
for workers by focusing on the half of the population—women—that has been understudied in this
literature. More directly, it illustrates how certain fundamental economic parameters, such as the
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return to labor market experience, are integral in determining both how and how long individuals are
affected by poor labor markets. Studies that look to identify welfare costs predominantly through
lost wages are likely to be inadequate for the less educated, particularly less educated women.
Of course, the absence of long-term labor supply and wage effects does not mean that women
who graduate high school in a recession are not affected negatively over the long run. A fertile area
for future research exists in exploring how temporary reductions in the likelihood of working found
here translate more thoroughly into lifetime income,33 health, the selection into and duration of
marriage, the quantity and quality of investments in children,34 and many other possible dimensions
of social interest.
With the 2008-2009 recession having brought unemployment rates into the double digits for the
first time in a generation, some caution should be exercised in generalizing the results found here to
the women coming of age today. Blau and Kahn (2007) and others have shown that women’s labor
supply elasticity has fallen and their return to experience has grown in the past quarter century,
although they have not yet approached the levels of men. These trends serve to lower the relative
value of home production as an alternative and may concentrate the impact of graduating in a
recession more toward wages and less in temporary reductions in working. As a consequence, the
longer term ramifications for women graduating high school today may be more substantial than in
the past.
33See Jacobsen and Levin (1995).




Sample and Variable Construction
The 12,686 individuals initially surveyed in the NLSY79 comprise different three sample groups:
a nationally representative sample of youths aged 14 to 21 in 1979, an over-sample of the poor and
racial minorities, and a military sample. Because the focus of the analysis in this paper is on the
choices of high school graduates, I use the first of these samples in the analysis. (The over-sample
is not used because not all of its respondents are followed for the entire time horizon.) I restrict the
estimation sample to individuals who graduated high school on time (at age 17, 18, or 19) and have
valid AFQT scores. Appendix Table 2.2 provides details about how conditioning the sample affects
the sample size.
Details on the construction of the key variables used in the analysis are presented below.
Unemployment Rate: The national unemployment rate is the non-seasonally-adjusted annual
average for all labor force participants age 16 and older as calculated by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) from the Current Population Survey (www.bls.gov/cps).
AFQT: The Armed Forces Qualifying Test is derived from four of the ten components of the Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), with the score on each component being a variable
in the NLSY79. Specifically, the raw AFQT score is given by: arithmetic reasoning score + word
knowledge score + paragraph comprehension score + 0.5*numerical operations. I regress this raw
AFQT score on year of birth dummies using the 1979 probability sampling weights. The residuals
from this regression are converted into z-scores by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation within each year of birth.
Labor Force Participation: This binary variable is created from the employment status recode
variable for each survey year through 1998, the last year in which the employment status recode
variable exists. It is coded 1 if the respondent has a current job or is looking for one and coded 0
otherwise.
Working: This binary variable is also created from the employment status recode variable for each
survey year through 1998. It is coded 1 if the respondent has a current job and 0 otherwise.
Annual Weeks Worked and Annual Hours Worked: The NLSY79 has a complete work
history section beginning in January, 1978. Each calendar week describes the labor force status of
the individual and the number of hours worked. These variables are summed across the weeks in a
calendar year to create annual measures.
College Enrollment: This binary variable is created within the NLSY79 based on start and stop
dates at post-secondary institutions and indicates whether the individual was enrolled as of May 1
of the calendar year of the survey.
Log wages: The NLSY79 asks for the hourly rate of pay for up to five jobs in every survey wave.
I construct hourly wages using the rate of pay variable from the first job (which is the current or
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most recent job) among respondents who are employed at the the time of the survey. These wages
are converted to 1977 dollars using the CPS-U-RS and then are transformed by natural logarithm.
Outliers below $1 or above $200 (in 1977 dollars) are excluded from analysis.
Cohort Size Effects
The NLSY79 cohorts are born from 1957 through 1964 and consist of the younger Baby Boomers,
an unusually large cohort. The fertility rate, or the number of births per 1000 women aged 15 to
44, peaked in 1957 at around 120 and then began a steady decline that lasted until the mid 1970s,
reaching a low of around 65. Nonetheless, the Baby Boom is generally dated as lasting through
1964 because the fertility rate, though falling, remained historically high—it was about 105 in 1964,
approximately the level in 1949, three years after the start of the Baby Boom.35 The sheer size of
the cohort may have important implications on schooling and labor market decisions. Falaris and
Peters (1992) show that the size of both past and future cohorts (that is, the timing of birth relative
to whether the birth rate is rising or falling) affects both the amount of education an individual
receives and the age at which one completes formal schooling. Specifically, cohorts born during the
upswing of the cycle tend both to get more education and take longer per additional year to get it
than do cohorts born during the cycle downswing; cohorts born at peaks or troughs fall in between.
Thus, in the NLSY79, we might expect to see slightly less education and earlier labor market entry
for the younger cohorts. However, Falaris and Peters find that the cyclical effects for women, while
statistically significant, are quite small relative to those for men. The authors hypothesize that the
gender difference may be due to women’s smaller total labor supply and thus weaker incentives to
obtain more school in order to mitigate the negative wage effects of excess supply. This explanation
can nest with business cycle effects on women’s labor supply, but it suggests caution in disentangling
the demographic cycle from the business cycle.
A potential shortcoming of the national rate regressions is the inability to control for cohort size.
By restricting the sample to women who graduated high school at more or less the same age, any
indicator for cohort size would be almost perfectly collinear with the national unemployment rate
in the equation. If Falaris and Peters are right, however, omitted variable bias from missing cohort
effects in the national rate analysis should be trivial. Furthermore, since cohort size is falling with
time in the NLSY79 sample, the results of Welch (1979) suggest that the younger cohorts should
be faced with higher wage offers (and, hence, incentives to participate in the labor market), ceteris
paribus, than the older cohorts. But it is the younger cohorts in the sample who experienced the
highest unemployment rates upon graduation: 9.7 for the 1982 grads and 9.6 for the 1983 grads.
Thus, to the extent that cohort effects are present, we would expect the bias to go against finding
negative unemployment rate effects.36
Sample Attrition
Approximately one-third of the viable sample has attrited by survey year 2004. However, most
of the attrition occurs relatively late in the sample (mid 1990s and afterward). Thus, if much of
35These numbers are from U.S. Vital Statistics: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/pubs/pubd/vsus/vsus.htm.
36A crude approach to control for cohort effects in the national unemployment rate regressions is to include a linear
time trend in year of birth or year of high school graduation. Doing so, however, has no notable effect on any of the
unemployment rate coefficient estimates.
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the effect of the initial labor demand shock is concentrated relatively soon after graduation, as the
framework suggests, estimation should not be significantly plagued by sample attrition. Nevertheless,
to address the potential problem, each estimation equation was run on two samples, one using all
available person-years and the other using only individuals who were interviewed every survey year.
The resulting sets of estimates were not appreciably different; sample attrition does not seem to be
a major problem.
Appendix Table 2.1: Sample Means of Standardized AFQT by High School Graduation Cohort
High School
Graduation Year Mean Std error Significantly different from:
1975 0.296 0.051 1976**, 1983***
1976 0.115 0.048 1977*, 1980**, 1982*, 1983***
1977 0.231 0.047 1983***
1978 0.208 0.048 1983***
1979 0.183 0.046 1983***
1980 0.278 0.043 1983***
1981 0.183 0.049 1983***
1982 0.236 0.052 1983***
1983 -0.543 0.129 −
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table 1:
 Sample Means of St dardized AFQT by High School Graduation Cohort
Significance levels are from t-tests of differences in means for the specified years
Notes: Significance levels are from t-tests of differences in means for the specified years. (* significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.)
Appendix Table 2.2: Sample Sizes and Attrition in the NLSY79 Cross-Section Samples
1) Female respondents in cross-section sample 3108 100.0% –
2) + also graduate high school 2409 77.5% –
3) + also graduate at age 17-19 (on time) 2337 75.2% 100.0%
4) + also have valid AFQT score 2211 71.1% 94.6%
1) Male respondents in cross-section sample 3003 100.0% –
2) + also graduate high school 2208 73.5% –
3) + also graduate at age 17-19 (on time) 2149 71.6% 100.0%











Appendix Figure 2.2: Net Marginal Effects of HS Graduation Unemployment Rate on the
Probability of College Attendance, by Years Since Graduation
Notes: Data represent the net marginal effect (in percentage points) on the likelihood of working 
(Appendix Figure 1) or being enrolled in college (Appendix Figure 2) per percentage point increase in 
the national unemployment rate at the time of high school graduation. Solid lines show effects 































Appendix Figure 1: Net marginal effects of HS graduation unemployment rate 
on the probability of working, by years since graduation 































Appendix Figure 2: Net marginal effects of HS graduation unemployment rate 
on he probability of enrolling in college, by years since graduation 
Men Women Men, quartic Women, quartic
Notes: Data represent the net marginal effect (in percentage points) on the likelihood of being enrolled in college per
percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate at the time of high school graduation. Solid lines show
effects estimated by year; dashed lines show effects from a quartic in actual time since graduation.
Appendix Figure 2.1: Net Marginal Effects of HS Graduation Unemployment Rate on the
Probability of Working, by Years Since Graduation
Notes: Data represent the net marginal effect (in percentage points) on the likelihood of working 
(Appendix Figure 1) or being enrolled in college (Appendix Figure 2) per percentage point increase in 
the national unemployment rate at the time of high school graduation. Solid lines show effects 































Appendix Figure 1: Net marginal effects of HS gra tion unemployment rate 
on the probability of working, by years since graduation 































Appendix Figure 2: Net marginal effects of HS graduation unemployment rate 
on the probability of enrolling in college, by years since graduation 
Men Women Men, quartic Women, quartic
Notes: Data represent the n t marginal effect (in percentage p ints) on the likelihood f working per percentage point
increase in the national unemployment rate at the time of high school graduation. Solid lines show effects estimated
by year; dashed lines show effects from a quartic in actual time since graduation.
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CHAPTER III
The Opt-In Revolution? Contraception and the Gender Gap
in Wages
3.1 Introduction
During the 1980s, the long-standing U.S. gender gap in pay narrowed rapidly. The median
annual wage and salary earnings of women working full-time, full-year rose from roughly 60 percent
of men’s earnings in 1979 to 69 percent a decade later. Not only was this a striking departure from
the stability of women’s relative pay during the 1970s, but the speed of women’s convergence in the
1980s was also faster than during the 1990s and the 2000s.
The correlates of the narrowing of the gender gap in the 1980s are well documented: the decade
witnessed a convergence in measured labor market skills between men and women. Expecting to
remain in the labor-force longer, women born in the 1950s (who came of age in the 1970s) narrowed
the gender gap in college going and completion, attaining professional degrees, and working in non-
traditionally female occupations (Goldin 2004, 2006). Increases in demand for skills that benefited
women relative to men increased the returns to women’s investments in market skills (Blau and Kahn
1997, Welch 2000). Widening wage inequality among women may have also encouraged women to
invest in market skills and led more able women to select into full-time employment (Mulligan and
Rubinstein 2008). Each of these factors may have contributed to and resulted from the growth in
women’s work experience (O’Neill and Polachek 1993, Wellington 1993).
The root causes of these tremendous changes are less clear. Two important but elusive candidates
include the resurgence of the women’s movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the new legal
protections afforded to women under the 1964 Civil Rights Act (and later federal enforcement) that
reduced overtly-discriminatory hiring and compensation practices-both of which should have changed
attitudes and norms about women’s employment. Recent literature suggests oral contraception,
often called “the Pill,” as another important candidate. Its diffusion to younger, unmarried women
improved their ability to time births, altered their expectations about future childbearing, and
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reduced the cost of altering career investments to reflect their changed expectations. The timing of
its diffusion during the 1960s and 1970s also fits well with the slow growth in women’s wages during
the 1970s (as younger women invested more in their human capital) and the rapid convergence in
the gender gap during the 1980s (when these women enjoyed the returns on their human capital
investments and accumulated labor-market experience). To quantify the importance of the Pill,
Goldin and Katz (2002) use state-by-birth-cohort changes in the age of consent from 21 to 18
for medical care and, thereby, prescription birth control. Based upon extensions of this empirical
strategy, the recent literature links “early access to the Pill” to delays in marriage (among college
goers) and motherhood, changes in selection into motherhood, increased educational attainment,
labor-force participation, and occupational upgrading among college graduates (Goldin and Katz
2002, Bailey 2006, Guldi 2008, Hock 2008, Ananat and Hungerman 2012). Although these studies
imply that the Pill benefitted individual women’s careers, its effect on aggregate wages need not
be large or even positive due to changes in the composition of working women and increased labor
supply. No study, however, has considered the impact of these many changes on the gender gap in
compensation.
This chapter examines the role of the Pill in altering women’s life-cycle wages and its ultimate
implications for convergence in the gender gap during the 1980s and 1990s. Following earlier work,
our empirical strategy leverages state-by-birth-cohort changes in laws reducing the age of consent for
medical care and access to prescription birth control for unmarried women under age 21. We extend
the literature by providing two new tests of this empirical strategy’s identifying assumptions. Using
the 1970 National Fertility Study, we show that early access laws doubled Pill use among women
between the ages of 18 and 20-precisely the ages affected by access laws-but not beyond age 21, when
the laws did not bind. In addition, we test the excludability of Pill access laws (i.e., the assumption
that early legal access to the Pill was conditionally, randomly assigned) using the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Young Women (NLS-YW ). Among 18 family background characteristics that
should not have been affected by these legal changes, early access to the Pill is correlated with only
one at the 10 percent level-no more than would be expected by chance.
Using longitudinal wage information from the NLS-YW, our main results show that early access
to the Pill lowered women’s wages in their early twenties (corresponding to the 1970s) but raised
their wages in their thirties and forties (corresponding to the 1980s and 1990s). By their late forties,
women with early access to the Pill earned a statistically-significant hourly premium of 8 percent-
enough to account for between a third and half of the total hourly wage gains for these cohorts
over their peers born a decade earlier. Consistent with the well-known relationship of women’s wage
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growth to cumulative labor-force experience, our decomposition indicates that almost two thirds
of the Pill-induced wage premium at the mean is explained through its effect on women’s labor-
force experience. Another third of the premium is due to changes in educational attainment and
occupational choice.
The NLS-YW also sheds light on the mechanisms for these effects. Stratifying our sample by
measures of high school “IQ score” reveals that the flexibility conferred by the Pill had no measurable
impact on the education or experience of lower IQ women. Both middle and higher IQ women,
however, raised their educational attainment in their twenties and, in their thirties, acquired more
labor-market experience and increased their representation in non-traditionally female occupations.
Interestingly, the Pill’s largest effects on work experience accrued to women in the middle of the IQ
distribution with some college, not to the high-achieving women who have been the focus of earlier
studies. In keeping with this finding, early access to the Pill had the largest impact on the lifecycle
wages of women in the middle of the IQ distribution. Thus, the rapid narrowing of the gender gap
during the 1980s reflected, in part, a Pill-induced revolution in middle-ability women planning for
and opting into paid work.
3.2 The Revolution in Women’s Work
Aggregate statistics documenting women’s wages from the 1950s and 1960s only hint at the
tremendous changes in women’s earning capacity. Goldin (1990: Table 3.1) shows that women’s real
wages fell relative to men’s from the 1950s to the 1960s; from the 1960s through the mid-1970s, the
gap in pay remained constant at roughly 60 percent (Blau, Ferber and Winkler 2010: Figure 51).
Beginning in the 1980s, the gender gap in wages narrowed substantially. Although this narrowing has
continued to the present, its pace has slowed since the mid-1990s. To provide context for our cohort-
age based investigation, this section uses the 1964 to 2009 March Current Population Surveys (CPS )
to describe by age and cohort the changes in women’s wages and labor-force outcomes, what Goldin
(2006) dubbed the “quiet revolution.”1 We also present statistics relative to men to underscore the
convergence in outcomes.
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of mean annual wage and salary earnings in 2000 dollars (PCE
deflator) for seven different birth cohorts of women relative to men-a measure of the age-specific
gender gap for the following cohorts: those born from 1922 to 1927 (called mid-1920s), 1928 to 1932
(early 1930s), 1933 to 1937 (mid-1930s), 1938 to 1942 (early 1940s), 1943 to 1946 (mid-1940s), 1947
1We use CPS rather than the NLS, because the CPS contain information on older cohorts and their larger sample sizes
make our series less noisy. Data from the NLS-YW augment this discussion when informative.
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Figure 3.1: The Evolution of the Real Annual Wage Earnings of Women Relative to Men by Age
and Birth Cohort
Opt-In Revolution - 30 
Figure 1. The Evolution of the  nnual Wage Earnings of Women Relative to Men by Age 
and Birth Cohort  
  
Annual labor earnings include income from all jobs, including self-employment. The series is adjusted for 
inflation to year 2000 dollars using the personal consumption expenditures deflator (BEA 2009). Data are 
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Notes: Annual labor earnings include income from all jobs, including self-e ployment. The series is adjusted for
inflation to year 2000 dollars using the personal consumption expenditures deflator (BEA 2009). Data are weighted
using CPS sample weights and collapsed into two-year age groups. Source: 1964-2009 March CPS.
to 1950 (late 1940s), and 1951 to 1954 (early 1950s).2 For cohorts born before the 1940s, the relative
wage series have similar age profiles. Beginning with cohorts born in the early 1940s, the gender gap
increases less rapidly (i.e., the pay of women relative to men falls less rapidly) in women’s twenties
and rebounds more quickly after age 30. For 34 year-olds, annual incomes increased from 39 percent
of similarly aged men for the 1938 to 1942 cohort to 55 percent for cohorts born less than a decade
later.
Large changes in relative wage and salary earnings followed dramatic relative increases in women’s
pre-market and post-entry career investments. Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006) show that the
share of women (relative to men) attending and completing college accelerated for cohorts born
after the mid-1930s. Labor-force participation during the childbearing years grew rapidly as well.
At the extensive margin, participation of 30-year-old women born in the mid-1940s increased by 16
percentage points (from a base of 39 percent) over cohorts born a decade earlier. For women born
in the early 1950s, this statistic increased another 14 percentage points.3 Because the labor-force
participation of men was stable over this period, these increases imply a narrowing in the cohort-
based gender gap in participation, shown as a flattening of the relative labor-force participation
2This divides the cohorts of the National Longitudinal Surveys of Mature and Young Women into roughly equal-sized
groups. Wage and salary earnings in Figure 3.1 exclude farm, business or self-employment income. Our sample
excludes those who report zero earnings, but Figure 3.1 makes no further sample restrictions.
3Statistics for women alone are computed using the March CPS, but only statistics relative to men are presented for
brevity.
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series plotted in Figure 3.2, panel A). Women’s greater labor-force participation also translated into
considerably more work experience (cf. O’Neill and Polachek 1993, Wellington 1993). In the NLS-
YW, we calculate that women born in the early 1950s worked 3000 more hours between ages 24 and
40 than did women born in the mid-1940s—an increase of 1.5 full-time, 50-week years.4
Changes in the nature of women’s work for pay—along with their experience—also coincide with
the narrowing of the cohort-based gender gap. The fraction of women working in professional or
managerial jobs in their mid-thirties was roughly twice as high for cohorts born in the mid-1940s as
for cohorts born a decade earlier. Figure 3.2, panel B, shows that, after accounting for the increase
in the share of men working in professional and managerial jobs, women’s representation in these
fields at age 30 increased by 25 percentage points between the cohorts born in the early and late
1940s and another 24 percentage points for cohorts born in the early 1950s.
Although the remarkable, late-twentieth-century transformation in women’s careers is well known,
its catalysts are less well understood. Women may have been pulled into the labor force by changes in
demand reflecting increasing enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation or skill- (and gender-) bi-
ased technological change (Welch 2000, Black and Juhn 2000, Weinberg 2000, Black and Spitz-Oener
2010). At the same time, rapidly changing ideas about women’s work and roles in the workplace
(Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti 2004, Fernandez and Fogli 2009, and Fortin 2009), shifts in divorce
rates (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007), and the availability of better colleges and better education at
the same colleges (Goldin and Katz 2010) may have increased the supply of women’s skills to the
market. The next sections describe the potential importance of the Pill for young women’s decisions
and wages and outline our empirical strategy for quantifying its role within the broader social and
economic changes of the last 40 years.
3.3 Was This an Opt-In Revolution? The Expected Effects of Changes
in Pill Access on Women’s Lifecycle Wages
The diffusion of oral contraception, first released for the regulation of menses in 1957 and ap-
proved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration as a contraceptive in 1960, had an important
impact on younger women’s ability to time births and plan future childbearing. Women born in the
early 1940s (who would be young adults in the early 1960s) would have been the first with access
to the Pill in late adolescence when they made decisions about family formation, childbearing, and
4We cannot compare these estimates with cohorts born earlier than the mid-1940s, as the Mature Women were first
interviewed when they were between the ages of 30 and 45. Therefore, we are missing information on these older
cohorts’ labor-force participation at younger ages. For construction of these experience measures, see Appendix 3.A.
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Figure 3.2: The Evolution of Human Capital Investments by Age and Birth Cohort
Opt-In Revolution - 31 
Figure 2. e Evolution of Hu an Capital Investments by Age and Birth Cohort 
A. Share of Women Participating in the Labor Force Relative to Men 
 
B. Share of Women Working in Professional and Managerial Jobs Relative to Men 
 
Share participating in the labor force is constructed from a binary variable indicating whether the respondent 
was employed or looking for a job at the time of the survey. Job groups are coded using the 3-digit Census 
occupational codes in the CPS. Women are counted in a job category only if they are employed at the time of 
the survey. Data are weighted using CPS sample weights and collapsed into two-year age groups. Source: 
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was employed or looking for a job at ti e of the survey. Job groups are coded using the 3-digit Census
occupational codes in the CPS. Women are counted in a job category only if they are employed at the time of the
survey. Data are weighted using CPS sample weights and collapsed into two-year age groups. Source: 1964-2009
March CPS.
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career investments. They would have also been the first to gain autonomy in deciding to use con-
traception (rather than sharing it with their partners), the first to be able to make decisions about
contraception at a time separate from intercourse, and the first to benefit from the reliability and
expectation of birth predictability the Pill conferred over the entirety of their childbearing years and
early careers. Changes in expectations are key. Even women who would not have married or had a
child before age 22 without the Pill may have altered their career investments as their expectations
about future childbearing changed.
The difficulty of parsing the Pill’s effect on women’s wages relates to the timing of its appearance.
By cause or coincidence, the Pill’s diffusion coincided with important changes in norms and ideas
about women’s work and the end of the baby boom. Following Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey
(2006), our empirical strategy makes use of state-level variation within birth cohorts in “early legal
access to the Pill” (ELA), which allowed younger women to consent for medical care. As described in
Bailey (2006), most legal changes were due either to judicial expansions in the rights of legal minors
or to legislative changes that lowered the age of majority to 18. The timing of changes in ELA
differed considerably across states (the earliest change was in 1960 and the latest in 1976), but the
common feature of these laws is that they gave physicians latitude to prescribe oral contraception
to unmarried women under 21 without consulting parents (Paul, Pilpel, and Wechsler 1974, 1976).
State-by-birth cohort variation in ELA, therefore, facilitates comparisons of labor-force outcomes
for women who gained legal access to the Pill earlier (typically at their 18th birthdays) to those who
gained access at 21.
This three-year difference in access to the Pill during a formative life stage potentially affected
a host of decisions. Having access to the Pill at age 18, for instance, directly reduced the cost of
delaying childbearing and marriage to enter or stay in college.5 Even among those who did not
attend college, better fertility control reduced the cost of remaining at a job long enough to obtain a
promotion or additional training. In addition to decreasing the costs of investing, access to the Pill
at 18 may have altered the expected returns to early human capital investments. All else equal, the
same early human capital investment would yield larger expected lifetime returns if women anticipated
being in the labor force more or being more successful in achieving their career aspirations. In short,
5A lower risk of childbearing at ages 18 to 19 may have also affected when and whom women married, which could have
an independent effect on their careers (Chiappori and Oreffice 2008). Staying in college longer could allow marriage to
a more educated man and, therefore, increase a woman’s nonwage income and reduce her labor-supply (Ge 2008). On
the other hand, staying in college longer should increase a woman’s own earnings and, therefore, increase her options
outside of marriage. If this leads to greater divorce, women would have lower nonwage incomes and, therefore, tend
to work more at older ages (and younger ages, to the extent that women are risk averse and forward looking). For
both reasons, marriage delay may improve women’s career outcomes independently of fertility delay (Loughran and
Zissimopolous 2009, Miller 2011).
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earlier access to the Pill should have both reduced the costs of and increased the expected returns
to early career investments—predictions consistent with the empirical literature: Hock (2008) and
Ananat and Hungerman (forthcoming) show Pill access affected college enrollment and education;
Bailey (2006) shows that it increased women’s labor-force attachment; and Goldin and Katz (2002)
find that it increased college women’s representation in non-traditionally female professions.
This theoretical framework suggests three (potentially reinforcing) mechanisms linking ELA to
steeper wage and salary earnings profiles. First, ELA may have increased labor-force participation,
which enabled women to accumulate more labor-market experience and job- or firm-specific capital.
Thus, women with ELA would experience more rapid wage growth. We call this mechanism the
“experience mechanism.” Second, women with ELA may have shared the costs of gaining on-the-job
human capital by accepting lower initial wages but then enjoyed larger wage growth with tenure. We
call this channel the “on-the-job-investment mechanism.” Third, ELA may have increased school
enrollment and participation in training programs, which should lower wage earnings at younger
ages, and increase them following school exit. We call this channel the “formal human-capital
investment mechanism.”
Our empirical estimates of the effect of ELA on wages should be interpreted cautiously for two
reasons. The first relates to the off-setting effects of labor supply. Because ELA could increase
labor-force participation for large numbers of women thus reducing the capital-to-labor-ratio, its
effect on any one woman may be larger than its effect on an entire birth cohort, which our analysis
recovers. The magnitude of these supply-side effects depends (among other things) on the degree
of substitutability of male and female labor in production. The closer substitutes men and women
are in production, the smaller the labor-supply effect and the more likely the overall effect of ELA
on wages will be positive (due to its effect on human capital accumulation). Our analysis recovers
estimates that include this labor-supply effect, so our estimates will tend to understate the effect of
the Pill on an individual woman’s wages, especially in the shorter-run (at younger ages) before firms
adjust their capital stock.
The second reason relates to selection. Because wages are only observed for labor market par-
ticipants, the observed impact of ELA on women’s wage growth will be larger than the effect on the
average woman if the Pill differentially affects human capital investments and labor supply of higher
ability women. If, for instance, early access to the Pill causes higher ability woman to continue in
their education and makes them less likely to work in their early twenties, then the ELA-induced
growth in wages will reflect both the returns to these greater investments and changes in the compo-
sition of working women to favor those of higher ability. Our analysis explores these compositional
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effects explicitly by breaking our sample into three IQ tertiles (based upon a composite developed
from high school aptitude tests) and examining the effects of ELA for women within each of these
tertiles.
3.4 Data and Empirical Strategy for Identifying the Impact of the Pill
on Wages
Our analysis uses the rich, longitudinal data of the National Longitudinal Survey of Young
Women (NLS-YW ), which contains interviews beginning in 1968 for 5,159 women, ages 14 to 24,
with 21 subsequent interviews. Crucial is that the NLS-YW sampled women born from 1943 to
1954, cohorts that varied in their early legal access to the Pill. Although this data set is smaller
than those used in earlier studies, the restricted version contains information on the legal state of
residence for the respondents at age 21. We use residence at age 21 (which should be reported as
parents’ residence for unmarried, college women) to infer treatment status with considerably less
error than previous studies.6
The NLS-YW confers several additional advantages. It contains a rich set of pre-treatment
outcomes for testing the validity of our empirical strategy and also facilitates an analysis of hetero-
geneity in the impact of the Pill by socio-economic status and high school IQ of the respondent,
which allows us to understand the ways in which the Pill influenced the selection of women into paid
work.7 Finally, the NLS-YW provides information on women’s wage earnings in every survey year as
well as their career investments including educational attainment, job training and certification, and
labor-force participation (weeks and hours). Repeated reports of women’s labor-force participation
allows us to construct measures of their cumulative labor-force experience and link the Pill to this
important correlate of women’s wage gains.
3.4.1 Empirical Specification
Our empirical strategy follows the previous literature with several modifications. We estimate














6Restricting the sample to those with valid date of birth (cohort) and state of residence information reduces the sample
to 4354. Both Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2006) use repeated cross-sections that contain no information on
an individual’s state of residence at ages 18 to 21. As a result, Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2006) infer ELA
based upon the reported birth state or state of residence at the time of the survey respectively.
7Appendix 3.A describes the survey questions and coding of each variable.
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where Y is the outcome of interest for individual i, at age a, who was born in year c = 1943,
1944, . . . , 1953 (also referred to as “birth cohort”), and residing in state s = 1, 2, . . . , 51 at age
21. Fixed effects for state of residence,
∑51
s=2 λsDs where Ds = 1 if i resided in state s at age 21,
and single year-of-birth cohorts,
∑1953
c=1944 λcDc where Dc = 1 if i was born in year c, are included
in all specifications. The dummy variables Dg(a) are set to 1 if the respondent’s age fell into the
five-year age group, g (14-19, 20-24, . . . , or 45-49). Standard errors for all models are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.8
Early legal access to the pill, ELAcs, is equal to one if a woman born in year c would have had
access to oral contraception before age 21 in her state of residence at age 21, and interactions of
ELA with the age-group dummy variables allow its effect to vary across the lifecycle. Therefore,
the key parameters of interest, the βg terms, measure differences in the outcome of interest in age
group g between women with and without early legal access to the Pill. It is worth noting that βg
will understate the impact of early Pill access for three reasons: local compliance and enforcement
were imperfect; many young women could not have afforded the Pill even when it was legal; and
young women may have driven across state lines to obtain it.
The main modification to Bailey (2006) is that we rely upon a revised legal coding (see Appendix
3.B). This updated legal coding reduces measurement error in ELA and allows the estimation of
more precise effects over the lifecycle. Because these laws are not used elsewhere in the literature,
the following section establishes their relationship with Pill use and subjects them to validity checks
using detailed information on pre-treatment characteristics.
3.4.2 Validity of Using ELA to Identify the Impact of the Pill
One important assumption required to obtain consistent estimates of βg is that ELA is uncor-
related with the error term after conditioning on state, age-group and birth-cohort fixed effects, or
cov(ELA, η | Z) = 0, where Z captures the fixed effects in equation (3.1).
One reason that cov(ELA, η | Z) may not be zero is that ELA may not be conditionally, randomly
assigned at baseline. That is, a systematic correlation between omitted characteristics and ELA could
drive the relationship between ELA and outcomes. Because the NLS-YW contain rich information
on respondents’ backgrounds at age 14 before treatment with ELA, we test this possibility using the
8For dichotomous dependent variables, we estimate probits and report average partial effects (APEs). The standard
errors are calculated using a non-parametric bootstrap method with states as clusters (1,000 repetitions).
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following specification,







where X is a pre-treatment characteristic and other notation remains as previously described. Thus,
γ measures the residual correlation between ELA and pre-treatment characteristics that could indi-
cate correlations with other, unobserved characteristics. (This approach is akin to testing for balance
in observable characteristics in a controlled experiment.) Failure to reject γ = 0 is consistent with
conditional random assignment of early legal access to the Pill. Although the power of this test is
limited by our small sample sizes, it provides a strong validity test of the empirical strategy.
Table 3.1 reports the results of this exercise for 18 pre-treatment characteristics including a binary
variable for whether the respondent’s father was born in the U.S.; a binary variable for whether the
respondent’s father/mother worked for pay or held a professional job when she was 14 (four separate
outcomes); an occupational prestige index for the father, conditional on working; a socio-economic
status index for the respondent’s parents in 1968; a binary variable for whether the respondent
resided on a farm or in a rural area at age 14; a binary variable for whether the respondent had
access to magazines, newspapers or a library card at age 14 (three separate outcomes); a binary
variable for whether the respondent lived in a household with two parents at age 14; the number
of siblings a respondent had; the highest grade completed by father/mother by 1968 (two separate
outcomes); the number of years of schooling parents wanted the respondent to obtain when she was
age 14; the atypicality of the respondent’s mother’s job (conditional upon mother working; negative
numbers represent more atypical outcomes); and the respondent’s IQ score in high school (see
Appendix 3.A for details). Each column represents a separate, least-squares regression estimate of
γ.9 Consistent with treating ELA as conditionally, randomly assigned, only one of the 18 estimates
is statistically significant at the ten percent level—no more than expected by chance. It is also
reassuring that the pattern of correlations suggests no consistent relationship
9Linear probability models are used for binary outcomes to circumvent potential problems with disclosure. The results


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































between ELA and the pre-treatment characteristics. For instance, ELA is negatively associated
with father’s employment and with family socio-economic status, but is positively associated with
mother’s education and professional employment.
Even if ELA is conditionally, randomly assigned, another reason that cov(ELA, η | Z) may not
be zero is that ELA is packaged with other policy changes. Although the history of these legal
changes makes this unlikely, one concern is that cohorts with ELA were differentially treated with
abortion access by chance—a treatment that could have a similar effect. Although data limitations
mean that abortion access cannot be measured directly, our analysis accounts for this possibility by




















λcDc + ηiacs (3.1’),
where EAA represents “early access to abortion” and is equal to 1 if an individual resided (at age
21) in Alaska, California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, New York or Washington, states that
legalized abortion in 1970. C50 is equal to 1 for birth cohorts born in 1950 or later, because the early
legalization of abortion in 1970 could not have affected Pill use or fertility timing among 18 to 20 year-
olds before 1970 (cohorts born before 1950). It is also important to note that any cohort-invariant,
state-level differences in access to abortion will be captured in the state effects. The interaction
of EAA and C50 with age-group dummies allows the differential evolution of outcomes for state-
birth-cohort groups exposed to legal abortion in their state of residence before their 21st birthdays.
Separate interactions of EAA and C50 with ELA and age-group dummies allow early abortion
access and early access to the Pill to be complements or substitutes. Finally, cross-state travel
to obtain abortion is accounted for by inclusion of log distance to the nearest large city providing
legal abortions to out-of-state residents (Buffalo, New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, or
the District of Columbia), LnDists, for cohorts born in 1950 or later (cf. Joyce, Tan, and Zhang
2010). Therefore, the key parameters of interest, βg, measure differences in outcomes in age group
g between women with and without ELA for cohorts that did not have early access to abortion in
their home state after adjusting for cohort-level changes in cross-state travel for abortion.10
10Disclosure limitations from the Research Data Center prevent us from reporting the estimates on EAA and the ELA-
EAA interactions, although we can summarize these findings generally. We find that early abortion access does have
independent effects on many (but not all) of the outcomes we examine, of a comparable magnitude to ELA. The
coefficients on the interactions are consistent with the Pill and abortion acting as substitutes, which agrees with
Ananat and Hungerman (2012), although the estimates are seldom statistically significant. The inclusion of these
abortion controls has a negligible effect on the ELA point estimates, as can be seen by comparing estimates here to
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Finally, we test the sensitivity of our results in four alternative specifications of (3.1’): one with
linear, state-specific time trends; another with controls for Vietnam casualties11; another using only
a balanced sample of individuals (those missing information in any year or attriting are omitted);
and another using state where the respondent attended high school to match to ELA rather than
state of residence at 21.12
3.4.3 The Relevance of Early Legal Access for Pill Use
Testing the relevance of ELA for women’s use of the Pill is more difficult, because the NLS-
YW contains no information on young women’s contraceptive decisions. Goldin and Katz (2002)
examined this question with a single cross-sectional data set (1971 National Study of Young Women,
NSYW71 ) and found that ELA increased Pill use among 17 to 19 year-olds by 4 percentage points
(40 percent), but it is unclear how this evidence bears upon this analysis for two reasons. One
reason is that Goldin and Katz (2002) used a different legal coding, which means their estimates
may not generalize to the coding used in this paper. A second and more important reason is that
the single cross-section of data in the NLSY71 cannot be used to estimate the implicit first stage of
this analysis, because state and cohort fixed effects cannot be included. Key for our investigation
is that ELA increased Pill use at ages 18 to 20 after conditioning on year of birth and state fixed
effects.
The 1970 National Fertility Survey (NFS ), which asked ever-married women to recall Pill use
over the decade of the 1960s, allows us to examine this question directly for the subset of women
who were ages 18 to 21 before 1970 and women who were married by 1970. We re-estimate equation
(3.2) where X is a binary dependent variable equal to 1 if a respondent first used the birth control
pill before age a, where a = 18, 19, . . . , 22. If ELA mattered for Pill use at ages 18 to 20, we would
expect γ to be positive.
Before presenting the results, several limitations of the data should be noted. First, the sample
is restricted to ever-married women. Because women treated with early access to the Pill tended
to delay marriage (cf. Goldin and Katz 2002, Appendix Table 3.1), unmarried young women not in
the 1970 NFS may have been among those with the strongest response to ELA. This would lead our
estimates to understate the impact of ELA on Pill use. Second, the 1970 NFS provides information
those without abortion controls in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
11Using data from the National Archives on the Vietnam Conflict, the specification in equation (3.1’) is augmented with
controls for state-level casualties. These controls include state-specific annual death rates lagged one, two, and three
years; and cohort-specific, state-level death rates within two years of a woman’s date of birth.
12Due to disclosure requirements on implicit sample sizes, we cannot include all of these controls and restrictions in one
specification. More details on each specification can be found in Appendix 3.A.
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on a smaller set of cohorts and identifying variation than does the NLS-YW analysis. In order to
estimate γ using a balanced panel, the analysis restricts the sample to the birth cohorts of 1942
(age 18 in 1960) to 1948 (age 22 in 1970), which results in 1,985 observations. Implicitly, this limits
the states transitioning to ELA to Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, Ohio, and Washington. Finally,
stigma-induced underreporting of Pill use among young, unmarried women with ELA who started
systematically earlier would also lead to an understatement of the impact of ELA on Pill use.
Despite these limitations, these data provide strong evidence that ELA increased Pill use at the
appropriate ages. Panel A of Table 3.2 presents separate regressions of equation (3.2) for first Pill
use before a given age. By chance, it appears that women in the five states that transitioned to ELA
before 1968 were significantly less likely to use the Pill before age 18—a bias that works against our
finding effects.13 However, Pill use by age 18 (before age 19) was 17 percentage points higher—an
increase of roughly 140 percent over the national mean use at that age. Pill use by age 20 was 16
percentage points higher, an increase of 43 percent over the national mean. These striking differences
fall sharply to a statistically-insignificant 5 percentage points at age 21, when women without ELA
could obtain the Pill legally.14
Panel B of Table 3.2 explores heterogeneity in this effect by the community size of the primary
sampling unit. We implement this by augmenting equation (3.2) with a dummy variable for non-
metropolitan area as well as the interaction of this variable with ELA. Not surprisingly the strongest
responses to ELA occurred in metropolitan areas. Consistent with changes in ELA increasing access
to the Pill at age 18, use of the Pill in metropolitan areas with ELA was 30.4 percentage points
higher—2.5 times the national mean in metro areas. This difference was 13.7 percentage points
in less populated areas. Use of the Pill before age 21 was 26.9 percentage points, or 77 percent,
higher among women with ELA in metro areas and 12.7 percentage points, or 31 percent higher,
in non-metro areas, and these estimates are virtually unchanged with the inclusion of state linear
time trends (see Appendix Table 3.2). For metro and non-metro areas, the difference in Pill use for
women with ELA fell to 10 percentage points and 3 percentage points, respectively, by age 22, when
early access laws ceased to bind.
13The relatively small standard error for the estimate of Pill use before age 18 appears to be an artifact of heteroskedas-
ticity. When calculated under the assumption of homoskedasticity, the standard error is 0.042, rendering the estimate
statistically insignificant. We also experimented with variance estimation by clustering at the state-by-year-of-birth
level (instead of at the state level) and by using standard Huber-White methods. These alternative approaches did
not weaken our inferences for any of the other estimates.
14Although omitted here for brevity, we also find that these differences in use translated into meaningful differences in
marriage timing (cf. Goldin and Katz 2002) and age at first birth (cf. Bailey 2006, 2009): women with ELA delayed





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Stronger results in metropolitan areas are consistent with the difficulty of getting contraceptives
anonymously in small towns or rural areas (even when legal).15
Although these results provide the best evidence in the literature of the relevance of ELA, we
caution against using them as a denominator to approximate average treatment effects for Pill use
on the treated (ATT) for several reasons. First, the sample of married women and stigma about
reporting premarital Pill use may lead this analysis to understate the true effect of Pill access on
Pill use, which would inflate estimates of the treatment effect on the treated. Second, the external
validity of these results is difficult to establish. Not only was the 1970 NFS not designed to be
representative at the state level, but the estimates for the handful of states that transition to ELA
(cohorts of 1942 to 1948) during our sample period may not represent the effects for the full set of
cohorts (1943 to 1953) considered in the analysis. Finally, even if the effect of ELA on Pill use lies in
our estimated range of 16 to 19 percentage points, dividing other ELA effects by this amount yields
the ATT only if ELA has zero effect on women who did not use the Pill. That would not be the case if
the option to use the Pill affects human capital investment or if there are general equilibrium effects
or demand-side responses to Pill diffusion. For instance, as more women enter the workplace with
ELA, women in these markets who did not use the Pill may benefit from reductions in employers’
statistical discrimination. Our intention-to-treat estimates in the following section include these
general equilibrium effects, but our estimates of Pill use in the NFS do not.
3.5 Results: How the Pill Affected Women’s Lifecycle Wages
3.5.1 The Effect of the Pill on Women’s Wages
Figure 3.3 plots the effect of ELA on women’s life cycle wage earnings for four dependent variables
in each of four panels. The figure includes our baseline specification (using equation (3.1)), a
specification with abortion controls (using equation (3.1’)), and the four alternative specifications
described above. Throughout the results section, our discussion focuses on the magnitudes of our
estimates with abortion controls (3.1’), but it is important to note that the estimates from each of
the other five specifications are generally not statistically different from those in (3.1’).
15Knowing the town doctor—or knowing that your parents did—or potentially being observed by your neighbor entering
the local Planned Parenthood may have deterred many young women from seeking a prescription for the Pill—even







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Across the six specifications, samples (including and excluding nonworking women), and defini-
tions of the dependent variable, Figure 3.3 shows a consistent pattern. Women with ELA earned
less in terms of hourly and annual wages in their early twenties, but their wage and salary earnings
grew more rapidly than their counterparts as they aged.16 At ages 20 to 24, working women with
ELA earned 3 percent less in hourly terms (Table 3.3 columns 1 and 2) and 9 percent less on an
annual basis (Table 3.3 columns 3 and 4). By their early forties, women with ELA earned a statis-
tically significant premium of 5 percent hourly and 11 percent annually. This implies they earned
63 cents more per hour and roughly 2,200 dollars more per year. Notice that the annual amount is
substantially larger than the 1,300 dollars implied by the hourly increase for a full-time, full-year
worker, which is consistent with ELA also affecting labor-force participation.17 Column 5 confirms
this. Including women who did not work increases the ELA annual wage premium to 2,700 dollars
per year.
Although previous work links the diffusion of the Pill among younger, unmarried women to
increased educational attainment (Hock 2008), women’s lifecycle labor-force participation (Bailey
2006), and marital outcomes and occupational upgrading among college graduates (Goldin and
Katz 2002), none of these studies explores the implications of these changes for women’s wages,
which is this paper’s objective. The following sections extend the literature by reexamining these
mechanisms and explicitly linking them to wages. For thoroughness, we replicate previous findings
in the literature for a sample of all women and compare our findings, which are based on different
cohorts and measures of ELA, to previous estimates. In addition, we add to the literature on the
Pill’s labor-market effects by examining novel outcomes such as on-the-job training and cumulative
labor-market experience (Section 3.5.2) and by considering how the Pill changed selection into human
capital investments and paid work across ages (Section 3.5.3).
3.5.2 Mechanisms for the Pill’s Effect on Wages
Our theoretical framework provides three potentially reinforcing explanations for ELA’s effects
on wage profiles. The experience mechanism suggests that the initial increase in women’s labor-force
participation could have depressed wages at younger ages but increased wages later as these
16Although the estimates are not statistically different, it is noteworthy that using high school state rather than state
at age 21 reduces the effect of ELA on wages. This is the case because we are less likely to have information on high
school state for women who left the state for college. (Note that our estimates of college enrollment in Table 3.4 are
also much smaller for this sample.) Because women attending out-of-state colleges may have been the most able or
ambitious, it makes sense that our wages estimates are slightly smaller when we omit them.
17The annualized value of the hourly premium may also differ from the annual wages because the compensation infor-
mation represents different pay periods. Hourly wages are from the most recent job, whereas annual wage and salary






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































women accumulated labor-market experience and/or job/firm-specific capital. The on-the-job train-
ing mechanism requires no initial or longer-run differences in labor-force participation, but suggests
that workers with ELA increased their on-the-job human capital investments, which would also result
in steeper wage earnings profiles. The formal human capital investment mechanism is consistent with
women reducing their initial labor-force participation as they invested in their education or training
and then reaping the returns to these early investments when they returned to the labor market,
which would also result in steeper wage earnings profiles. Each of these explanations likely operated
to some degree in practice, so our exploration of the Pill’s labor-force participation effects here aims
to shed light on the predominant mechanism for its observed wage effects. Importantly, each of these
explanations postulates different labor-force participation and human capital investment patterns.
As a starting point, we examine the effect of ELA on women’s labor market participation at
the extensive (1 = in the labor force) and intensive margins (using “usual weekly hours” for work-
ing women) and find that women with ELA participated less in their early twenties and more in
their late twenties and thirties.18 These differences in labor-force participation resulted in different
cumulative experience profiles as shown in Figure 3.4A and column 1 of Table 3.4, which define
women’s cumulative work experience as weeks worked multiplied by usual weekly hours summed
across survey waves (see Appendix 3.A for more details). The results show that women with ELA
had worked 18 percent fewer hours by their late twenties but erased this deficit during their thirties.
By their early forties, women with ELA had amassed the equivalent of 1.15 years more of full-time,
full-year work (2,300 more hours)—an increase of over 10 percent relative to their same-aged peers
without ELA, and about 30 percent larger than the increase found by O’Neill and Polachek (1993)
between cohorts born in the mid-1930s and those born a decade later.19
18These findings are consistent with Bailey’s (2006) results using repeated cross-sections from the March CPS, but
the magnitudes in the NLS-YW are larger than in the CPS but less precisely estimated owing to significantly
smaller sample sizes. These differences in magnitude are expected because Bailey’s (2006) use of current state of
residence (rather than residence at age 21) should attenuate her results. For brevity, we omit estimates for labor-force
participation from this paper and compare our NLS-YW estimates to Bailey (2006) in this footnote. At ages 25 to 34,
women with ELA were roughly 3.8 percentage points, or 6 percent, more likely to work for pay in the NLS-YW ; Bailey
reports an almost identical estimate (3.9 percentage points for women ages 26 to 30) but her estimate is smaller at 1.6
percentage points for women ages 31 to 35. The NLS-YW also shows a larger effect in the late thirties than the CPS,
although the NLS-YW estimate is statistically insignificant. The effect of ELA on hours worked (excluding zeros) in
the NLS-YW is not as comparable, because it asks usual hours worked whereas the CPS asks the number of hours
worked in the CPS reference week. The effects at older ages are larger for usual hours worked in the NLS-YW, where
women 30 to 34 years-old worked one additional hour per week on average, 2.5 percent more than their counterparts
without ELA; 35 to 44 year-olds worked 1.3 to 1.7 additional hours, or 3.5 to 4.8 percent more. Full results are
available upon request.
19The comparison with O’Neill and Polachek is approximate, both because they analyze slightly different groups of
women and because their measure of labor market experience is different. In particular, they count years in which at
least 26 weeks were worked as a full year of experience; changes at the extensive margin or changes on the intensive










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This pattern of reduced labor-force participation is the reverse of the labor-supply shift needed to
decrease wages at younger ages. Similarly, the on-the-job training channel is also inconsistent with
early career dips in labor supply: if fewer women are working for pay, more cannot be accumulating
on-the-job training at these ages. The Pill-induced accumulation of experience is most consistent
with the formal human-capital investment channel, which postulates that ELA women used the
Pill to make more investments in formal schooling and training early in their careers and enjoyed
the returns on these investments in terms of steeper wage profiles, which also encouraged greater
labor-force attachment, as they aged.
Panels B through F of Figure 3.4 examine ELA’s effect on these more formal human capital
investments including women’s college enrollment, years of education, occupational training, and
professional occupations for the six specifications; Table 3.4 presents estimates in tabular form.
The results provide a rich picture of Pill-induced changes in women’s career investments. College
enrollment was 4.9 percentage points, or 20 percent, higher for women with ELA in their early
twenties but not at later ages (Table 3.4 column 2; Figure 3.4B).20 Their advantage in grades
completed (Table 3.4 column 3; Figure 3.4C) peaks in their late twenties, at a little more than
one quarter of a year and erodes a bit as women without ELA returned to school in their thirties.
A difference of one quarter of a year of schooling, however, persists through the early forties. In
addition to completing more formal education in their early twenties, women with ELA were 15
percent more likely to report occupational training (Table 3.4 column 4, Figure 3.4D) in their late
twenties. Although reports of occupational training remain modestly elevated for ELA women at
older ages, the estimates are not statistically different from zero.
Women’s greater human capital investments also appear in their occupational choices, which
capture both observed (more formal education) as well as unobserved career investments (such as
more career commitment or effort) (see Appendix 3.A for more information on occupational coding).
With ELA, women were 17 to 30 percent (4 to 6 percentage points) more likely to be working in a
professional or managerial job during their late twenties and thirties, respectively (Table 3.4 column
5, Figure 3.4E). Half of this increase in the late twenties, and all of it during the thirties, was due
to entry into non-traditionally female professional occupations—professions other than nursing or
teaching (Table 3.4 column 6, Figure 3.4F).
20Estimates are 30 percent larger than our baseline estimate (0.066 for a 27 percent increase) when we include controls
for Vietnam mobilization. Estimates are 50 percent smaller (0.026 for an 11 percent increase) when we use high school
state. Using high school state reduces our estimates because we are less likely to have information on high school
state for women who went out of state to college. Thus, our sample of women for whom we have high school state
disproportionately drops out-of-state college enrollees. These estimates are larger than reported in Hock’s (2008)
working paper. Using the October CPS, he finds—using a different measure of ELA—that college enrollment was
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is also interesting that differences in professional work erode with age, as female professionals with
ELA retire.21
Together, more investments in formal human capital and greater labor-market attachment con-
tributed to women’s steeper age-earnings profiles. But given ELA’s reduction in labor-supply during
women’s early twenties, the decrease in working women’s wages at those ages remains an open ques-
tion. It is also unclear to what extent changes in the composition of women investing in their human
capital and working for pay drive the increase in women’s wages at older ages. We address both
questions in the next section.
3.5.3 Heterogeneous Effects of the Pill and the Role of Workforce Composition in
Wage Growth
In addition to shifting women’s investments in their human capital, early access to the Pill may
have shifted which women pursued an education, went to graduate or professional school, and got
promoted. If higher ability women disproportionately used the Pill to make career investments with
the expectation of working longer, and thus were initially more likely to be out of the labor force,
then women working during their early twenties may have been negatively selected. As higher-ability
women entered the work force in their later twenties after having made their career investments,
their greater skills (unobserved and observed) would lead their earnings profiles to be steeper than
those of less skilled women. Moreover, less skilled women may have seen their earnings fall as their
more skilled counterparts began working. In short, access to the Pill may have altered selection into
the labor market at younger ages, which could help explain the effect of the Pill on age-earnings
profiles shown in Figure 3.3.
To examine the importance of selection, we use a composite of respondents’ performances on
aptitude tests from their high school transcripts, which was reported to the NLS-YW in 1968 and
called an “IQ score” in the documentation. IQ is available for only two-thirds of the sample, so we
divide respondents into IQ tertiles (low, middle, and high) to maintain samples sizes large enough for
disclosure.22 Equation (3.1’) is then estimated for each of the IQ tertiles separately. We also examine
heterogeneous effects of ELA by educational attainment (any versus no college) and, for education
outcomes, family background (socio-economic status tertiles of families when the respondent was
21Our estimates are larger than those found in Goldin and Katz (2002, Table 5), who use a sample of U.S. born college
graduate women ages 30 to 49 and find that the Pill increased the share in professional occupations, excluding teachers
and nurses, by 0.4 percentage point (3 percent). One reason for the difference may be that their estimate includes
women in their forties, where we find smaller effects.
22Griliches, Hall and Hausman (1978) point out that these IQ composite scores are missing “almost at random” in the
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, which is also the case in the NLS-YW. See Appendix 3.A for details on
the composite score.
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14). Whereas IQ tertile measured in high school is not affected by ELA directly (cf. Table 1),
educational attainment is (Table 3.4). The latter breakdown should be viewed as a description to
help us explore how different groups of women differentially benefitted from early access to the Pill.
Table 3.5: Heterogeneity in the Impact of Early Access to the Pill on Real Hourly Wages
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No College Some 
College 
ELA * Age 20-24 -0.670 0.580 -0.390 -0.260 -0.730 
 (0.634) (0.623) (0.444) (0.294) (0.529) 
ELA * Age 25-29 -0.190 0.980 0.460 -0.110 0.050 
 (0.580) (0.724) (0.477) (0.293) (0.518) 
ELA * Age 30-34 -0.956 1.873** 0.720 0.060 0.760 
 (0.519)* (0.759) (0.669) (0.306) (0.583) 
ELA * Age 35-39 -0.120 1.888** 0.540 -0.190 1.346** 
 (0.654) (0.794) (0.577) (0.410) (0.662) 
ELA * Age 40-44 -0.420 2.216** 0.790 0.550 1.347** 
 (0.958) (0.944) (0.632) (0.479) (0.611) 
ELA * Age 45-49 0.720 2.302** 3.046*** 0.797* 2.677*** 
 (1.043) (0.939) (1.010) (0.470) (0.907) 
Observations 10468 14165 16788 40229 21785 
Unique women 793 975 1112 2895 1456 
R-squared 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.17 0.26 
      
Mean of DV  for 20-24 5.59 6.49 7.18 5.49 7.21 
Mean of DV for 25-29 5.89 6.79 8.69 5.52 9.51 
Mean of DV for 30-34 6.59 7.19 8.94 6.18 9.74 
Mean of DV for 35-39 7.44 8.40 10.79 7.16 11.42 
Mean of DV for 40-44 8.34 9.89 12.79 8.34 13.63 
Mean of DV for 45-49 10.02 12.59 16.04 10.33 16.76 
 
This table uses a specification similar to column (1) of table 3. Each column presents estimates from a separate 
regression. Unlike table 3, this table includes zero wages in the left-hand-side variable. We cannot report 
results excluding the zeros among the separate groups for disclosure reasons, but they follow a pattern similar 
to that shown above. Columns (1) to (3) break women into thirds of the IQ distribution, and columns (4) and 
(5) divide women into no college and some college. All other notes are as in table 3. 
 
  
Notes: This table uses a specification similar to column (1) of T ble 3.3. Each column presents estimat s
from a separate regression. Unlike Table 3.3, this table includes zero wages in the left-hand-side variable. We
cannot report results excluding the zeros among the separate groups for disclosure reasons, but they follow
a pattern similar to that shown above. Columns (1) to (3) break women into thirds of the IQ distribution,
and columns (4) and (5) divide women into no college and some college. All other notes are as in Table 3.3.
Table 3.5 begins this analysis by examining the effect of ELA on women’s hourly wages by IQ
tertile and college attainment.23 Whereas ELA reduces or has no significant effect on earnings for the
lowest IQ tertile (column 1), it increases them in the middle and upper third of the IQ distribution
(columns 2 and 3) for women aged 30 to 49. Almost all of the wage gains accrued to women in the
23We note that the results in Table 3.5 are from samples that included observations with zero earnings, unlike Table
3.3, which included only observations with positive earnings. This change was unfortunately necessary for disclosure
reasons but does not affect the patterns we observe.
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middle of the IQ distribution, where the effects are largest both absolutely and relatively. For this
group, women with ELA enjoyed greater hourly wages throughout their twenties and the premium
grew to a statistically-significant 20 percent at ages 30 to 49.
It is worth noting that the estimates in this table are from a more flexible version of the regression
model that allows the state, cohort and age group fixed effects to vary by IQ group. The fact that
ELA had an effect within the middle IQ group suggests that the labor market gains described
previously are not the sole result of shifts in the composition of the workforce. Furthermore, if
the wage effects of ELA were driven by changing selection into the labor market by women with
different ability levels, we would expect the overall wage effects from models without IQ controls to
be substantially larger than those from Table 5’s models that stratify by IQ tertile. Instead, Table
3.3 and Table 3.5 imply similar average estimates (compare the ELA estimates averaged across the
three IQ tertiles in Table 3.5 to the overall population estimates in Table 3.3).24
The fact that the wage effects are strongest for women attending some college suggests that
one mechanism for these middle-IQ women was college enrollment. Although ELA conferred little
if any wage premium for women without college (column 4), women with some college (column 5)
experienced lower wages in their early twenties (perhaps as they worked at temporary jobs) but a 12-
percent wage premium in their late thirties.25 The effects for the highest IQ group are considerably
smaller and not statistically significant at any age below 44, which suggests these women may have
already been taking advantage of their educational and career opportunities without ELA. In contrast
to these positive effects, the lowest IQ women with ELA suffered a statistically significant wage
reduction of roughly 15 percent in their early thirties. Although this negative effect is consistent
with the Pill increasing crowding in jobs where lower IQ women were working or decreasing the
relative skills of lower IQ women, the estimate is not robust to the inclusion of state linear time
trends (Appendix Table 3.3). The lack of wage benefits for lower IQ women may be related to the
limited returns to human capital investments in low-skilled jobs or the absence altogether of these
women’s investments in their human capital, which we examine next.
24There are two other reasons why the averages of the estimates in Table 3.5 might differ from those in Table 3.3:
the smaller sample in Table 3.5 (excluding women with missing IQ information) and the different outcome variable
(including women with zero earnings). We further confirmed that the averages of the ability-group specific ELA
estimates are also similar to the overall estimates when the samples both include women with zero earnings: the
former tend to be smaller at younger ages but larger for women in their forties.
25It is worth noting that the estimated effects of ELA by college attainment in Tables 3.5 (for wages) and 3.7 (for
experience) may be downward biased because of compositional effects. If the marginal women who attended college
because of ELA were on average higher ability than the women with ELA and no college, but of lower average
ability than the women who attended college even without ELA, the estimated effects of ELA on average wages and
experience for each group will appear lower than the actual impact on individuals in either group.
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third of IQ 
distribution 
Middle 














ELA * Age 20-24 -0.507** 0.240 0.170 0.220 -0.140 0.200 
 (0.205) (0.198) (0.185) (0.141) (0.218) (0.316) 
ELA * Age 25-29 -0.409* 0.360 0.420** 0.480*** 0.020 0.340 
 (0.207) (0.228) (0.191) (0.147) (0.242) (0.274) 
ELA * Age 30-34 -0.431** 0.386* 0.426** 0.410*** 0.000 0.280 
 (0.206) (0.224) (0.197) (0.161) (0.246) (0.288) 
ELA * Age 35-39 -0.401** 0.437* 0.505** 0.434*** 0.080 0.270 
 (0.197) (0.220) (0.202) (0.161) (0.253) (0.309) 
ELA * Age 40-44 -0.494** 0.455* 0.449** 0.427** 0.080 0.270 
 (0.215) (0.243) (0.191) (0.175) (0.254) (0.274) 
ELA * Age 45-49 -0.380 0.330 0.584*** 0.425** 0.030 0.200 
 (0.239) (0.243) (0.207) (0.190) (0.267) (0.296) 
Observations 13538 17550 20982 25101 24538 24798 
Unique women 793 975 1112 1392 1366 1342 
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.12 0.19 0.26 
       
Mean of DV  for 20-24 11.87 12.40 13.30 10.98 12.26 13.22 
Mean of DV for 25-29 12.05 12.74 14.08 11.21 12.66 14.01 
Mean of DV for 30-34 12.28 13.02 14.39 11.53 12.94 14.35 
Mean of DV for 35-39 12.35 13.16 14.58 11.63 13.07 14.52 
Mean of DV for 40-44 12.45 13.27 14.72 11.72 13.26 14.64 
Mean of DV for 45-49 12.55 13.45 14.87 11.86 13.39 14.77 
 
This table uses the specification in column (3) of table 4. Each column presents estimates from a separate 
regression. Columns (1) to (3) break women into thirds of the IQ distribution, and columns (4) to (6) divide the 
sample into thirds of the distribution of family background characteristics. SES is available for more women than 
IQ score, so the sample sizes in columns (4)-(6) are larger. All other notes are as in table 4. 
  
Notes: This table uses the specification in column (3) of Table 3.4. Each colum presents estimates from a
s parate regression. Columns (1) to (3) br ak w men int thirds of the IQ distribution, and columns (4) to (6)
divide the sample into thirds of the distribution of family background characteristics. SES is available for more
women than IQ score, so the sample sizes in columns (4)-(6) are larger. All other notes are as in Table 3.4.
The next set of tables explores how the Pill affected human capital investments and paid work
by IQ and childhood SES. The estimates in Table 3.6, which uses highest grade completed as a
dependent variable, are roughly consistent with the pattern of ELA’s effects on wages. ELA’s effects
on education are large and positive in the middle of the IQ distribution and negative for the lowest
IQ group. (These negative effects may reflect higher IQ women crowding out lower IQ women
in colleges.) Unlike the wage estimates, however, ELA’s effects on education are also large and
statistically significant for the highest IQ tertile. By age forty, ELA’s effects for the middle and
upper IQ groups translate into a 0.4 to 0.5 year schooling advantage. The right side of the table
shows that ELA’s effects are largest for women from the lowest SES households (columns 4 through
6). Women with ELA from the most disadvantaged backgrounds attained roughly half of a year
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more education than their peers (column 4). This is a large effect, amounting to roughly one third
of the difference in grades completed between women in the low and middle SES groups.26 Although
our data do not reveal whether these effects arise at the stage of high school completion, college
admission, or class standing and persistence, it is clear that higher IQ women with access to the
Pill—especially those from disadvantaged households—were more likely to continue their educations.
Thus, ELA shifted women’s educational attainment into more of a meritocracy.
Is the heterogeneity in the Pill’s effects by IQ apparent for labor-force attachment as well? Table
3.7 uses cumulative labor-force experience to examine this question. As with education, the effect
of ELA on labor-force experience is largest for women in the middle third of the IQ distribution
and with some college. Middle IQ women (column 2) with ELA had accumulated 2,200 to 4,800
additional hours of work experience by their early thirties to late forties. Women in the highest IQ
group (column 3) with ELA also participated more, but these effects on experience are smaller and
less precise. Echoing the wage results, the effects of ELA on labor-force experience are largest for
women with some college (column 5).27
In summary, the data provide strong support that the Pill influenced which women invested
in their careers and shifted into paid work. Given the lack of labor-supply or schooling gains for
low IQ women, the Pill appears to have induced positive selection into higher education as well as
the labor market. This analysis also shows different responses to early access to the Pill across IQ
tertiles. While lower IQ women with ELA did not gain ground in terms of education or experience,
both middle and higher IQ women raised their educational attainment and those with some college
became more likely to work for pay. Interestingly, the Pill’s largest effects on work experience
accrued to women in the middle of the IQ distribution, not to the high achievers who have been the
focus of other studies. Thus, our findings highlight the different ways in which women across the IQ
distribution used the flexibility conferred by early access to the Pill to opt into paid work.28
26The effect of ELA on college enrollment among 20 to 24 year-olds for the lowest IQ group was 0.9 percentage points
(s.e. 3.6, mean 12 percent); it was 3.9 (s.e. 3.5, mean 19 percent) and 5.9 percentage points (s.e. 2.7, mean 37 percent)
for the middle and upper IQ groups, respectively. The effect of ELA on college enrollment among 20 to 24 year-olds
for the lowest SES group was 11.3 percentage points (s.e. 3.8 percentage points), an implied increase of 108 percent
(of the mean of 10.5 percent). It was 3.9 percentage points (s.e. 4.1, mean 21 percent) and 2.1 percentage points (s.e.
3.0, mean 36 percent), respectively, for the middle and upper SES groups.
27We also directly estimated the effect of ELA by IQ tertile and college attendance on (binary) labor force participation.
The heterogeneity in effects is similar: women in the middle IQ tertile in their late twenties and early thirties show the
largest increases in participation. Higher IQ women also show increased participation at these ages, but the estimates
are smaller and less precise. Women with some college show significant participation responses to ELA as well, with
significantly lower rates in their early twenties, followed by significantly higher rates over the next decade.
28Another potential mechanism for the Pill’s wage effects is its interaction with the marriage market and the size of
spousal earnings. To investigate this “marriage-market channel,” Appendix Table 3.4 examines the relationship of
ELA with both the likelihood of never having married (panel A) and the likelihood of having divorced (panel B) by IQ
group and college attendance. In almost all cases, we cannot reject that the likelihood of having married is unrelated
to ELA. In contrast, divorce rates were significantly higher for women with ELA in the lower IQ groups and among
women without any college. Women in the lowest third of the IQ distribution with ELA were almost twice as likely
to divorce (9.7 percentage points) by their late twenties (panel B, column 1). Similarly, ELA women with no college
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No College Some 
College 
ELA * Age 20-24 -1,083 409 -397 -871* -1,056* 
 (1,299) (964) (720) (499) (593) 
ELA * Age 25-29 -1,253 278 -389 -928* -920 
 (1,295) (1,043) (695) (552) (615) 
ELA * Age 30-34 -688 2,214* 654 45 862 
 (1,145) (1,150) (802) (450) (722) 
ELA * Age 35-39 -153 3,015** 1,377 346 2,045** 
 (1,371) (1,313) (872) (693) (871) 
ELA * Age 40-44 40 4,778*** 1,853* 2,095** 3,001*** 
 (1,761) (1,701) (983) (861) (1,026) 
ELA * Age 45-49 -600 3,701* 1,379 1,492 2,344* 
 (2,251) (2,242) (1,228) (1,075) (1,331) 
Observations 12469 16531 20181 47925 26150 
Unique women 790 975 1112 2898 1456 
R-squared 0.610 0.637 0.679 0.582 0.703 
      
Mean of DV  for 20-24 2533 3152 2793 2833 2432 
Mean of DV for 25-29 5160 6103 6340 5382 6516 
Mean of DV for 30-34 9558 10755 11432 9755 12104 
Mean of DV for 35-39 14822 15936 17151 14662 18106 
Mean of DV for 40-44 20975 21570 23838 20752 25111 
Mean of DV for 45-49 27775 29652 31933 27964 33133 
 
This table uses the specification in column (1) of table 4. Each column presents estimates from a separate 
regression. Columns (1) to (3) break women into thirds of the IQ distribution, and columns (4) and (5) divide 
women into no college and some college. All other notes are as in table 4.  
 
Notes: This table uses the specification in column (1) of Table 3.4. Each column presents estimates
fr m a separate regression. Colu ns (1) to (3) break women into thirds of the IQ distribution, and
colum s (4) and (5) divid w men into no college and some college. All other notes are as in Table 3.4.
3.6 Decomposing Pill-Induced Wage Gains
To quantify the contribution of each of these different human capital investments to the estimated
Pill premium in wages, we decompose women’s ELA-induced log hourly wage premium in their
late forties into five components: formal education, on-the-job training, cumulative experience,
occupational choice, and changes in marital status (that affect wages through the income of a
spouse). We present results using the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition at the mean (Blinder
1973; Oaxaca 1973) and the recentered influence function procedure (RIF) proposed in Firpo, Fortin,
and Lemieux (2009), which generalizes Blinder-Oaxaca to other quantiles. This approach has the
were almost 34 percent (4.4 percentage points) more likely to divorce. However, these effects are for the wrong groups
of women to be driving the wage effects. Although they are strong for women in the middle of the IQ distribution,
they appear for those without any college—not the middle IQ women who pursued college. In short, little evidence
points to divorce and the absence of a second earner as the explanation for the wage effects.
112
advantage of not being sensitive to the decomposition order and permits a richer characterization of
the importance of Pill-induced changes in productive characteristics at different points in the skill
distribution. To implement both procedures, we restrict the estimation sample to the last available
wage observation for each woman in the 45 to 49 age group and use women without ELA as the
reference group.
Table 3.8 quantifies how much of the difference in the log hourly wage premium of women with
ELA at various points along the wage distribution can be explained (in an accounting sense) by each
of the characteristics. Panel A reports the Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions at the mean and shows
that cumulative experience accounts for just under two-thirds of the Pill premium. Education and
occupation each account for another sixth of the gap, with both job training and marriage having
negligible effects. Together, these five factors explain over 90 percent of the ELA wage premium at
the mean.
What do our estimates imply about the returns to education and experience for women? Women
with ELA obtained 0.18 years more schooling by their late forties (Table 3.4, column 3), which
increased their wages by 0.015 log-points (Table 3.8, panel A), for an implied return of 0.083
(=0.015/0.18). If we also attribute the entire 0.014 log-point increase in wages (Table 3.8, panel
A) from occupational upgrading to schooling, the total return to women’s schooling would be 0.161
(=0.029/0.18). These estimates are both within a plausible range of Heckman, Lochner and Todd’s
(2006) 0.128 estimate of the returns to education for white men in 1990 (p. 326). For the same
group, Heckman, Lochner and Todd estimate coefficients on experience and experience squared of
0.1301 and −0.0023, respectively (Ibid). Applying these returns to experience to our estimates in-
dicates that, from an initial experience level of 15 years, that 0.57 years more experience (Table 3.4,
column 1) would increase women’s log-wages by 0.034 (0.1301 ∗ 0.57− 0.0023 ∗ (15.572 − 152)). Our
decomposition attributes more than that, 0.056 log points, to the 0.57 years of additional experience,
which is also reasonable if the returns to women’s experience are higher than the returns for men or
level off less quickly (cf. Weinberger and Kuhn 2010).
The results of the RIF procedure, shown in panel B, are consistent with the Oaxaca-Blinder
decompositions, with experience accounting for the largest share of the premium, followed by edu-
cation and occupation.29 The relative roles of experience and education-occupation, however, vary
at different points in the wage distribution.
29The decomposition results are also similar if we use the semi-parametric approach of DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux
(1996) to re-weight the characteristics of women without ELA to resemble those of women with ELA at different
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Consistent with Table 3.5’s result that the largest wage effects occur for women in the middle of the
IQ distribution, panel B shows that the total log-wage differential associated with ELA varies non-
monotonically across the distribution and is largest (0.106) at the median. Furthermore, education
and occupation explain relatively more of the wage gap (and cumulative experience relatively less)
higher in the wage distribution, which accords with the results from Table 3.7 showing stronger
cumulative experience in the middle rather than highest IQ group. At the 25th percentile the five
components explain nearly all of the wage gap while at the median they explain about 85 percent
of the gap; at the 75th percentile, they actually over-explain the gap, suggesting they may be offset
by other factors near the top of the wage distribution.
3.7 The “Opt-In” Revolution
In 2003, Lisa Belkin’s New York Times Magazine article, “The Opt-Out Revolution,” reopened
the debate about the reasons for persistent differences in women’s and men’s labor market outcomes.
In particular, she argued that the women who might have been the professional equals of men chose
not to be—these women ”opted out” to raise their children. Shang and Weinberg (2009) find some
evidence that college graduate women have begun to have more children, but these changes seem
small relative to the Opt-In Revolution that began 50 years ago.
This paper quantifies the role of the Pill in catalyzing this revolution. As the Pill provided
younger women the expectation of greater control over childbearing, women invested more in their
human capital and careers. Most affected were women in the middle of the IQ distribution and with
some college, who experienced remarkable wage gains over their lifetimes. To put our results into
perspective, the Pill-induced effects on wages amount to roughly one-third of the total wage gains
for women in their forties born from the mid-1940s to early 1950s.30 Our decomposition shows that
almost two thirds of these Pill induced gains (at the mean) can be attributed to increasing labor-
market experience and another third is due to greater educational attainment and occupational
upgrading.
What do our estimates imply about the importance of the Pill in narrowing the gender gap from
1980 to 2000? To answer this, we simulate a counterfactual hourly wage distribution from the 1980,
30This estimate is obtained by comparing the coefficients for ELA*40-44 and ELA*45-49 in Table 3.3 to the total change
in wage rates for women in their 40s between the 1943-46 and the 1951-1954 cohorts in the NLS-YW. Weinberger
and Kuhn (2010) distinguish between changing “levels,” the starting wage at labor-force entry, and “slopes,” the
growth in wages after entry, and argue that changes in “slopes” can account for one third of the narrowing in the
gender gap over the last 40 years—a number they argue provides a reasonable upper bound for the importance of all
post-schooling investments. Our measures of career investment combine both pre-market investments (e.g., college
and occupational choice, which should shift levels) and post-market investments (e.g., labor market experience and
on-the-job training, which should shift slopes).
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1990, and 2000 population censuses by removing age-specific estimates of early legal access to the Pill
from the earnings of cohorts born after 1940 (Table 3.3, column 2) and compute the actual hourly
wage distribution for men and women in 1980, 1990 and 2000.31 From 1980 to 1990, the actual
gender gap in real hourly wages for 25 to 49 year olds closed by 0.126 log points, and the simulated
gender gap closed by 0.113 log points. From 1990 to 2000, the actual gender gap in real hourly
wages closed by 0.074 log points, and the simulated gender gap closed by 0.051 log points. Our main
estimates, therefore, imply that 10 percent of the narrowing in the gender gap during the 1980s
and 31 percent during the 1990s can be attributed to early access to the Pill. While improvements
in contraception play an important role in increasing women’s earnings, our results also implicitly
highlight the importance of other factors. The unexplained component of cross-cohort changes due
to, for example, shifts in the demand for women’s labor (e.g., anti-discrimination legislation and
enforcement or changes in preferences) as well as shifts in the quality of women’s education remain
substantial.
Did the Pill unleash the Opt-In Revolution? Our results provide no conclusive answer. They may
understate the Pill’s broader influence because our empirical strategy does not allow us to explore the
effect of changes in access to the Pill beyond age 20 and fails to capture the potentially large social
multiplier effects. For instance, the Pill’s availability likely altered norms and expectations about
marriage and childbearing and firms’ decisions to hire and promote women-even among cohorts
without legal access to the Pill. Thus, the effects of the Pill may be larger than we find, though it
is not clear how much larger. Even these conservative estimates, however, suggest that the Pill’s
power to transform childbearing from probabilistic to planned shifted women’s career decisions and
compensation for decades to come.
31Real hourly wage is total wage and salary earnings of last year divided by the product of weeks worked last year and
usual hours worked per week and divided by the PCE deflator to get year 2000 dollars. The estimates use IPUMS
person weights and exclude real hourly wage outliers of less than $2 or more than $200. The sample contains native-
born women ages 25 to 49 whose wages were not imputed and who were not self-employed. The simulated log hourly
earnings values are adjusted by subtracting the estimates in column 2 of Table 3.3 for women who were born in or
after 1940 and born in a state where they would have had early access to the Pill.
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3.8 Appendices
3.8.1 Appendix 3.A: Data and Specifications
This appendix summarizes the creation of the variables used in the analysis as well as the
construction of the alternative specifications used for Figures 3.3 and 3.4. The independent variables,
including the key ELA measure, are described first, followed by the sequence of dependent or outcome
variables. (The dependent variables are available in every wave of the survey unless otherwise stated.)
Finally, each alternative specification is discussed.
Age and year of birth: Determining the age of the respondents at each survey is crucial, both in
identifying early legal access, which is age dependent, and because the effects of early legal access
are likely to vary over the lifecycle. Both age at time of interview and date of birth (month and
year) are asked in various waves of the survey; however, they are not always consistent. Date of
birth was asked in 1968, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1988 and 1991 and confirmed or corrected in 1995, 1997,
1999, 2001, and 2003. Of the 5,159 women in the sample, 94 (1.8 percent) had conflicting birth
date reports, and another 818 (15.9 percent) had only a single report. For the conflicting cases, all
available data were used to check birth reports, but, in most cases, the modal reported year and
month of birth was used.32 From the date of birth information, age at the end of each survey year
(not at the time of interview) was constructed for consistency between early and later waves.33
State of residence: The geocoded version of the NLS-YW, available at Census Research Data
Centers, contains the state of residence of each respondent for each wave of the survey. Using
respondents’ age information and variables pertaining to mover status in the public-use data, one
can construct variables for the state of residence at key ages (such as 18, 19, 20, and 21) for most
but not all respondents. In some cases, women exit the sample before they reach the key ages; in
others, women in the older cohorts who move frequently during the key ages are not observed until
they are older. Nonetheless, for each of the key ages (18 through 21), between 80 and 90 percent of
the respondents were successfully matched to a state of residence.
Early Legal Access to the Pill (ELA): By researching state laws, the authors compiled a list
of the years in which each state legally allowed unmarried women (of age 20 or younger) to have
access to the birth control pill (see Appendix 3.B: Legal Variables). Using the restricted version of
the NLS-YW, state of residence at each survey is observed and the respondents’ state of residence at
age 21 is used to generate the ELA variable. A respondent’s ELA status was coded 1 if her year of
birth plus 20 was greater than or equal to the year in which her residence state at age 21 first allowed
legal access. State of residence at age 21 rather than age 20 was used because it was identifiable for
more women (4,419 versus 4,398) and the correlation between the two was high (r = 0.94).
Early Abortion Access (EAA): Five states (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Washington, and New
York) and the District of Columbia legalized abortion in 1970, three years before Roe v. Wade. We
code a respondent as having EAA if she lived in one of the above areas at age 21 and was born
in 1950 or later; these are the cohorts of women who had legal abortion access in their states of
32The exact code is available from the authors upon request.
33The early waves sampled respondents in the early months of the year but later waves sampled respondents in later
months.
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residence before the age of 21. To address the possibility that women crossed state lines to obtain
an abortion, we also constructed a measure of the distance in miles between each state’s population
centroid in 1970 and the closest major location providing abortions in the pre-Roe period (District
of Columbia, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Buffalo, and New York City. This distance was then
transformed into its natural logarithm.
Age at first marriage: Although age at first marriage is directly asked in 1968, this is useful only
for women who had been married prior to the first interview. To determine marital ages for the
rest of the sample, three additional sources are used: (a) marital histories, (b) changes in current
marital status, and (c) timing of changes in marital status. Marital history questions are asked in
1978, 1983, 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003. In 1978 and 1983, the questions ask about up to the three
most recent marriages (including the current one); in the latter years, only the date of the most
recent marriage is asked. Current marital status is asked in every survey year. Changes in marital
status are reported in 1969 and 1970 and every survey year from 1985 onwards. We observe no first
marriage date for 809 women. This outcome is only used in Appendix Table 3.1.
Wages and salary earnings: Hourly rates of pay for the current or most recent job (measured in
cents) and annual wage and salary earnings from the previous calendar year are available for years
1968 through 1993. For 1995 through 2003, the hourly rate of pay variable is for the first (main)
job, and annual wage and salary earnings are for the previous 12 months rather than the previous
calendar year. Information on wages and salary earnings excludes farm, business, or self-employment
income. Each of the wage, earnings, and income variables is converted from nominal to 2000 dollars
using the PCE deflator and then converted to natural logarithms. Although there is no effective
top code to hourly wages, annual earnings are subject to censoring from above, with the top code
varying across years. (Generally, fewer than 2 percent of women have top-coded earnings in any
year.) In the analysis, hourly wage outliers (less than 2 or more than 100 real dollars) are excluded.
Cumulative experience: We measure cumulative work hours at the start of each calendar year
as the sum of hours of work reported since 1967. We approximate hours of work with the product
of usual weekly hours and our best estimate for the number of weeks worked each year.
We rely on three sets of questions to compute number of weeks worked. In 1968, 1969, 1975, 1977,
1980, 1982, 1985 and 1987, respondents were asked to report the number of weeks they worked in
the previous calendar year. In 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1991 and 1993, the survey
asked the number of weeks worked since the last eligible interview, regardless of whether or not that
interview took place. In 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003, they survey asked
weeks worked since the last actual interview. We combine these measures as available, being careful
to avoid double-counting. (This procedure is complicated and idiosyncratic to each survey wave; the
code used is available upon request.)
Despite our best efforts, we note that it is not possible to create a truly comprehensive measure of
weeks worked for several reasons. First, there are some gaps in coverage for which no weeks worked
questions were asked: The initial shift from calendar year to survey period leads to a small time
period (generally under 6 weeks) for which we have no measure of weeks worked. The size of this
coverage gap increases over time. For example, we miss nine to eleven months between the 1973
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interview and January 1, 1974, and the entire calendar year of 1975. Second, item non-response
for a question regarding weeks worked poses a significant problem because cumulative experience
is dependent on all past responses. It is only possible to recover cumulative experience for women
who miss an interview and are subsequently re-interviewed if the later interview asks about weeks
worked since the last actual interview.
Our main measures address these concerns with additional sample restrictions or assumptions. We
address the coverage issue by rescaling the experience measure to a base of full coverage. We
effectively assume that the fraction of weeks observed working is the same as the fraction of weeks
elapsed spent working; that is, we scale the cumulative weeks worked measure by the ratio of total
weeks elapsed to total weeks for which there is coverage. For the second problem, we exclude women
once they have an episode of an item non-response for the weeks worked question. For the third
problem, we restrict estimation to women who have a valid weeks report in every survey wave
(no missed interviews and no item non-response). None of these alternate measures, whether used
individually or all together, changes the qualitative pattern of results we find of ELA on cumulative
experience. The numbers and estimates reported in Table 3.4 apply the first and second measures
but exclude the third in the interest of maintaining a larger sample size.
College enrollment: Using questions that asked about current enrollment in an academic program
of study, as well as the highest grade completed, a respondent was coded as enrolled in college
(a binary variable) if she was enrolled and the highest grade completed was at least 12. As a
result, “college enrollment” includes all forms of academic post-secondary education but excludes
vocational/occupational training. Note that women who did not graduate from high school are
excluded (coded as missing).
Highest grade completed: The basis of these variables is the set of revised highest grade com-
pleted questions. Although the “revised” set has supposedly been cleaned and corrected of errors
found in the original highest grade completed questions, an inspection revealed that several prob-
lems remained, and these were often some form of non-monotonic progression. Five hundred thirteen
women (10.0 percent) had at least one discrepancy, but in most cases these were minor, such as a
jump up or down of one grade in a single survey wave before returning to trend. The “revised”
variables were cleaned further of likely misreports using responses from previous and later years.
Specifically, “jump” deviations that last only a single wave (in some cases, two waves) are smoothed
by replacing these values with those that occur both before and after the deviation. For example, a
woman whose highest reported grade is 12 in 1975 and 1977, 10 in 1978, and 12 in 1980 and 1982,
would have the 1978 value recoded to 12. This procedure leaves 205 women (4.0 percent) with a
non-correctable discrepancy, such as multiple, non-monotonic jumps; these respondents are flagged
and excluded from the analysis. Including these women alters the results very little.
Labor-force participation: Labor-force participation (LFP) is based on the employment status
recode (1968 through 1993) or monthly labor recode (1995 through 2003) variables. The LFP dummy
variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent is employed at the time of the survey (whether at
work or not) or unemployed, and 0 otherwise. Note that choice of specific activities in the survey
for non-labor-force participants changed between 1993 and 1995, when the NLS-YW adopted the
new CPS definitions. Results using this measure are reported in footnote 21.
119
Usual weekly hours: These variables are based on a question asking about the usual hours worked
per week at the respondent’s job. For most years, the job is defined to be either the one currently
held or the job most recently held since the last interview; however, in 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973,
1978, and 1983, the question pertains to the current job only. In these cases, another question
specifically referring to the usual hours worked at the most recent job is used to supplement the
current job question to maintain comparability: Respondents with missing values for the current job
only question are replaced with the usual hours worked from the most recent job question. Finally,
because responses in some years are top-coded at 99 hours while some are not, values above 99 are
recoded to exactly 99. This affects no more than 1 to 3 women in any year and has a negligible
impact on the estimates.
Occupational training: Although the NLS-YW asks several questions throughout the survey
waves about occupational training, the questions are not completely consistent across waves. In
1968 and again from 1980 through 2003, the survey asked whether respondents had undergone
(a) any on-the-job training since the last interview, and (b) any other occupational or vocational
training. From 1969 to 1978, however, these two different types of training were co-mingled in a single
training question. For consistency, both training types are combined into a single (binary) indicator
that captures whether the respondent underwent any form of vocational or occupational training,
on-the-job or otherwise, since the last interview. The estimation sample for training includes only
respondents who were not currently attending an academic program, because training questions
were asked only of respondents not enrolled in an academic program until 1975.
Occupation: For each wave of the survey, there is a variable containing the 3-digit Census code of
the respondent’s current or most recent job. Through 1993 the variable is for current or most recent
job; for 1995 through 2003, when the new (circa 1994) CPS definitions were used, the variable for
job 1 (the main job) is used. Unfortunately, a consistent coding is not available in the data. The
coding at the beginning of the survey is based on the 1960 scheme, and it is available through 1993.
Coding based on the 1980 scheme begins in 1980 and runs through 1999; the 1990 scheme runs from
1993 through 2001; and the 2000 scheme runs from 1995 through 2003. Thus, there is significant
overlap for several years. In the interest of creating a longer series, we aggregate the different
coding schemes by collapsing the 3-digit job codes into four groups that can be made consistent
over the entire time period. We use a coding scheme as soon as it becomes available, so we use the
1960 scheme for data years 1968 through 1978, the 1980 scheme for years 1980 through 1991, the
1990 scheme in 1993, and the 2000 scheme for years 1995 through 2003. The four groups are: all
professional and managerial jobs, non-traditionally female professional and managerial jobs, clerical
and sales jobs, and all other jobs. “All professional and managerial jobs” generally includes any 3-
digit code that falls under the “professional, technical and kindred workers” or “managers, officials,
and proprietors except farm” categories (or their equivalent) from any of the coding schemes. “Non-
traditionally female professional and managerial jobs” is a subset of the first category that excludes
the traditionally female occupations of nurses and elementary, secondary, and not elsewhere classified
(n.e.c.) teachers. “Clerical and sales jobs” includes 3-digit codes listed under the clerical or sales
categories, and “all other jobs” includes all 3-digit codes not in one the previous groups, including
craftspeople, operatives, agricultural workers, and service jobs. The complete list of 3-digit Census
job codes to our four groups by coding scheme is available by request. For the analysis in Table 3.4,
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a woman must be currently employed to be counted in one of the four job groups; if she reported a
3-digit code in the survey but also reports not being currently employed, we code her as a zero in
all four job categories.
IQ and Childhood Family Socioeconomic Status: The 1968 wave of the NLS-YW included
a questionnaire for the high schools of the respondents, which in addition to asking about school
characteristics also asked for the most recent intelligence or aptitude test of the respondent. Scores
were reported for 3,530 of the respondents (though almost none for respondents born in 1953).
(Griliches, Hall and Hausman (1978) provide an assessment of whether scores are missing at random
in the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, the nearly identical survey for men, and conclude
that they very nearly are.) The agency that processed the NLS-YW, the Center for Human Resource
Research (CHRR), converted these scores from various tests composites to a unified “IQ score”
based on a normally-distributed national population with mean 100 and standard deviation 15.
(More information on this procedure can be found at http://jenni.uchicago.edu/evo-earn/IQ.pdf.)
Based on this distribution and the unified score, a respondent was also classified into an IQ quantile
and stanine. Using information from the initial survey wave on father’s occupation and education,
mother’s education, eldest sibling’s education, and availability of reading material at home, CHRR
also constructed a summary family socioeconomic status variable to follow a normal distribution
with mean 100 and standard deviation 30. Our analysis breaks these measures into tertiles.
Attrition: In most cases, the empirical analysis has made no attempt to restrict the sample to
non-attriters. The decision to exploit every person-year observation was made in order to maximize
sample size. One of our sensitivity checks, reported in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, shows that findings based
upon a balanced panel of individuals are very similar to those reported in the paper. In addition,
regressions, available upon request, show no correlation between each year’s interview status and
ELA.
Variables Used in Table 3.1 Balancing Tests
1. Father worked for pay: binary variable equal to one if a respondent’s father worked for pay
when respondent was 14. About 93 percent of the sample had a father working for pay at age
14. (Note: This is not conditional on having a father in the HH).
2. Father held professional job: binary variable equal to one if a respondent’s father had a
“professional” job when respondent was 14. “Professional” has the same coding as in the main
results, based on 1960 occupational definitions. About 20 percent of the sample had a father
working in a professional job. (Note: This is conditional on having had a father working at
age 14).
3. Mother worked for pay: binary variable equal to one if a respondent’s mother worked for
pay when respondent was 14. This was not asked of respondents who lived with their mother
as the sole parent. About 39 percent of the effective sample had a mother working for pay at
age 14. (Note: This is conditional on having a father (or other male adult) in the HH).
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4. Mother held professional job: binary variable equal to one if a respondent’s mother had a
“professional” job when respondent was 14. “Professional” has the same coding as in the main
results, based on 1960 occupational definitions. About 13 percent of the sample had a mother
working in a professional job. (Note: This is conditional on having had a mother working at
age 14).
5. Duncan index of household head: Duncan index socioeconomic job score of head of
household when respondent was age 14, as created by CHRR in the data. Values are conditional
on the head (not necessarily father) working when respondent was 14. (The scale runs from 3
to 97).
6. , Socio-economic status: socioeconomic index of respondent’s parents in 1968, as provided
in the data. Based on father’s occupation and education, mother’s education, eldest sibling’s
education, and availability of reading material at home. By construction, SES is distributed
N(100,900).
7. Magazines in home: binary variable equal to one if a respondent had magazines available
at home when she was age 14. About 64 percent of the sample did.
8. Newspapers in home: binary variable equal to one if a respondent had newspapers available
at home when she was age 14. About 83 percent of the sample did.
9. Respondent held library card: binary variable equal to one if a respondent had a library
card when she was age 14. About 70 percent of the sample did.
10. Two-parent household: binary variable equal to one if a respondent lived in a household
with two parents (including step-parents) at age 14. About 80 percent of the sample lived
with two parents at age 14.
11. Number of siblings: number of siblings of respondent in 1968 (not necessarily in the house-
hold); we can’t reliably determine whether this includes step- and half-siblings.
12. Father born in U.S.: binary variable equal to one if a respondent’s father was born in
U.S./Canada. About 96 percent of sample had the father born in U.S./Canada.
13. Highest grade completed by father: highest grade completed by father, in 1968. Condi-
tional on having a father in household. Item non-response is relatively high; ELA, however, is
uncorrelated with whether father’s HGC is observed.
14. Highest grade completed by mother: highest grade completed by mother, in 1968. Con-
ditional on having a mother in household. Item non-response is relatively high; ELA, however,
is uncorrelated with whether mother’s HGC is observed.
15. Parents’ education goals for respondent: number of years of schooling respondent’s
parents want respondent to obtain, when respondent was 14.
16. Atypicality index of mother’s job: atypicality index of respondent’s mother’s job when
respondent was 14, conditional on respondent’s mother working then. Atypicality index is the
female percentage of an occupation minus the percent of the experienced civilian labor force
that was female in 1970; negative numbers indicate more atypical occupations.
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17. Respondent’s IQ score: continuous IQ score of respondent. Reference distribution is inde-
pendent national norm, not empirical sample. Only two-thirds of entire sample had an IQ or
achievement test administered; while these two-thirds were slightly above national norms, the
presence of an IQ score is uncorrelated with ELA.
18. Rural residence: binary variable equal to one if a respondent resided on a farm/ranch or in
another rural area at age 14. About 26 percent of the sample lived in a rural area at age 14.
Alternative Specifications
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 include six specifications: one following equation (3.1) called our baseline
specification, one following equation (3.1’) that augments our baseline specification with abortion
controls, and four alternative specifications of (3.1’) described below. Tabular presentation of esti-
mates from equation (3.1’) are presented as the main tables of the paper.
Linear state-specific time trends: The specification in equation (3.1’) is augmented with the
interactions of each state of residence dummy with the year of observation.
Vietnam casualties: Using data from the National Archives on the Vietnam Conflict (http:
//www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/electronic-records.html), the speci-
fication in equation (3.1’) is augmented with controls for state-level casualties. These controls include
state-specific annual death rates lagged one, two, and three years; and cohort-specific, state-level
death rates within two years of a woman’s date of birth.
Balanced panel: The specification in equation (3.1’) is estimated on a sample that is restricted to
women who are interviewed in every survey wave from 1968 through 2003 and successfully answer
all relevant questions (no item non-response).
High school state: This specification uses state of residence during high school (rather than at age
21) for all state-based variables. Like state of residence at age 21, this variable is created using each
wave’s state of residence, move histories, and tenure at current residence. Because older cohorts are
father removed from high school age, they are less likely to be successfully matched, particularly
if they moved frequently. (While this problem exists for state of residence at age 21, it is more
pronounced for high school state.)
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3.8.2 Appendix 3.B: Legal Coding
The coding used in this paper relies upon the updated coding of Bailey and Guldi (2009) and
differs from the coding used in Bailey (2006) for 15 states. These differences in coding reflect two
main changes: (1) Non-specific female age of majority statutes are not treated as emancipation for
the purpose of consenting for medical care unless this is specifically noted in the statute. As a result,
the coding changes in 4 states. (2) Statutes were interpreted incorrectly, enforcement was ambiguous,
or earlier statutes, policy changes or attorney general decisions were found. These changes affected
coding in 11 states; in six of these cases, the date of legal change shifts by only one or two years.
These legal changes are summarized in the table below, and then the explanation of each of the
changes is discussed in detail, including legal citations by state.
Dates of Legal Change Granting Early Access to the Pill












District of Columbia 1971 1971
Florida 1974 1974
Georgia 1968 1968
Hawaii 1970 1972 X TFP → AOM
Idaho 1963 1972 X FAOM → AOM
Illinois 1973* 1969
Indiana 1973 1973
Iowa 1973 1972 X Earlier AOM
Kansas 1970 1970
Kentucky 1968 1965/68? X Ambiguous
Louisiana 1972 1972
Maine 1971 1969 X Earlier AOM
Maryland 1967 1971 X TFP → MM
Massachusetts 1974 1974
Michigan 1972 1972
Minnesota 1973 1972 X Earlier AGD
Mississippi 1966 1966




Nevada 1969 1973 X FAOM → AOM
New Hampshire 1971 1971
New Jersey 1973 1973
New Mexico 1971 1971
New York 1971 1971
North Carolina 1971 1971
North Dakota 1972 1972
Ohio 1965 1960 X MM
Oklahoma 1966 1972 X FP → AOM
Oregon 1971 1971
Pennsylvania 1971 1970 X Earlier MM
Rhode Island 1972 1972
South Carolina 1972 1972
South Dakota 1972 1972
Tennessee 1971 1971
Texas 1974 1974
Utah 1962 1975 X FAOM → AOM
Vermont 1972 1972
Virginia 1971 1971
Washington 1971 1968 X AOM → FP
West Virginia 1972 1972
Wisconsin 1973 1972 X Earlier AOM
Wyoming 1969 1969
Differences in coding 15
Notes: Legal change is coded as the earliest date, at which an unmarried, childless women under age 21 could
legally consent for medical treatment without parental or spousal consent. A full legal appendix and scans of
statutes are available from Bailey and Guldi (2009). FAOM→ AOM: lower female age of majority changed to the
legal majority for men and women for all purposes. FP → AOM: family planning law changed to age of majority
law; AOM → FP indicates the reverse. TFP → AOM/MM: erroneously coded treatment for pregnancy statute
changed to be the date for the change in legal age of majority/mature minor doctrine. Earlier AGD/AOM/MM
indicates that an earlier attorney general decision/age of majority/mature minor doctrine was located. *Illinois
is a typo in the published version of Bailey (2006) that the author did not catch before publication. The correct
coding and the coding used in her analysis is 1969. See below for more details.
Arkansas: Bailey (2006) coded the 1948 Arkansas statute that stipulated that females over 18
were of the age of majority [AR Code §9-25-101 (1987), AR Stat. Ann. §57-103 (1947)], but it
is unclear that this law treated women as legal adults except for marriage. Effective July, 1973,
Arkansas passed a law allowing pregnant minors of any age to consent to medical care other than
abortion (Merz et al. 1995: footnote 150; Acts 1973, No. 32, §1, p.1028). The law provided that any
female could consent to medical treatment or procedures “for herself when in given [sic.] connection
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with pregnancy or childbirth, except the unnatural interruption of a pregnancy” [AR R.S. §82-
363 (1976)]. The statute goes on to grant the power of consent to “any unemancipated minor of
sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or
medical treatment or procedures” [ibid.]. Bailey and Guldi (2009), therefore, code a mature minor
doctrine as of 1973.
Hawaii: Bailey (2006) erroneously codes a “treatment for pregnancy” statute as a mature minor
doctrine: “The consent to the provision of medical care and services by public and private hospitals
or public and private clinics, or the performance of medical care and services by a physician licensed
to practice medicine, when executed by a female minor who is or professes to be pregnant” [HI Rev.
Stat. §577A-2 (1999), L. 1968, c. 58]. Under this law, only minors professing to be pregnant or
having a venereal disease could consent to “medical care,” defined as “the diagnosis, examination
and administration of medication in the treatment of venereal diseases and pregnancy” [L. 1968,
c. 58, §4]. This law did not permit non-pregnant teens to be treated or prescribed contraception
legally. Bailey and Guldi (2009) code the legal change in the age of majority, effective March 28,
1972, which lowered the age of majority to 18.
Idaho: Bailey (2006) codes a female age of majority statute [ID Code Ann. §31-101 (1932)], but it
is unclear whether consent to contraception would have been covered under this statute. Bailey and
Guldi (2009) found a 1972 amendment that equalized the ages of majority for males and females at
18 and extended this majority for all purposes [ID Code §32-101 (1983); am. 1972, ch. 117, S1, p.
233].
Iowa: Bailey (2006) codes the change in the legal age of majority to 18 in 1973. Bailey and Guldi
(2009) located and code an earlier change in the legal age of majority from 21 to 19 in 1972 [IA
Code Ann. §599.1 (1954), Acts 1972 (64 G.A.) ch. 1027, §49; Acts 1973 (65 G.A.) ch. 140, §49].
Kentucky: Bailey and Guldi (2009) codes a law, effective January 1, 1965, that lowered the legal
age of majority “for all purposes” in Kentucky to 18 [KY R.S. §2.015 (1967), enacted Acts 1964,
ch. 21, §1]. Because this Council of State Governments publication in 1973 noted that this 1965
had law prompted “a good deal of confusion [about the exact privileges granted to those 18 and
older] and four years later [a] clarifying statute was passed” [1972: pp.12-3], Bailey (2006) codes
the 1968 amendment to the age of majority statute that included the clause “all other statutes to
the contrary notwithstanding” [KY Acts ch. 100, §1, approved March 25, 1968] that clarified the
interpretation of the statute.
Maine: Bailey (2006) codes a change in the legal age of majority passed in 1971 which lowered the
legal age of majority to 18 [1 M.R.S.A. §73 (1979); 1969, c. 433 §8; 1971 c. 598, §8]. Bailey and
Guldi (2009) located an earlier statutory change in the age of majority, effective October 1, 1969,
which lowered the legal age of majority in Maine from 21 to 20.
Maryland: Bailey (2006) erroneously codes a “treatment for pregnancy” statute based upon Merz
et al. (1995: footnote 388), which notes that minors could consent to medical treatment for “alcohol
and drug abuse, venereal diseases, pregnancy, contraception other than sterilization, and in cases of
rape or sexual abuse” since June 1, 1967. However, the specific language relating to contraception
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was not added until 1971. The original statute, effective June 1, 1967, restricted the law to “apply
. . . to minors who profess to be in need of hospital or clinical care or services or medical or surgical
care or services to be provided by a physician licensed to practice medicine, whether because of
suspected pregnancy or venereal disease, regardless of whether such professed suspicions of pregnancy
or venereal disease are, or are not subsequently substantiated on a medical basis” [MD Laws 1967 ch.
468]. Therefore, Bailey and Guldi (2009) code the 1971 revision to the 1967 statute that eliminated
the restriction to pregnant minors or minors suspected to be pregnant.
Minnesota: Bailey (2006) codes the change in the age of majority to 18 effective June 1, 1973
[Minn. Stat. §518.54(2) (1990)]. One year prior to the change in the age of majority, on May 27,
1971, a series of statutes concerning the consent to medical care of minors became effective. One
section provides for an extension of the rights of emancipated minors [MN Stat. Ann. §144.341
(1989); see also CA Civil Code §34.6 (1982)]. Although ambiguous in their applicability to consent
for birth control, a 1972 Attorney General decision interpreted these statutes as “not making it
a crime for physicians to furnish birth control devices to minors” [From LexisNexis Academic:
Minn. Stat. §144.341-144.347, 617.251 (1971), No. 494-b-39, 1972 Minn. AG LEXIS 35]. The
interpretation of these statutes remained in dispute for some time; they were again challenged in
Maley v. Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. Cir. Case No. 37769 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Third Jud.
Dist., Jan. 5, 1976). In this case, six couples filed a class action lawsuit, seeking to prevent Planned
Parenthood from providing contraceptive services to unemancipated minors without parental consent
(Paul, Pilpel and Wechsler, 1974; http://www.popline.org/docs/730457). However, the Minnesota
District Court upheld the constitutionality of sections 144.343 and 144.344, writing that “under
these sections Planned Parenthood could provide minors with contraceptive information and services
without parental consent, unless a parent specifically notifies Planned Parenthood that he/she does
not wish his/her child to receive such services” (DHEW 1978, p.244).34 This decision, therefore,
reinforced the attorney general’s broad interpretation of the statute. Legally, Planned Parenthood
could provide contraceptives to unmarried minors as long as they had not been explicitly informed
by parents. Bailey and Guldi (2009), therefore, revise the coding to reflect the 1972 attorney general
decision.
Missouri: Bailey (2006) coded the Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth decision
[428 U.S. 52 (1976)], in which the Supreme Court ruled that the state could not prohibit minors
from obtaining abortions and, by extension, contraception. Bailey and Guldi (2009) located an
earlier Attorney General decision issued in March of 1973 stating that “no law prohibits physicians
from prescribing contraceptives to minors who do not have parental consent or who have not been
emancipated by marriage or other means” [DHEW 1978, p. 253, citing Op. Atty. Gen. 3/9/1973].
Nevada: Bailey (2006) codes a 1969 lower female age of majority statute, but this statute was in
effect since at least 1930 and applied only to women’s ability to enter into contracts [NV C.L. §300
(1930); NV R.S. §129.010 (1963); see also DHEW 1974, p. 236]. Bailey and Guldi (2009) code a
1973 amendment to the age of majority statute which equalized the ages of majority for males and
females at 18 [N.R.S. §129.010 (2003); 1973, p. 1578].
34Though the final Maley ruling was not issued until 1976, according to Paul, Pilpel and Wechsler (1974), the district
court came to the same conclusion during a preliminary stage of the case in 1973.
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Ohio: Ohio courts adopted a mature minor doctrine as early as 1956. The Lacey v. Laird [166 Ohio
St. 12, 139 N.E. 2d 25 (1956)] opinion states:
A charge that this 18-year-old plaintiff [who had nose surgery when she was 18 without
her parents’ consent] could not consent to what the jury could have found was only a
simple operation, would seem inconsistent with the conclusion of our General Assembly,
that any female child of 16 can prevent the taking of liberties with her person from being
raped merely by consenting thereto at the time such liberties are taken.My conclusion is
that performance of a surgical operation upon an 18-year-old girl with her consent will
ordinarily not amount to an assault and battery for which damages may be recoverable
even though the consent of such girl’s parents or guardian has not been secured [139
N.E. 2d at 34].
Legal interpretations held that minors could consent to minor surgery and general medical care
under this decision (DHEW 1974: 265), but Ohio also had an anti-obscenity statute. Ohio’s statute
originally passed in 1885 and banned the dissemination of information and supplies relating to
contraception. The words “for the prevention of conception” were removed from Ohio’s statute in
1965, so Bailey (2006) coded 1965 as the earliest date that an unmarried minor could obtain the Pill
legally. However, Ohio’s statute went on to note that “nothing in this section [about contraception
and obscenity] or the next two sections shall be construed to affect teaching in regularly chartered
medical colleges, or the publication of standard medical books, or the practice of regular practitioners
of medicine, or druggists in their legitimate business” [OH R.S. 7027 (1896)] [April 30, 1885: 82
v. 184]. It is not clear how to interpret this physician and pharmacist exceptions, which makes it
unclear whether to code Ohio as 1960, when the Pill was introduced (this assumes that the obscenity
statute was not binding for physicians), or 1965, when the law was amended to omit language about
contraception (this assumes the obscenity statute was binding for physicians).
Oklahoma: Bailey (2006) coded a family planning statute [OK Stat. Ann. Tit. 63 Ch. 32, §2071-5
(1984)]. Although no explicit eligibility requirements are stated in the statutes, the Department of
Health Education and Welfare (DHEW) contacted the state about their policy and reported that,
“[a]ll categories of adults apparently are eligible for family planning services; no exclusions were
noted in the CFPPD survey and none appear in the written policies. According to the Division of
Maternal and Child Health’s Guidelines for Family Planning Programs, ‘minors may be accepted
for services if: 1) ever married or ever pregnant; 2) bearing acceptable proof of impending marriage;
3) accompanied by parent or guardian requesting services; 4) referred by a recognized agency, a
doctor, a nurse, or a clergyman’. . . [However,] contraceptive advice may be given in all cases where
the ‘health needs of the patient make it advisable. . . ”’ (1974, p.271). Because these policies only
allow legal minors who are pregnant to obtain contraceptive advice, Bailey and Guldi (2009) code
the change in the legal age of majority which was amended and effective in August 1, 1972, which
equalized the ages of majority for men and women at 18 [OK Stat. Ann. Tit. 15 §13 (1972); L.
1972, c. 221, §1].
Pennsylvania: Bailey (2006) coded a mature minor doctrine effective in 1971, but Bailey and Guldi
(2009) located an earlier mature minor statute, enacted on February 13, 1970 and effective in April
1970, that allowed any minor 18 or over to consent to medical care: “Any minor who is eighteen
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years of age or older. . . may give effective consent to medical, dental and health services for himself
or herself, and the consent of no other person shall be necessary” [PA Stat. tit. 35, §10101 (1977)].
Utah: Bailey (2006) coded the lower age of female majority, but this statute’s application was
unclear with respect to medical care. Policy documents indicate there was considerable ambiguity
regarding whether physicians could prescribe birth control to unmarried women under age 21. On
July 21, 1971, the Attorney General advised “not to provide family planning information or services
to minors without parental consent ‘until such time as the state legislature may adopt appropriate
legislation.’ . . . In support of this view the Attorney General cites the common law requirement of
parental consent in the absence of an emergency, plus the expression of legislative intent inferred
from the statute dealing with prophylactics. . . ” (DHEW 1974: 300 citing Op. Atty. Gen. No.
71-017, July 21 1971). Bailey and Guldi (2009), therefore, code the amendment to this statute in
1975 to make both men and women legal adults at the age of 18 for all purposes [L. 1975, ch. 39,
§1, approved March 24, 1975].
Washington: Bailey (2006) codes the legal age of majority ”for all purposes” which changed from
21 to 18 in 1971. Bailey and Guldi (2009) located an earlier policy change and code 1968, because
a Washington Board of Health Policy directed that all persons were eligible for family planning
without parental consent, including never-pregnant, never-married minors [WAC248-128-001 for
Board of Health policy adopted August 3, 1967, codified July 1, 1968].
Wisconsin: Bailey (2006) erroneously coded the date of 1973 as the year the legal change in age
of majority to 18 became effective [WI Laws 1971, ch. 213; see also DHEW (1978: 363)]. In fact,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 3.3: Heterogeneity in Real Hourly Wage Growth: State Linear Time Trends
 
Opt-In Revolution Appendix C: Additional Estimates and Sensitivity Checks – 12 
Table C5B. Heterogeneity in the Growth of Real Hourly Wages: State Linear Time Trends  
 












No College Some 
College 
ELA * Age 20-24 -1.283** 0.380 -0.610 -0.621** -0.907* 
 (0.631) (0.590) (0.491) (0.266) (0.493) 
ELA * Age 25-29 -0.530 0.780 0.240 -0.350 -0.190 
 (0.558) (0.716) (0.491) (0.257) (0.510) 
ELA * Age 30-34 -0.800 1.868** 0.700 0.100 0.760 
 (0.558) (0.761) (0.687) (0.303) (0.625) 
ELA * Age 35-39 0.450 2.040** 0.740 0.120 1.610** 
 (0.745) (0.810) (0.623) (0.409) (0.735) 
ELA * Age 40-44 0.520 2.477** 1.080 1.042** 1.691** 
 (1.108) (0.935) (0.704) (0.470) (0.710) 
ELA * Age 45-49 2.121* 2.625** 3.507*** 1.524*** 3.184*** 
 (1.204) (0.980) (1.067) (0.445) (0.891) 
Observations 10468 14165 16788 40229 21785 
Unique women 793 975 1112 2895 1456 
R-squared 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.19 0.28 
Mean of DV for 20-24 5.59 6.49 7.18 5.49 7.21 
Mean of DV for 25-29 5.89 6.79 8.69 5.52 9.51 
Mean of DV for 30-34 6.59 7.19 8.94 6.18 9.74 
Mean of DV for 35-39 7.44 8.40 10.79 7.16 11.42 
Mean of DV for 40-44 8.34 9.89 12.79 8.34 13.63 
Mean of DV for 45-49 10.02 12.59 16.04 10.33 16.76 
 
See table 5. The estimates here include state linear time trends. 
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